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Abstract 
 
Globally, Tuberculosis remains a devastating disease, despite the availability of 
treatment. The disease is associated with poverty, and those with the disease incur a high 
cost of accessing care, while simultaneously experiencing income loss due to a loss in 
productivity. A key challenge in TB programmes remains the accurate diagnosis of the 
disease, especially in people who are HIV positive. Diagnosing TB can be very resource 
intensive and the accuracy of diagnosis is dependent on a range of disease, health service 
organisation and provider behaviour factors. This thesis seeks to enhance understanding 
of how the behaviour of healthcare workers mediates the value of TB diagnostic 
algorithms, and how this may affect the costs, outcomes as well as the economic burden 
associated with the disease in South Africa. The work presented is based on empirical 
work done alongside a pragmatic cluster randomized control trial.  Empirically, it 
examines the longitudinal economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment in South 
Africa. The discrepancies between the time at which patients incur the greatest cost and 
income loss, and the available social protection are highlighted. Based on empirical work, 
a purpose-built state-transition mathematical model of TB diagnosis and treatment was 
developed to estimate the cost-effectiveness, from the perspective of the health service 
and the patient, of health systems interventions to strengthen TB diagnosis. Recognising 
healthcare workers as those who ultimately express policies, the behaviour of healthcare 
workers was included in the cost-effectiveness analysis by 1) using data from a pragmatic 
trial reflecting routine practice and clinical decision-making at the time of the study; 2) 
developing a conceptual framework of the relationship between behaviour at decision 
points and disease outcomes; and 3) investigating how these interactions may influence 
the value of the diagnostic algorithm. Possible public policy levers to improve TB 
diagnosis in healthcare facilities, as well as the potential mediators of costs and effects 
were explored.  The thesis concludes with recommendations for further methodological 
work to expand on the approach explored in this thesis to improve how heterogeneity in 
estimates of cost-effectiveness is presented to decision-makers.   
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 “We make no apologies for making these excursions into other 
fields, because the separation of fields, as we have emphasized, 
is merely a human convenience, and an unnatural thing. Nature 
is not interested in our separations, and many of the interesting 
phenomena bridge the gaps between fields.” 
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Preface 
 
In 2006, as a newly graduated pharmacist, I was required to work in a public health 
facility in South Africa for one year before being allowed to register as a qualified 
pharmacist. The clinic that I was assigned to, was situated within a farming community 
in the Western Cape of South Africa. On my first day, I was given the keys to ‘my’ 
dispensary, opened the door and was met by a staggering pile of brown patient folders, 
all with prescriptions waiting to be dispensed. While I had arrived at 8am, patients had 
arrived well before 6am to claim a place in the queue for when the clinic doors opened at 
7am. Upon opening the pharmacy hatch, a sea of faces was looking back me, impatiently 
awaiting their medicine as a last step in a long process, hurriedly on their way to work. I 
was rapidly initiated into the process, the never-ending paracetamol prescriptions for 
pain-related conditions that required a much more holistic approach; the delays between 
ordering medicine and its eventual arrival at the clinic; the need to split packets of 
medicine between patients to make the available stock stretch in the face of impending 
stockouts, triggering earlier repeat visits for patients. But what I also developed great 
admiration for, was the resourcefulness and resilience of staff at public health facilities, 
where a plan could be made around a lack of key resources, and where nurses would stop 
by the pharmacy to lend a helping hand at the end of their day. I observed how staff would 
reorganise the way the clinic provides services, to reduce waiting times, consolidate staff 
workload and improve patient satisfaction, where possible. It was a world, far removed 
from the spaces where neat, tidy and linear policies were drafted.  
 
By the end of that year, I had learnt a great deal about the complexities of health service 
provision, the resilience of staff and how inexorably the clinic functions as part of the 
community. Some of my experiences during that year, led to a series of research questions 
on possible models for providing pharmaceutical care. Given my work as a pharmacist 
in the district, I was invited to share my research findings at meetings with district 
management and with the pharmacists and nurses working in the district. These meetings 
allowed a bidirectional dialogue, with me presenting the experiences of patients. This 
was followed by collective discussions on how to reorganise services to improve patient 
outcomes in a manner that would be sustainable in each of the clinics, given constrained 
resources. Those experiences taught me the importance of the daily discretionary 
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decisions made by healthcare workers. More broadly, it highlighted decision-making at 
the district level, where managers must decide on how services are organised with what 
is available, while attempting to comply with a myriad performance measures set by 
provincial and national government often at the whim of a global community.  
 
The dynamics of the decisions faced by these frontline decision-makers, and how the 
actions taken as a result of these decisions influence population-level outcomes 
(including the financial burden on the patient) are often discounted. However, it is these 
decisions, at the very heartbeat of the health system, that ultimately amends the 
effectiveness of policies (both positively and negatively) and an understanding of this 
complexity is crucial to decision-making in decentralised health systems. It was only 
later, that I discovered the works of the political theorist, Lipsky who wrote about street-
level bureaucrats and how the values and practices of those who implement policies, 
fundamentally change the direction and vision of the policy. Similarly, Ostrom 
introduced the idea of public entrepreneurship to describe how individuals (or groups) 
organise public institutions to provide goods and services. She noted that the capacity in 
a system to engage in public entrepreneurship is political, and that the ability to do so is 
enabled and constrained by a set of formal and informal rules. The drivers of behaviour 
and motivation of public entrepreneurs are complex, as they have access to more 
resources than entrepreneurs in the private sector but are also more constrained by 
bureaucratic institutional structures. My understanding of the relationship between the 
actions of actors and how they are dictated by institutional structures was enriched by the 
work of the social theorist, Coleman who studied the intersection between micro - and 
macro-level interactions. The work of these scholars would give language to, and deeper 
understanding of my experiences working in the public sector and would go on to shape 
the work that culminated in this thesis.  
 





Globally, Tuberculosis (TB) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) remain leading 
causes of premature mortality in high-burden countries, including South Africa. TB has 
been found to be associated with poverty, malnutrition and cigarette smoking (1–4). In 
an analysis of longitudinal household survey data in South Africa, Ataguba et al (2011) 
found that the poorest 40% of the population accounted for 65% of the TB disease burden 
(5). It has been observed that TB epidemics worsen in societies with failing public service 
capacity (6); and that identifying people with active TB and initiating treatment as early 
as possible is crucial to reducing transmission and achieving TB control. Within a global 
priority setting framework of working towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC), and 
given the unlimited need for healthcare, to be met with limited resources, there is an ever-
increasing emphasis on comparing the value of investments in health care, to optimise 
the use of scarce resources and to strategically plan resource allocation (7).  
 
Historically, decision-making for public policy has often focused on technical solutions, 
such as drugs and diagnostics, and this has also been a feature of the global TB control 
agenda (8–10). However, there is a growing recognition that solely technical solutions 
do not produce the population-level effectiveness initially predicted (11–14). The 
implementation of XPert MTB/RIF, a novel TB diagnostic was an example of this gap 
between expected and observed population-level effectiveness (15). The test was initially 
lauded for its improved ability (compared to smear microscopy) to detect TB especially 
in HIV positive patients, which was thought to potentially reduce TB-associated 
mortality. It is hypothesised that the reasons for the differences between the outcomes of 
single technical interventions and the implemented public policy, can be ascribed to the 
way in which these interventions are communicated to those who interact with the 
beneficiaries as well as how they interact with other investments  (13,16–19).  When 
conducting cost-effectiveness analyses alongside clinical trials that are evaluating the 
potential cost and impact of technical solution, behaviour and resource constraints in the 
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context are controlled to various degrees depending on the study design (16). To provide 
a more accurate understanding of what the population-level effectiveness and resource 
use may be, there is a need to understand 1) how resources will be made available to 
support the intervention and 2) how health care workers as agents in the health system 
may respond to the introduction of the intervention to ensure that resource allocation is 
optimised.  
 
Economic evaluation represents a set of analytic approaches to evaluate the value of 
public policy investments, whereby the incremental costs and outcomes of investment 
options are compared (20). These analytical approaches typically fit into a broader 
explicit or implicit decision-making process, either at a global, a country – or at a local 
level. Ideally these processes would also be iterative, re-evaluating whether the 
implementation of certain technologies remain cost-effective unless compared against a 
newer (more expensive) test (21).  Economic evaluation is intended to provide guidance 
for making decisions to maximise outcomes within a finite set of resources, typically the 
budget of a programme (22). It has been argued that under the conditions of a perfectly 
competitive market, in the long run, the only resource constraint of interest would be the 
budget constraint (21: 20). However, this theory assumes that all other constraints to 
achieving a specified outcome, including skilled human resources, technology, or 
infrastructure, could ultimately be relaxed by purchasing the additional resources needed 
(24,25).  However, within an imperfect market system, this is unlikely to hold true and it 
would be more difficult to alleviate some constraints by purchasing additional resources 
than others (26). This is because the outcome (as well as the costs) of the implementation 
of a policy is partly mediated by the ways in which policies are interpreted and 
reconfigured by those who implement them (27).   
 
Heterogeneity in the implementation of investments as a function of constraints in the 
health system, might be explicitly explored by differentiating between proximal and 
distal constraints; with distal constraints referring to constraints that mediate an 
interaction with a direct impact (28,29). For example, while it would be possible, with an 
increased budget, to employ additional healthcare workers to implement an intervention 
of interest (proximal constraint), there may be a limited number of trained healthcare 
workers in the country and additional investment in education and training is needed 
(distal constraint).  Without the additional investment in education, it is possible that the 
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desired outcome may not be fully achieved, resulting in a sub-optimal allocation of 
resources (13).  While some economic evaluations will have an expanded scope by 
including the costs associated with purchasing the additional support required, by for 
example, including the costs of the development of the guideline, unless the causal 
pathway between the distal constraint and the outcome of interest is well understood, it 
is unclear what the resultant impact on the efficiency of the investment may be (30,31). 
In the remainder of the thesis, economic evaluations with an expanded scope (that include 
the costs or outcomes of additional support), will be referred to as economic evaluations 
of health systems investments. This is to distinguish these investments from a broader 
category of work considering investments in public health where the investment is made 
outside of the health system with the impact on a range of development indicators 
evaluated (32).  
 
In addition to the challenge of estimating the mediating effect that constraints may have 
on the costs and outcomes of interventions, other challenges related to evaluating health 
systems investments include;  
 
? how to evaluate the costs and outcomes that fall on other public sectors, the spill over 
costs and outcomes;  
? the way in which the characteristics of social systems, for example the adaptation of 
guidelines and changes in behaviour are dealt with analytically (33–37); and  
? how the timing of outcomes is included.  
 
The case of the dynamic nature of social systems, can be explained by considering the 
interaction between disease transmission and health care worker behaviour. In the 
evaluation of public policies related to transmittable diseases - including the costs and 
outcomes related to transmission of the disease and how this in turn influences the burden 
of need in the population - will affect the cost-effectiveness of interventions (38,39). For 
example, where disease elimination is being modelled, it has been shown that the cost-
effectiveness of a specified intervention will decline as elimination is approached, with 
the cost per additional case identified increasing (40). However, in any system these 
changes are likely to coincide with a corresponding change in the behaviour of healthcare 
workers in response to the decline of the prevalence of the disease and as other competing 
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interventions are implemented. The introduction of new interventions in the system may 
therefore result in a non-linear increase of the effectiveness (and costs) of interventions 
over time (17).  
 
Similarly, the quantification of spill over costs and outcomes may pose a challenge when 
evaluating certain investments. Investment in healthcare will either increase or reduce the 
productivity loss associated with ill health, as well as the costs incurred by patients and 
their families (3,41,42). This effect will also differ between the poor and the wealthy in 
the community, and this distribution of effect between poor and rich may be of interest 
to policy makers when deciding between alternative investment strategies. However, 
these costs and effects will fall outside of the health sector, on the social welfare system 
or in countries with an insufficient state social safety net, these costs will fall on families 
and communities.  
 
In evaluating health systems investments, the challenge therefore is to identify the scope 
of the analyses and how (and whether) the different characteristics of a system will or 
can be included in the analyses. Previous studies that expanded on the traditional cost-
effectiveness framework to include system constraints, focussed on constraints that are 
amenable to monetary investments, specifically those related to the number of healthcare 
workers, their training, health service infrastructure and technology (43–45); or 
considered how institutions are restructured due to investments (46). However, there 
remains a paucity of work explicitly considering how the interaction between the 
structure of the system, the disease characteristics and the behaviour of healthcare 
workers may influence the estimation of costs, outcomes and the allocative efficiency of 
alternative policy options once implemented. Work presented in this thesis addresses 
some of this gap in the literature, using the example of an evaluation of a new diagnostic 
test used in TB case finding in South Africa. 
 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
Given the areas of debate outlined above, the aim of the thesis is to explore how the 
behaviour of healthcare workers alters the value of clinical guidelines (specifically TB 
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diagnostic algorithms), and how these changes may affect firstly the value of the 
implemented diagnostic, and secondly the economic burden of a disease on patients, their 
households and their social networks.  
 
The objectives of the work presented in the thesis therefore are to: 
1. Develop a conceptual framework describing the TB diagnostic related interactions 
between healthcare workers and the system within which they work; 
2. Estimate the economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment in South Africa; 
3. Develop a mathematical model representing the TB diagnostic pathway in South 
Africa, with an emphasis on the decision points of healthcare workers; 
4. Determine the cost-effectiveness and cost-utility (from a societal perspective) of 
investments to support the implementation of new TB diagnostics in South Africa; 
5. Propose and reflect on approaches for modelling how healthcare workers’ 
behaviour - in response to the resources available to them - will alter the value of 
the implementation of new TB diagnostic technologies. 
 
In this thesis, I will propose a set of considerations for how an economic evaluation 
framework may be expanded to include interactions related to the decision-making of 
healthcare workers in response to constraints experienced within their environment. In 
addition, I will explore how implementation may vary as a result of differences in 
behaviour, and this in turn may change our predictions for resource allocation. To do this, 
the analysis draws on theory related to the behaviour of agents in systems as well as 
decision-making under uncertainty. The example of the implementation of a new TB 






The above objectives are addressed in two manuscripts and a supplementary appendix, of 
which one paper is published, and one paper plus the supplementary appendix has been 
drafted and received feedback from co-authors. “I confirm that I have been granted 
permission by the University of Cape Town’s Doctoral Degrees Board to include the 
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following publication(s) in my PhD thesis, and where co-authorships are involved, my co-
authors have agreed that I may include the publication(s)” 
  
Since the work has been done as part of a large multi-disciplinary team, my contributions 




Foster N, Vassall A, Cleary S, Cunnama L, Churchyard G and Sinanovic E. 2015. The 
economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment in South Africa. Social science and 
medicine, 130: 42 – 50.  
 
As the first author, I contributed to the design of the patient cost study and the data 
collection tools, as well as the integration of the patient cost questions within the trial 
survey platforms. I worked under the guidance of the study principal investigator, Anna 
Vassall, who provided extensive feedback and comments on the work. I was responsible 
for training interviewers on how to ask the patient costs questions, piloting and refining 
the questionnaire further, as well as following up on issues of data quality or where there 
were queries. Kerrigan McCarthy was the project manager for the trial and therefore led 
the implementation of the epidemiological study. For the second cohort, the treatment 
cohort, where we were sampling from the same facilities, Lebogang Ramma and Lucy 
Cunnama managed follow-up interactions with study staff. In addition, I liaised with the 
Aurum data management team for frequent reviews of the economics data and wrote 
STATA code to check data quality, followed by the code and analysis of the longitudinal 
dataset, I also presented interim findings to the funders and at conferences, wrote the first 
draft of the manuscript and revised based on co-author feedback. 
 
Chapter 6: 
Foster N, Cleary S, Cunnama L, McCarthy K, Ramma L, Siapka M, Sinanovic E, 
Churchyard G, Fielding K, Grant AD and Vassall A. Strengthening health systems to 
improve the value of Tuberculosis diagnostics in high-burden settings: a cost and cost-
effectiveness analysis. Drafted. 
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This paper is part of work done within a large collaborative project. I led the development 
of the model as well as the analysis. I wrote the first draft of the paper and extensively 
revised based on feedback from co-authors. The epidemiological team (specifically 
Kerrigan McCarthy and Katherine Fielding), through the leading of the trial, collected 
the outcomes data and matched outcomes data from various sources to the primary 
dataset. This process is described in more detail in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  Mariana 
Siapka created a merged dataset of the economic variables with the various trial datasets, 
the inclusion and exclusion rules used when combining the datasets were developed, 
discussed and approved between myself, Anna Vassall and Katherine Fielding. I 
developed the mathematical models that are presented in the thesis, with guidance from 
Susan Cleary, and Anna Vassall. I am very grateful to Alison Grant, Kerrigan McCarthy, 
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1.4 Structure of the remaining chapters 
 
The thesis is presented in eight chapters, with the current chapter introducing and 
outlining the body of work. The policy context and decision structures globally and in 
South Africa are introduced in Chapter 2, where there is a description of the history of 
TB control policies, how these intersected with major public policy changes and the 
presumed impact on the epidemic. Lastly, the present state of the epidemic, and potential 
implications for the need for public sector resources, is discussed.   
 
In Chapter 3, theories related to our understanding of how the market for healthcare 
functions are outlined, followed by a review of theories that aids our understanding of 
behaviour and agency. Lastly, the chapter is concluded with a discussion on how these 
theories influence our understanding of approaches to evaluating health systems 
investments. Key methodological debates are identified. The chapter also includes an 
outline of the theoretical foundations of economic evaluation as an analytical approach. 
Issues discussed include the conceptualisation of costs, and outcomes, time preference, 
heterogeneity and the transferability of the results. The latter part of the chapter provides 
a theoretical framework for analysing the way in which the resource use and outcomes 
of decision-making, at various levels, are shaped by the way in which agents in the health 
system respond to how the structure of the health system is organised.  
 
The methodological approaches used in the thesis are described in Chapter 4. The chapter 
initially outlines the approaches used, with further details of each of the specific analyses 
provided in the results chapters (Chapters 5 to 7). A detailed write-up of the development 
of the mathematical model as the primary analytical method used in the thesis is provided. 
Empirical literature is reviewed and presented, as pertaining to the interactions 
mathematically expressed. 
 
In the results chapters (5 to 7), Chapter 5 presents a longitudinal patient cost study that 
was used to identify at which point in patient care associated with TB, the greatest 
economic burden of ill health is experienced. This section also introduces the concepts 
of an extended economic burden on not just individuals and their ability to pay for 
healthcare but also on households, and their social networks. This analysis also provides 
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the utilisation parameters that become the patient pathway through care upon which the 
model presented in Chapter 6 is based. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a mathematical modelling approach to analysing the context within 
which interventions are placed, and how this may affect decision-making for investing in 
complementary investments to the TB diagnostic pathway.  Data from a pragmatic cluster 
randomised control trial, and the longitudinal patient cost study presented in Chapter 5, 
were used to parameterise the resource use and treatment outcomes of individuals 
entering the model. Secondary data were used to parameterise the disease progression of 
individuals in various states in the model. Given the pragmatic nature of the trial, as well 
as the lack of a gold standard TB diagnostic test, data on true TB status were not collected. 
The model was calibrated to the trial data of time to mortality and time to treatment 
started.  
 
Chapter 7 builds on this approach by exploring how the behaviour of healthcare workers 
may influence the value of the TB diagnostic algorithm. This model analysis represents 
a more nuanced prediction of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed investments. 
Implications for economic evaluation as a methodological approach are discussed. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 reviews and discusses the findings of earlier chapters and makes 
recommendations for a contextually nuanced decision-making process to inform 
decentralised decision-making structures embedded in the South African health system. 
It also presents an argument for how public policies may be designed differently if we 
considered the perspectives of those beyond the household (as a community) who provide 
financial support, caregiver time and other supportive resources. 
 
The novel contributions of this thesis are outlined in terms of their empirical, analytical 
and conceptual contributions. These include the first study empirically showing how the 
costs to patients and their ‘community’ change as patients move through care from first 
symptoms to the end of treatment, in South Africa. In addition, it contributes to our 
understanding of the resource – and behavioural drivers associated with TB diagnosis. It 
includes detailed cost analyses of the cost of TB diagnosis and patient movement through 
care. The conceptual contribution of the thesis relates to the development of a framework 
for exploring how the interaction between resource availability and healthcare worker 
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behaviour in the health system may be incorporated into mathematical modelling for 
resource allocation. It does this by constructing healthcare worker utility functions from 
a combination of patient-level data and empirical literature.  Lastly, the analytical 
contributions include the development and calibration of a mathematical model of patient 
movement through care. 
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This chapter presents an overview of TB control policies globally and in South Africa, 
with an emphasis on how these policies evolved over time within a particular macro-
economic environment. The development of global and local policies within the social 
context of the country is described. Understanding how history has shaped both the 
institutions, as well as the population and healthcare worker responses to TB control 
policies is useful in understanding how this history is still shaping the context of policy 
implementation today. Policy and guideline changes are influenced by current knowledge 
of the TB epidemic, but also by changes in the broader political climate and views on 
resource allocation. Tuberculosis is a good example of how epidemics are shaped by 
public policies, often implemented outside of the health system – most notably here 
housing, the mining sector and social welfare.  
 
 
2.2 Public policy and TB control 
 
The disease Tuberculosis (TB), is caused by a bacterium, Mycobacterium Tuberculosis. 
The disease is an ancient human zoonotic disease and known by many names, among 
others consumption, phthisis, scrofula (for extra-pulmonary TB), Pott’s disease, and 
yaksma. Many of these names refer to the way in which the disease ‘consumes’ the 
patient, leading to the wasting away of the patient. More recently, it has been called the 
white plague. This was to contrast TB against another very deadly disease, the black 
plague, as well as to signal the characteristic pallor associated with those who suffer from 
the disease (46: 2). The disease is associated with conditions outside of the health system 
such as overcrowding, poor living- or working conditions, indoor smoking, poor 
nutrition, infection with HIV which suppresses the immune system, as well as exposure 
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to airborne irritants such as silica dust  (48,49). TB is transmitted through airborne 
transmission (50), but it is thought that most transmitted infections lead to latent TB, that 
is only activated once the infected individual’s immune system can no longer suppress 
the bacteria, with a resultant progression to active disease (51). It is only when the disease 
is active in the individual’s body that it can it be transmitted and leads to ill health and 
death.  
 
Public policies to control epidemics are primarily aimed at firstly ‘removing’ the person 
who is infected from the population, to prevent the spread of the disease at a population 
level. Individuals are ‘removed’ from the population either through diagnosis and 
treatment initiation or through the physical separation from others who may become 
infected, through quarantine in sanatoria as an example (39). Alternatively, efforts are 
focused on preventing transmission by reducing individuals’ probability of contracting 
the disease through preventative strategies such as vaccination. These interventions are 
prioritised under the hypothesis that, at a population level, reducing transmission will 
reduce mortality, long-term disability (morbidity) and the consequences of the medical 
poverty trap (worsening impoverishment) on households (52).    
 
In the pre-antibiotic era, TB control policies were focused on segregating those with TB 
in sanatoria to prevent the transmission of the disease, and treatment included bed rest, a 
healthy diet and fresh air, in the hope that this would support the body to fight the 
infection (53). In 1882, Koch identified the organism Mycobacterium tuberculosis as the 
cause of TB, which launched a new era for TB control strategies. By 1920 the BCG 
vaccine was developed, which consisted of a weakened version of the bacteria to 
stimulate the immune system to contain the disease. In the 1930’s, country-level TB 
control policies included the testing of cattle for TB, with zoonotic TB being considered 
a possible driver of the epidemic in humans. This, in conjunction with the increased use 
of pasteurised milk, is thought to have helped prevent animal to human transmission of 
bovine TB. In 1944, with the advent of antibiotics, and the discovery and development 
of firstly Streptomycin, followed by Isoniazid (1952) and Rifampicin (1968), the focus 
of TB control policies shifted away from preventative, psychosocial and community 
interventions to biomedical innovation with a specific focus on anti-microbial agents. By 
1950, after the end of World War II, the prevalence of TB in developed countries (here 
using the example of the city of London) had dropped to below 0.1% from 0.5% in the 
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pre-antibiotic era (54). Improved living conditions, the control of bovine TB, improved 
nutrition as well as the availability of TB treatment are thought to have contributed to 
this shift. Housing reforms post World War II, particularly the 1919 UK housing act, is 
also thought to have contributed due to slum clearance and improved living standards, 
reducing household overcrowding and TB transmission (54). 
 
In 1995, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared TB a global health emergency, 
followed by the introduction of a comprehensive treatment strategy, called the Directly 
Observed Treatment Short Course (DOTS). The strategy was initially introduced based 
on epidemiological modelling of the epidemic and possible interventions suggesting that 
this combination of interventions would curb the epidemic (55).  The focus of the DOTS 
strategy was to start treatment as soon as possible and improve patient adherence to the 
regimen to ensure that the course is completed, avoiding recurrence, transmission and the 
development of resistance.  
 
The five components of the DOTS strategy were:  
? government commitment,  
? case detection by microscopy,  
? standardised treatment,  
? regular drug supply, and  
? standardised recording and reporting (56,57).  
 
The emphasis on government commitment and regular drug supply signalled an 
awareness of the importance of the health system as an organisation in delivering 
effective interventions. However, the broader policy conceptualisation and 
implementation was characterised by top-down policy processes, presenting to countries 
an ideal model to implement with limited country consultation of possible models for 
adaptation or specific constraints to implementation (58,59) . TB control policies further 
evolved based on the country disease burden; in low-prevalence countries, policies 
shifted focus towards screening and treatment of TB in migrant communities.   
 
In South Africa, the emergence of the HIV and AIDS epidemic led to a burgeoning in 
TB deaths, with TB becoming the most prevalent opportunistic infection in this 
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population and the primary cause of death in those HIV positive not on Anti-Retroviral 
Therapy (ART) (60,61). The social drivers of the dual epidemics are thought to be multi-
faceted (53). The HIV epidemic got a foothold into the South African population during 
Apartheid’s racial segregation policies. These policies forced, specifically black men into 
migrating from rural agrarian communities to work in the country’s gold mines (62). 
Accommodation was provided for these migratory workers in mine hostels, with a change 
in nutrition, combined with exposure to silica dust in the mines and living conditions that 
encouraged the spread of TB (47,63,64). In his book, the ‘Three Letter Plague’, Johnny 
Steinberg argues that the emergence of HIV at a time when family social structures were 
being eroded due to apartheid policies, contributed to the unprecedented spread of the 
disease and its devastating impacts (62). The deadly synergy between HIV and TB was 
thought to be a result of HIV suppressing the immune system by attacking CD4 cells, this 
suppresses the body’s healthy response to TB bacilli which is to encapsulate the bacteria, 




2.3 Socio-political context and financing to support TB policy 
 
Contrasting policies related to TB control with those for other diseases, it is striking how 
under-resourced TB control interventions have been historically, despite the high 
mortality rates associated with the disease (47). This dichotomy was explained by Phillips 
(2012) who contrasted the responses to the TB and polio epidemics in South Africa. 
Between 1918 and 1962 fewer than 950 people died from polio in South Africa, though 
the crippling results of polio lay in those left with pronounced physical disabilities. The 
disease preferentially affected the country’s “small but powerful and articulate middle 
class” as described by Phillips (65: 106). In contrast, during the same period, 29 964 TB 
deaths were recorded in the city of Cape Town alone (54).  In South Africa, the history 
of TB (like that of HIV) shadowed changes in social structure. Evolving public policies 
(Apartheid) towards racial segregation in South Africa were gaining traction, whereby 
white South Africans were favoured socially and economically. These policies intensified 
following residential segregation imposed during the Spanish flu epidemic of 1919 (66: 
103). Apartheid policies promoted rural poverty, inadequate health services to most of 
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the population, rapid urbanisation and fostered living conditions conducive to the spread 
of TB (47,67). Because the poverty line followed along racial lines, TB control was not 
prioritised (66). The frustration of medical authorities over the failure of TB control 
measures resonates through this quote from a paper presented at the first Symposium of 
the South African Medical Research Council’s Tuberculosis Research Institute in 1985, 
as quoted by Packard (1989). 
 
 “Since the disease [TB] is totally curable and available control 
measures are sufficient to combat the disease effectively, the 
natural course of the epidemic can be altered to a rapid decline. 




When examining historical South African national expenditure reports, there is a 
noticeable shift in priorities from TB control to AIDS care (68). In the 1994/1995 budget, 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) fund was introduced, intended 
as a mechanism for redistribution of wealth and services, addressing some of the social 
inequalities associated with the Apartheid system. The RDP fund included funding for 
housing development, primary health care, but also included earmarked funds for a 
conditional grant to support TB control.  However, within two years (from 1997), this 
was supplemented by additional donor funding to support strategies to deal with the 
burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic and TB became overshadowed by the prioritisation of 
the roll-out and expansion of HIV care. At the facility level, the comparison between the 
well-funded HIV service (largely funded through vertically implemented conditional 
grants) and the TB service has been stark and there have been calls for improved 
implementation of TB control strategies coupled with the necessary designated funding 
support (65,69). This socio-political context is central to understanding TB control 
strategies and their implementation, as it influences how services are organised in health 
facilities as well as how health care workers understand and respond to the disease. 
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2.4 The structure of decision-making in the South African healthcare 
system 
 
South Africa is the country with the highest levels of income inequality in the world (70). 
This inequality is mirrored in the organisation of the health system. The South African 
health system is characterised by two distinctly separate systems; a well-funded private 
system that provides services to a wealthy minority, and a public health system serving 
the majority of the population (71). The private healthcare system is funded through 
contributions made by employers on behalf of employees to private health insurance 
firms, who then purchases services from the private health sector (72). Services are 
provided by a network of private hospitals and medical practitioners. In contrast, the 
public health system provides health services to the majority of the South African 
population and is funded through the tax system. In terms of governance structures, 
decision-making power in the health system has been decentralised, with provinces 
having their own budgets and responsibility for the allocation of resources between 
competing health and other budget envelopes (73). TB services in South Africa are 
largely concentrated in the public sector, and where patients did first access the private 





In this chapter, the historical intersection between TB epidemics and public policy have 
been discussed. The macro-level factors that influence TB epidemics include structural, 
biological and institutional factors. Structural factors refer to issues such as poverty, 
housing and sanitation. Biological factors include how the disease is transmitted, but also 
our understanding of transmission, treatment and co-morbidities. The institutional rules 
include TB control clinical guidelines. Identifying macro-level patterns has the potential 
to illuminate important relationships and assist in predicting future responses.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 “Programmes are products of the foresight of policy-makers. Their 
fate though ultimately always depends on the imagination of 
practitioners and participants. Rarely do these visions fully coincide.”  






In this chapter, the theoretical literature related to the research question is discussed and 
relationships between concepts and theories are presented in a theoretical framework. 
Firstly, the interactions that make up the organisation of health services is explained using 
economic theory, characterising the relationships as a set of market interactions. This is 
followed by an overview of theories explaining the behaviour of agents within the health 
system, with a particular focus on theory related to how agents make decisions in 
evolving systems. The implications of observed behaviour observed on the design of 
mathematical models are then outlined. A potential approach is then proposed, further 
refined in the remaining chapters of the thesis, and re-evaluated in the discussion chapter.  
 
 
3.2 Economics of the organisation of health services 
 
In developing public policy, economic evaluation is an approach used to assist decision 
makers in choosing between competing investments (20,77,78). This analytical approach 
is used to estimate trade-offs in the cost and disease impact of alternative investments. 
Economic evaluation is an umbrella term and includes specific approaches such as cost-
effectiveness analysis, cost minimisation analysis and cost-benefit analysis. Emerging 
evidence from programmatic evaluations suggest that intervention benefits shown in 
modelling studies where data from clinical trials were used to derive estimates of 
efficacy, do not have the desired effects at a population level (79–81). Some have 
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hypothesised that this is a result of implementation into “weak” health systems (82), 
however one may argue that facilities within a health system will have highly variable 
levels of resources, human resource skills mix and configurations of service organisation. 
Cost-effectiveness analyses often shows how variability in patient characteristics may 
influence the decision, but there is paucity of analyses that consider how the decision 
recommendation may differ between health service contexts with different levels of 
resources (83).  
 
Context may in part be related to the capacity of the health facility. Aragon et al. proposed 
that the capacity of an organisation or system can be understood in terms of the ‘hard’ 
capacities such as infrastructure, technology and finances and the ‘soft’ capacities of the 
system.  The ‘soft’ capacities include the tangible soft capacities such as the 
organisational systems and procedures for planning; and the intangible soft capacities 
which include the values and beliefs of agents implementing policies (84–86). In cost-
effectiveness analyses we however seldomly include these interactions in our decision-
making. How may we incorporate an understanding of the ‘soft’ capabilities of the health 
system into mathematical models for decision-making? In this chapter, theories of 
structure and agency in public policy are examined, followed by a discussion of the 
theoretical foundations of cost-effectiveness analyses, and an overview of approaches to 
incorporating a more nuanced understanding of the intersection between public policy 
and the health system in these analyses. In the last section of the chapter, a theoretical 
framework for analysing the intersection between these relationships is proposed. 
 
The notion of the importance of systems as opposed to a focus on components of health 
programmes is received increasing attention, with the recognition that priority-setting 
based on disease specific priorities may result in import priorities being overlooked. The 
introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, superseded 
previous declarations with strong primary healthcare goals, such as the Alma-Ata 
declaration in 1978 (87). These goals were introduced following the adoption of the UN 
Millennium Declaration, with countries committing to allocating resources towards these 
goals for achievement by 2015. The MDGs were a clear political statement on setting 
priorities for global development. The health MDGs were very ambitious and had 
specific disease-focused targets (87,88).  Those critical of the MDGs were concerned that 
setting disease-specific priorities would draw attention away from integrated primary 
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care as incentives follow the targets (89). The task force on innovative international 
financing for health systems, that evaluated the constraints to scaling up the MDGs, 
identified ways in which the organisation of the health system would influence how 
investments may be scaled up (90). They concluded that interventions will be 
significantly shaped by the context of the health system within which they are being 
implemented, and that the costs and effectiveness estimates for resource allocation would 
therefore vary significantly between contexts. In their analysis of the task force’s 
findings, Hanson et al. (2003) distinguished firstly between constraints at different levels 
of the health systems, and secondly between constraints that may be amenable to buy-out 
through investment and those that would be more difficult to change, even with 
substantial investment (91). The authors identified constraints due to governance and 
policy frameworks as being more resistant to change through monetary investment alone. 
These constraints may be due to for example, overcentralized planning and management; 
a lack of inter-sectoral action and partnerships; and government bureaucracy. A 
commonality among the constraints that are less amenable to buy-out, is that they are 
related to discretionary behaviour by agents. Constraints that are more amenable to buy-
out, would for example include shortages of staff and lack of equipment or infrastructure 
(91). Classifying constraints by its amenability to buy-out, may underestimate 
interactions between cross-cutting constraints, making it difficult to predict whether an 
investment will relax a constraint. Developing a clear causal pathwayi, describing the 
mechanisms by which constraints and investments are thought to work in the interaction 
being evaluated, could provide a more nuanced understanding of the constraint and how 
investments to relax the constraint would operate. 
 
The ability to predict outcomes associated with interactions in systems, whether these are 
sensitive ecological systems, organisations, or biological systems broadly follows three 
schools of thought. There is the rational model, which suggests that one can control for 
the context and study the inputs and resultant outputs of an intervention in a linear 
fashion, analogous to a pathway through care. In this school of thought, it is then also 
possible to predict what the effect of the implementation of a standard intervention would 
be in another context (16). An alternative school of thought is that systems are inherently 
complex, and that the context is inextricably linked with the processes resulting from the 
                                            
i A causal pathway maps the events and interactions that lead to an outcome of interest. 
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relationship between the inputs and outputs. For this school of thought, transferability to 
other settings is not possible and interventions should be studied within their own 
systems. The third school of thought is that, when observing how interventions evolve 
and influence the systems they are implemented into, patterns can be observed, and 
lessons can be learnt from studying those patterns. These patterns may therefore be used 
to understand the transferability of intervention effects (33,92,93). In this thesis, I draw 
on this third school of thought by attempting to identify patterns of behaviours and to 
express these mathematically. 
 
When studying changes in systems, the focus may be on macro-level interactions or the 
focus may be more on the interaction between agents and resources and therefore 
considering micro-level interactions. When studying macro interactions the behaviour 
and interactions of institutions or governments are studied as units (94). However, 
changes in systems often happen because of the interaction between the macro and micro 
levels, and there with a paucity of frameworks to study such interactions.  
 
3.2.1 The market as a system 
 
Ostrom (1965) defined the market as representing an institutional structure of incentives 
and deterrents to enable individuals to pursue their own opportunities and at the same 
time, to perform “socially valuable functions” (95). In neo-classical economic theory, the 
health system conceptualised as a market, represents the dynamic relationship between 
supply (healthcare) and the demand for healthcare, with interactions between supply and 
demand conceptualised as a set of transactions. Adam Smith, introduced the notion that 
the mechanism governing this interaction is controlled by the price of the product and 
that if all participants are not satisfied, action will be taken to change behaviour by 
modifying demand or supply, until an equilibrium is reached (96). This theory assumes 
that individuals acting within the system are rational and will act to maximize their utility 
or profit. Apply the notion of systems in equilibrium, the social theorist, Pareto, used the 
analogy of a pendulum that moves towards equilibrium, for understanding the role of 
“elites” or the ruling class in the cyclical shaping of democratic governance structures 
underpinning social change (97). His observations of equilibrium in the system, was that 
the system is perpetually moving towards equilibrium, and that equilibrium is seldomly 
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static, but rather a continuously dynamic process. The relationship between the outcomes 
produced for a given set of resources, is referred to as the efficiency of the system. The 
market mechanism is considered Pareto efficient, when in terms of the outcomes, we 
cannot find a way to make some people better off without making someone else worse 
off (23,98: 5).  
 
The trade-offs associated with the relationship between the available resources and the 
outcomes produced can be presented as a production possibility frontier, see Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Production possibility frontier. Adapted from Brown & Jackson (99).  
 
The production possibility frontier is a graphical representation of all possible 
combinations of goods, also called the production possibility choice set, that can be 
produced with a fixed amount of resources (99). Using the example of two services that 
can be produced with the same combination of resources, on the y-axis of the graph, 
represented by Q(A) is the number of TB patients who could be treated with the given 
set of resources. On the x-axis, the number of children who can be immunised using the 
same resources is presented as Q(B). Ideally within a health facility, one would like to 
offer both services. The curve on the graph represents the boundary of the maximum 
possible output that can be produced from a given amount of input and is called the 
production function. The shape of the curve is dependent on the technology underlying 
this interaction. The production possibility frontier therefore shows the trade-offs 
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between for example seeing y number of TB patients (point A) and immunizing x number 
of children (point B). The opportunity cost of moving from point A on the graph to point 
B on the graph is presented by the number of units of Q(A) on the y-axis that cannot be 
produced in order to produce more of Q(B). 
 
The production possibility frontier as presented in Figure 1 is a simple representation of 
possible interactions in the market. Philosophically, this understanding of the market is 
similar to Newtonian ideas of equilibrium, suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship 
between a force applied and outcomes achieved. If the price is the primary “force” that 
may be applied to shift the equilibrium, as proposed by Smith, then the constraint to 
achieving an equilibrium would be a budget constraint (23). However, there may also be 
non-price rationing factors in health markets that may act as equilibrating mechanisms 
(100). This is particularly of importance given that access to primary healthcare 
(including TB diagnosis and treatment) may be cost-free at point of care in the South 
African public health system, and profit maximisation is therefore seldomly an incentive 
for provider behaviour. Dor et al. (1987) argues that the time cost associated with 
accessing healthcare would act as a rationing mechanism by influencing the demand for 
care in the market, even if care is provided free of charge (101). Non-price rationing 
mechanisms may therefore include the use of waiting lists or reduced physical availability 
of services to push the market equilibrium. On the supply-side, production could be 
transformed by adopting a new technology, by changing the skills mix of healthcare 
workers, or adding incentives – leading to a shift in the market equilibrium (100). 
Adopting new technology such as Xpert MTB/RIF (Xpert) for diagnosing TB, would 
therefore be expected to lead to a shift in the production function, with more outcomes 
(TB patients diagnosed or reduction in mortality) produced given the same initial inputs, 
if the resource use associated with Xpert is equivalent to that of sputum smear 
microscopy. 
 
When considering the production of public services, the production possibility frontier 
represents what is possible given the current mix and use of the available technology, 
however this may not represent what is feasible (99,100). Feasible choice constraints are 
constraints within the current production choice set and represents what is possible 
without large-scale investment in public health infrastructure or restructuring of the 
health system. An example of a large-scale investment requirement that may be 
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considered a feasibility constraint, is that further scale up of TB case finding policies 
requires access to chest x-rays for those who are symptomatic. However, radiography 
infrastructure is under resourced in the public health system in South Africa, and 
therefore would act as a feasibility constraint of the production possibility choice set.  
 
 
Figure 2. Production possibility frontier with feasibility constraints. Adapted from Brown 
& Jackson (99). 
 
In Figure 2, the production possibility frontier shown in Figure 1 is redrawn to show how 
the frontier will be constrained at various levels of the production choice sets due to 
feasibility constraints. The gap between the feasibility choice curve and the frontier, can 
be described drawing on two related concepts, x-inefficiency and transaction costs. X-
inefficiency is a term used to explain the discrepancies observed in the production of 
public services when an allocatively efficient mix of services is produced but possibly 
not at minimum cost (99). This may occur because of overmanning, an inefficient use of 
technology, or the organisation of services and has been related to the behaviour of 
bureaucrats. This is likely to cause an upward shift in the cost curve  (71: 127, 171). A 
related concept, though at a micro-level, is that of transaction costs, which speak to the 
cost of decision-making in a system, especially where consensus needs to be reached on 
a decision (99,102,103). Within a patient clinical pathway, there are typically multiple 
decision points, where the way in which the patient interacts with the health system 
generates the need for decision-making, that may be conceptualised as transactions with 
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an associated transaction cost. This idea has been applied to understanding the costs 
incurred by patients prior to accessing appropriate healthcare providers for TB care in 
Nigeria (104). The authors define transaction costs as the costs incurred by patients in 
accessing care from inappropriate providers before getting appropriate care. They 
furthermore argue that these costs are a result of characteristics of the nature of TB 
diagnosis (possibly harder to change) as well as some institutional determinants of 
transaction costs, such as the ways in which services are organised. An example of how 
health services may contribute to transaction costs if when patients are required to return 
to the health facility to receive the results of their diagnostic tests and if the result is 
negative, the need to go to another facility to get a chest x-ray, following which they need 
to return to the first facility for the interpretation of the chest x-ray and formal diagnosis 
(105). Abimbola et al. (2015) note in their paper, that transaction costs are hard to 
quantify empirically as they relate to the options foregone because of governance 
interventions already in place (104). Where others have attempted to conceptualise and 
measure these costs, it was often done at the proximal levelii and included estimating the 
cost associated with guideline development, implementation through training and the cost 
of additional support for the intervention (30,106).  
 
While these approaches are useful to start thinking about the cost of change in the system, 
it is unlikely to fully represent the costs and outcomes associated with how reducing x-
inefficiency in the system may change with time and scale-up. Some have argued that a 
possible solution may be to consult with policymakers working in the system to rate the 
efficiency of various interventions in their system (107), however it is likely that 
policymakers who are entrenched in the system may themselves be influenced by some 
of the ways of thinking that perpetuate inefficiency in the system being studied (108,109). 
An alternative approach, and one adopted in this thesis, is to use a processual analytic 
approach, as described by Pettigrew (1997). He argued that systems are made up of a set 
of norms and implicit rules and that if one wants to predict how a system may respond to 
new interventions, one first needs to understand how a system has evolved over time to 
generate an understanding of the range of mechanisms of change in the system 
(34,110,111). One may therefore argue that the cost of change (and efficiency foregone) 
is hard to quantify as it is irrevocably linked to the current organisation of the health 
                                            
ii The downstream or service level. 
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system and is therefore dependent on the analyst to imagine how an alternative may be 
organized. The approach used in this thesis, includes studying the history of TB policies 
in the system (Chapter 2), and identifying recurring patterns. Secondly, the causal 
pathways between the interactions the system and the mechanism influencing health 
outcomes are explicitly depicted in a conceptual framework shown in Chapter 4. The 
conceptual framework is then used for the interpretation of the model analyses presented 
in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
3.2.2 Dynamic systems 
 
Equilibrium theories are, however, not fully able to explain the dynamic behaviour 
observed in systems. This stems from the recognition that these interactions are more 
than the sum of their parts and are not merely scaled-up versions of micro-level 
interactions. Systems tend to display emergent, adaptive and self-organising properties 
(112,113). Emergence is the notion that when certain elements or parts stand in relation 
to one another, the whole will have formed properties that are not possessed by the parts 
in isolation (114). It recognises that parts are influenced by interactions at both the micro- 
as well as at the macro-levels; while at the same time exerting an effect on the macro-
level. This type of thinking has led some scholars to develop theories to study the 
relationship between the micro-level and macro-level. Notable scholars who studied 
these interactions include Schelling (1978), Young (1998), Ostrom (1965) and the social 
theorist Coleman (1986) (113,115–118).  
 
Greenwood-lee et al. (2016) distinguished between complex-adaptive systems 
characteristics at the macro-level as opposed to the agent (or micro)-level (119). 
Emergence, considered a systems-level characteristic, he defined as an… 
  
 “evolutionary dynamic that describes the process of adaptation that 
creates change in the ecological dynamic. It is a description of long-term 
emergent outcomes that result from a utility driven feedback mechanism, 
in which operational processes and strategies are evaluated, as agents 
seek to produce better outcomes for themselves. This includes how agents 
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evaluate and respond to the short-term impacts of the intervention, 
adapting, and adopting or discarding the intervention accordingly.” 
 
Adaptation, the agent (or micro)-level behaviour, Greenwood further defined as 
behaviour within… 
  
 “a system comprised of intelligent agents, where each agent has a set of 
objectives and attempts to achieve these objectives through a process of 
adaptation. In this context, adaptation refers to the process of change that 
results as various intelligent agents – from policy maker to patient – who 
modify their behaviour (including any actions required to implement the 
intervention) and improve outcomes relative to their own perspective and 
objectives. Thus, although an intervention is designed with one outcome 
effect in mind, its implementation and impact within the system may 
deviate from its design because of adaptation.” 
 
 
This process of adaptation makes the development and evaluation of effective and 
sustainable interventions difficult and drives the development of increasingly complex 
interventions. Indeed, interventions must be adaptable both over time and across a 
diversity of settings to ensure that the adoption and effectiveness of the intervention is 
not compromised as the population responds to both the direct and indirect changes 
introduced by the intervention. The high number of linkages between the components of 
the intervention and the system in which it operates, means that change in the long term, 
system-level outcomes may be non-linear, emergent and difficult to predict. 
 
The context within which interventions are implemented, influences the implementation 
and resultant cost and effect of interventions (120). These relationships may be 
challenging to understand or identify. In program evaluation theory, Gloubermann and 
Zimmerman (2002), divide interventions into simple, complicated or complex.  Simple 
problems are analogous to baking a cake using a recipe. The recipe needs to be followed, 
but there is some certainty that if the recipe is followed the results are reproducible. 
Complicated problems, on the other hand, are likened to sending a rocket to the moon.  It 
is crucial to follow a formula and sending one rocket to the moon successfully provides 
some assurance that sending subsequent ones is likely to be successful. Complex 
  27 
problems however are said to be like raising a child. There is no real formula, and being 
successful in raising a child once does not mean that one would be able to reproduce the 
success (121,122). Interventions are considered complex when they have a recursive 
property, change stimulates more change, outcomes and the means to achieve them 
emerge during intervention implementation (122). Complex interventions may be 
challenging for economic evaluation because the elements of the intervention and the 
required inputs may be difficult to identify (123). In multifaceted interventions, it may 
also be difficult to draw boundaries around the evaluation or in other words, to pin down 
the scope of the evaluation (123). 
 
In addition to complexity in the intervention, the health system within which 
interventions are implemented may display elements of complexity (123–126).  
Theoretical approaches that have emerged for understanding the interplay between health 
systems factors and the mechanisms by which an intervention works, include complexity 
theory and a realist philosophy of science. These approaches understand the health 
system as an open system, in which change is context dependent. Both approaches 
advocate a greater use of theory to understand the differences and similarities of 
contextualised interventions (36). In realism, causal processes are understood and 
identified as mechanisms in the form of context, mechanism, followed by outcome 
configurations (127).  This approach has been critiqued for being too linear, as it 
investigates aspects of program theory rather than its entirety. The process of a realist 
evaluation includes identifying mechanisms or causal processes that could explain how 
an intervention operates. These mechanisms are used to develop what is called a middle 
range theory, that is then tested against the available evidence in generating an 
understanding of the mechanisms of actions of interventions (128). This is analogous to 
the approach proposed by Pettigrew (1990) mentioned above, who suggested an approach 
for tracking an understanding of how policy has unfolded and been shaped over time, 
influenced and updated by changes in perspectives and new evidence. The approach is 
based on the belief that research on how systems change, should “explore the contexts, 
content, and process of change together with their interconnections through time” (34: 
268). Pettigrew argued that the focus for such an approach should be on “catching reality 
in flight and in studying long-term processes in their context”. He differentiated between 
an outer and an inner context. The outer context he defined as referring to the economic, 
social, political and sectoral environment within which the organisation (or firm) is 
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located. The inner context he defined as the structural, cultural and political environment 
through which ideas for change proceed.  
 
Complexity theory understands the interactions of processes as local rules that generate 
patterns of outcomes at other system levels.  The local rules may themselves change due 
to changes in the environment. This is called complex adaptive systems (CAS) and the 
principles have been applied in policy evaluations for decision making (36,120). 
Identifying these rules would therefore aid us in understanding how or why certain 
decisions have been made. Complexity theory therefore lends itself to the study of agent 
behaviour, while realist theory, allows for the in-depth examination of relationships 
between outcomes that may include causes other than actor behaviour.  
 
In the disciplinary field of policy analysis, there is a long history of social theorists who 
have been interested in understanding how innovation (whether technical or social) is 
adopted and spreads both within and between organisations. Lipsky (1980), for example, 
provided an understanding of how public policy is shaped by front-line bureaucrats. He 
observed that the decisions of street-level bureaucrats tended to be redistributive as well 
as allocative (31). He argued that because street-level bureaucrats must, on a day to day 
basis, deal with clients’ personal reactions to their decisions, they may adapt how a policy 
is implemented using their discretionary judgement and thereby amending the outcomes 
of the policy implemented. In a similar way, Gilson (2014) used the symbolism of a prism 
that refracts the light to explain how organisational culture and management may shape 
the implementation of policies (27). While the street-level bureaucrats’ framework 
explains changes happening in a distributed and diffused way by those implementing 
strategies, Rogers (2003), in his work on the diffusion of innovations, discussed the 
importance of what he calls ‘change agents’ in promoting implementation (129). He 
argues that an important factor in the implementation of interventions relates to a person 
with the ability to inspire action in others, being on board in championing the 
intervention, leading to widespread implementation.   
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3.3 Theories of behaviour and agency 
 
So far in this chapter, resource and outcome interactions were discussed as part of a 
broader system (at the macro-level). A simplifying approach to understanding the system 
is to break the interactions in the system down into components with independent but 
connected decision-making abilities, studying how the interactions on these components 
lead to change. 
 
 “…but son, you’ll understand folks a little better when you’re older. A 
mob is always made up of people, no matter what. Mr. Cunningham 
was part of a mob last night, but he was still a man. Every mob in 
every little Southern town is always made up of people you know…” 
Atticus Finch, in To kill a mockingbird (Lee 1960). 
 
 
As in this quote of an explanation provided by Atticus Finch to his son in the book, “To 
kill a mockingbird”, complexity in systems, whether social, biological or ecological, lies 
in the understanding that systems are not merely the sum of the behaviour of individual 
components of the system (35). Indeed, the system itself regulates behaviour, through 
rules and norms, but also individuals within the system will, based on their own 
understanding of the problem or value system, make decisions that sometimes go against 
what the expressed group decision is. 
 
 “Following most evolutionary biologists, we can first ask how a strange 




Sen (1985) defined agency as “what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of 
whatever goals or values he or she regards as important” (91: 203). Agency is therefore 
not only determined by the resources (capital) and capabilities of the individual, but also 
by the capabilities of collectives that the individual belongs to;  including gender, 
ethnicity, and country (131). The range of decision options that agents can action, may 
be conceptualised as dependent on an ‘option structure’ or ‘choice architecture’ within 
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which agents act (132).  The agency relationship to structure therefore refers both to 
something material or economic but also has a cultural aspect, relating to norms, customs, 
traditions and ideologies that govern the behaviour of those in communities. Some of 
these institutional rules may be negotiable, while others may be more fixed.  
 
While many of the theories conceptualising the relationships between agency and 
structure portray the agent as a passive victim of the structures (institutional rules and 
social norms) around them, Unger (1987) proposed the concept of negative capability. 
He argued that while the constraints of social structure mould the actions of agents, 
individuals are also able to resist, deny and transcend their context (133). This goes back 
to the observation made by Atticus Finch when describing the behaviour of a mob (see 
page 28). The ability to resist rules or social conditioning, Unger called the negative 
capability of agents. Figure 3 illustrates how the system’s characteristics may restrict 
agents’ choices that govern behaviour. In the figure, the individual agent is presented as 
a black circle on the left of the graph. The range of options that an agent would be able 
to action on, from an infinite set of options, is represented in the shaded grey oblong – 
bounded rationality. The notion of bounded rationality is used to explain that people do 
not always act in ways that may be considered rational from another perspective, because 
when faced with decisions where there is uncertainty, our rationality (or the range of 
options that we could consider) is limited by our thinking capacity, available information 
and time  (134). Sen argued that it is not only the ability to make a choice, but also the 
degree of fit between the available choice and what is acceptable to the agent given 
his/her values that define empowerment in choice.  
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Figure 3. Conceptual diagram representing constraints to agency behaviour.  
 
In Figure 3, this distinction is illustrated by showing the range of agency that an agent 
can act on (perfect capability) and how this is limited by collective action rules which are 
the rules set by the society within which an agent functions. The behaviour of individual 
healthcare workers when involved in the complex task of clinical decision-making, and 
when interpreting and acting on guidelines, can be conceptualised as being a function of 
a broader facility-level context, situated within a meso – district level context and within 
a wider national and global policy-making context (135). It is therefore not only the 
agent’s internal dialogue but is also influenced by the institutions within which people 
work and live. 
 
Various economic theory approaches to studying agency behaviour have been proposed, 
principal-agent theory, game theory and the evolution of the discipline of behavioural 
economics are briefly discussed in this chapter. Principal-agent theory is used to 
understand the relationship between a principal (the person who is purchasing services) 
and the agent (the person doing the work or the person implementing the 
intervention).Where there is a difference between the best possible outcome for the 
principal and the consequences of the acts for the agent, this is called ‘agency loss’ (136). 
Where the agent acts completely in their own interest, agency loss would be very high as 
opposed to when the agent consistently acts in the interest of the principal, the agency 
loss will be zero. An example of such an interaction is where health care workers are 
agents and policy makers are the principals. Policy makers will develop a set of clinical 
  32 
guidelines, setting expectations for the behaviour of health care workers in clinics. This 
is similar, in principle to the concept of x-inefficiency. Research using agency theory 
showed that agency loss can be minimized when the principal and agent have a common 
interest (i.e. the outcome of interest would benefit both) and when the principal is 
knowledgeable about the consequences of the agent’s activities, minimizing information 
asymmetry (137). The theory has been criticised for lacking nuance in understanding the 
motivations of the agent as it assumes that the agent is self-interested and that the 
objective is to maximize personal wealth.  
 
The need to better understand the nuance of what motivates agents/ individuals in this 
relationship, and how incentives may be used to change the behaviour of individuals 
within groups, has led to the development of a field of study that draws heavily on the 
psychology of human behaviour and interaction, behavioural economics (138,139). 
When applied to the development of public policy, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) defined 
approaches that channel people in specific directions while also allowing them some 
agency (discretion) to go their own way, as nudges (132,140). These nudges work by 
amending the ‘choice architecture’ which is understood as the context within which 
choices are made – analogous to the decision framework shown in Figure 3. The choice 
architecture is then designed with knowledge of how people make decisions and 
orchestrated for people to choose a specific option. An integral part of being interested 
in how nudges may work includes understanding when nudges do not work or may 
produce even more unanticipated results. Sunstein (2016) identified five mechanisms by 
which nudges may fail:  
 
? when they produce confusion in the target audience,  
? they may have only short-term effects,  
? people may resist,  
? they may be based on an inaccurate, though plausible, understanding of what 
motivates people within a certain context, or  
? there may be compensating behaviour resulting in no net effect (140).   
 
There is also an ongoing debate on whether nudges in the design of public policy 
intervention are ethical, with concerns that it may be irreverent of individual choice and 
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autonomy (141). Within health systems, there is a growing interest in understanding how 
health care workers may be incentivised to implement policies in specific ways. Some of 
these approaches, such as target setting, have however been known to cause unintended 
consequences (142,143) 
 
There are some similarities between the work on nudges and the work done by 
institutionalist economists who study the behaviour of groups. Institutionalist 
frameworks study the rules and relationships that govern the behaviour of groups, and 
conceptualise organisations as consisting of individuals who interact with one another 
based on a set of rules that are negotiated between organisations (116,144). Based on 
these rules observed and studied, one may be able to predict how a system would respond 
to change. A possible limitation of this approach is that it may conceptualise groups as 
homogenous and place less emphasis on understanding the behaviour and rationale of the 
individual actor within the group.  
 3.3.1 Agents in systems 
 
The literature discussed thus far in this chapter, considers an agent through their 
interactions with other agents, the next step is to consider how they act within institutions 
and broader societal systems.  
 
The rational choice model of decision-making suggests that people or institutions will 
choose to maximise their utility until they exhaust the available resources. However, 
within collectives (societies or institutions), the rational decision-maker may be more 
complex as the utility for an individual maximised may not be the same decision as 
aiming for utility maximisation in a group. The work of Elinor and Vince Ostrom aimed 
to understand how collectives make decisions when facing resource constraints (145). 
They conceptualised this decision-making as happening based on a set of implicit and 
explicit ‘rules’ agreed upon by the collective. This approach draws on human social 
behaviour, and explores how the group will shape behaviour, but may not hold true in 
communities where there is low social cohesion or where there are multiple interacting 
collectives within an institution. Elinor Ostrom, in some of her early work, identified 
individuals/ agents who would act differently to the collective; she called them public 
entrepreneurs conceptualising these actors as leaders who shape and change the collective 
rules for decision-making in absence of profit maximisation as an incentive (117). 
Ostrom et al. proposed an Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework that 
considers the action mechanisms as composing of an action area with action situations 
with participants. The action arena is constructed through exogenous variables which 
includes the biophysical conditions, attributes of the community as well as rules (146). 
These interactions lead to a set of interactions and outcomes. Some of the Ostrom’s work 
has similarities to the work of Lipsky, a social theorist who noticed that bureaucrats 
implementing public policy tend to reshape policies to adapt them to the context within 
which they are implemented (31). Street-Level bureaucrats are conceptualised as 
individuals working within an institution, where there is often a lack of resources to 
follow a policy implementation request (31: 1980).  This notion of the individual making 
decisions within a specific context, was expanded on with the behavioural economic 
literature, initially conceptualised by among others, Tversky and Thaler. Within this 
broad body of work, the individual is making choices within a contextual choice set that 
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may be modified through incentives (nudge), by making it easier to do the ‘right’ thing, 
or by making it harder to do what would be the first choice (sludge). These theories 
describing peoples’ behaviour represent a collaboration between the fields of economics 
and psychology; and have aimed at understanding the psychology behind the choices that 
people make when presented with a set of options, thereby expanding the idea of rational 
decision-maker with the aim of maximising their utility.  
 
While behavioural economic literature is valuable in describing the behaviour of agents 
in decision-making and how people may respond to incentives, there currently seems to 
be a lack of appreciation for whether decision-makers are empowered to decide, and how 
individuals’ empowerment to make decisions may be shaped by the structure of the 
society within which they live and how they interact with their peers (139). The structure 
of society may be conceptualised as being made up by the formal and informal ‘rules’ of 
the society or institutions within which individuals interact. An example of how this may 
impact on the implementation of health policies is that within very hierarchical work 
environments, agents are likely to have very constrained choices in terms of deviating 
from the prescribed norms and standards for their role in the organisation. In a clinical 
environment, it would mean that in such a setting, clinical guidelines especially as related 
to vertical disease programme implementation might be followed very strictly. 
Conversely, in settings where there is a scarcity of appropriately trained health care 
workers, health care workers may adopt roles that they were not originally trained for, 
leading to unanticipated deviations from diagnostic guidelines. Institutional norms or 
guidance may also change with changes in the system. For example, when considering 
the implementation of new technology at a systems level, there will initially be a 
disruption of the collective decision-making rules providing greater opportunity for more 
individual decision-making (146).  
 
3.3.2 Implications for modelling health systems investments 
 
As argued above, while acknowledging that the system is more than the parts, Mangham 
and Hanson (2010) argued that understanding intervention complexity can assist in 
identifying approaches to overcoming resource constraints and assist in tailoring the 
implementation approach to a specific context (147). Mathematical modelling is 
potentially a useful approach for exploring the effects of different factors that impact on 
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the cost-effectiveness of an intervention (148). However, how to conceptualise and 
express these interactions is challenging as elements of the system need to be reduced to 
sufficient simplicity to be analytically expressed. Coleman (1986) proposed a useful 
approach to analytically linking the macro and the micro context of actors when 




Figure 4. Annotated diagram of Coleman’s boat. Adapted from Coleman, 1986 (115). 
 
Coleman argued that change in systems happens at various levels. At the micro level, 
actors (here represented as black dots) interact with one another, through what Coleman 
referred to as “action-formation mechanisms” (149). These mechanisms are those actions 
that constitute a specific practice leading to the desired outcome (or not). This is the 
relationship or mechanism, that drives resource use in how patients interact with the 
health system. The mechanism between the actor and macro level on the left, called the 
situational mechanism, refers to how the context influences actors. On the right, the 
interaction between actors and how they influence the macro-level environment is 
represented, called the transformational mechanism. 
 
Considering the market equilibrium described above: the transaction between agents in 
the market would represent the action-formation mechanisms, however the role of agents 
and the dynamic micro-level decision making that contributes to the equilibrium of the 
system is not only constrained by a lack of physical resources as depicted by the budget 
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constraint, but also by institutional rules and practices, as well as the limitations in the 
thoughts and vision of individuals (agency) (150: 3). The institutional rules and practices 
are expressed through the situational and transformational mechanisms in Figure 4. 
 
Exploring agency behaviour within context has implications for modelling the scale-up 
of the effectiveness of interventions as well as the associated resource implications of 
interventions at scale. Coleman’s boat may be considered as a methodological framework 
for representing first the interaction between agents followed by the situational and 
transformational mechanisms identified and presented in a conceptual framework. 
Conceptualising constraints to producing healthcare outcomes, through an understanding 
of agency behaviour and how agents respond to the context, allows us to understand some 
of the drivers of heterogeneity in estimates of future resource needs as well as the possible 
effectiveness of interventions. This conceptualisation in addition, presents the 
opportunity to include an understanding of the incentives and constraints acting on the 
behaviour of agents in the system and how this may influence the effectiveness and 
resource use associated with interventions (151). It is therefore a possible approach for 
identifying policy levers. 
 
Using TB case finding in HIV positive individuals as an example, various factors that 
could potentially shape the implementation of a program have been identified. These 
factors can be loosely classified as related to healthcare worker behaviour (supply-side), 
patient behaviour (demand side), or health system/ infrastructure (supply-side) 
constraints. Healthcare worker behaviour relates to the actions of those who are 
responsible for service delivery and their interpretation of the guidelines; Lipsky called 
these agents street-level bureaucrats when referring to their ability to mould how an 
intervention is applied (31,120,152). These factors are likely to be influenced by and 
influence patient behaviour. For example, Lin (2011) identified a decrease in the time 
between testing and diagnosis as a potentially crucial mechanism for reducing the 
percentage of patients who will not return to collect their TB test results (153). This would 
be facilitated by a point of care TB diagnostic as it would negate the need for further 
visits to the healthcare facility and the associated costs. Health system, infrastructural or 
programmatic constraints are likely to be another mechanism for influencing both patient 
and provider behaviour which is ultimately very likely to impact on patient outcomes 
(105).
 3.4 On the theory of economic evaluation  
 
Cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analysis are economic analytic techniques comparing 
two or more interventions in terms of the ratio of incremental costs per unit of incremental 
health effect when moving from one comparator to another. The results of the analysis 
are intended to guide decisions to maximise population outcomes given constraints, most 
frequently the budget constraint. The way in which the outcomes of the investment are 
expressed typically defines the analysis. Health economists debate the appropriate 
theoretical basis for economic evaluation and the implications for how this should be 
applied (154–157). The two main schools of thought could be summarised as welfarist 
or extra-welfarist perspectives, especially when evaluating investments that provide a 
broader range of benefits than health. The welfarist approach aims to maximise societal 
welfare with a societal budget constraint, is concerned with the distribution of resources, 
and values all outcomes in monetary terms (158). In contrast, the aim of the extra-
welfarist approach is to maximised health outcomes within a resource constrained health 
system (154,157). Outcome measures are therefore health related. A challenge in the 
application of the extra-welfarist approach is that using such a framework implies that 
society is only interested in investing in interventions that will improve health, when 
many interventions needed to strengthen the health system more broadly may have a 
lower direct causal link to reducing mortality (158).  
 
3.4.1 Costs and Outcomes 
 
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) uses physical outcomes such as deaths averted, 
number of patients diagnosed with TB, or life years saved. However, this approach can 
be restrictive as it is difficult to compare outputs between different programmes. An 
alternative is the Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) which uses a multidimensional measure of 
health as a measure of effectiveness. The multidimensional measures of health include 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) and Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY). The 
aim of the multidimensional measures of health is to weight the quantity of life by the 
quality of those years. A limitation of both approaches is that they assume that the goal 
of the health system is only related to maximising health and therefore that the 
  39 
opportunity cost in choosing one investment option over another is only related to health 
(159: 13). However, that may be a simplified way of thinking about the outcomes 
associated with health care, as one would also be interested in the effect of health care on 
equity (160,161); how it intersects with social care and the economic burden of illness in 
the community (162,163). More recently, there have been attempts to expand outcomes 
to consider the impact of health interventions on people’s capability well-being rather 
than focusing on health (164). The capability approach has been expanded to the 
sufficient capability approach which prioritises individuals below a normatively 
sufficient level of capability with the aim of maximising the number of people in society 
that achieve sufficient capability, allowing for a more egalitarian distribution of health 
resources possibly in line with the society’s values.   
 
For each of these approaches an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is estimated, by 
calculating the difference in cost between the intervention and the comparator and 
dividing this by the incremental effectiveness of the intervention. The equation can be 
written as: 
 
 ICER = (Cintervention – Ccomparator) 
             (Eintervention – Ecomparator) 
(1) 
 
Where Cintervention represents the cost associated with the intervention, Ccomparator is the cost 
of the comparator. Similarly, Eintervention is the effect size of the intervention and Ecomparator 
is the effect size of the comparator. The strategy used as the comparator when estimating 
the ICER, will be the next least cost-effective option when the strategies are ranked (78). 
 
The standard practice in economic evaluations is for cost analyses to include the cost of 
all inputs needed to produce the required outputs. This is done to include shifts in the use 
of capital items in the opportunity cost estimation, however this decision implicitly 
assumes that there is no spare capacity in the system and does not consider the dynamic 
reorganisation of the health system that occurs with the implementation of new resources 
(165). Analysts that develop cost functions, quantify these system changes in more 
sophisticated ways, though do not include the interactions between outcomes and costs. 
The challenge in these analyses is how to identify the absolute constraints (that cannot be 
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relaxed) as opposed to constraints that may be relaxed through additional investment 
(91). 
 
The ICER is then compared against other possible investments to be considered, in a 
shopping list approach using league tables. The investment with the lowest value ICER 
would be chosen for investment. Alternatively, the ICER is compared against a cost-
effectiveness threshold (CET).  Best approaches to estimating the level of the CET are 
an area of current debate (166,167). There has been a move away from previous 
suggestions to use the GDP (gross domestic product) of the country, with two broad 
schools of thought emerging. Some have argued that the threshold should be based on 
the marginal productivity of the health system and that an investment that is less than this 
value should be adopted as represents a more efficient use of resources (168,169). Others, 
conceptualised the CET as a revealed willingness of the health system to pay for an 
improvement of health, through a deliberative process, revealing certain values and have 
thus compared the estimated ICER against the ICER of the last decision with a high 
budget impact that has been made thus putting these decisions in the context of other 
decisions made (170).This decision, against the threshold, is shown on a decision plane 
in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Quadrants of the cost-effectiveness decision plane. Adapted from Briggs & Tambour (171). 
In the figure, NW refers to the north-west quadrant; NE refers to the north-east quadrant; SE to the south-
east quadrant and finally SW to the south-west quadrant. The dotted line crossing through the origin 
represents the maximum acceptable ICER (incremental cost-effectiveness ratio). An ICER that is plotted 
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below this line would be considered cost-effective while anything above the line would not be considered 
acceptable. If a treatment is said to be dominated, it means that another treatment is absolutely preferred. 
Typically, absolutely dominated options will not be considered for investment. 
 
Following the estimation of the ICER, the decision can be presented on the cost-
effectiveness decision plane. This allows for an explicit comparison against the decision-
rules, a process for determining whether an investment should be implemented. The 
plane, plots on the x-axis the incremental effectiveness of a new investment, and on the 
y-axis, the incremental cost.  The ICER of an investment that is more effective and more 
costly would therefore fall in the top right-hand quadrant of the graph. The decision rule 
is that an argument could be made for investment if the ICER falls below the maximum 
acceptable ICER which is represented by the sloped dotted line that crosses the intersect 
of the graph. If the new investment is more effective and less costly, then the investment 
is said to dominate other investments and should be implemented.  If an investment is 
less costly and less effective, it may still be implemented, if the reduction in effectiveness 
is acceptable. Lastly, if the new investment is less effective and more costly, the strategy 
is said to be absolutely dominated, with what is currently being done being less costly 
and more effective, and thus the dominated strategy would not be considered. Within a 
given healthcare budget, investment strategies being considered are seldom mutually 
exclusive, and what is often useful to policy makers is to present ICER in the form of an 
investment “expansion pathway”. This is done by estimating each ICER not compared to 
the base case comparator, but rather to the previous less cost-effective option that is not 
dominated (172: 329). 
 
In theory, by making decisions based on the maximisation of cost-effectiveness ratios at 
the margin is necessary for Pareto optimality (22,173). However, in practice, in many 
low- and middle-income countries, cost-effectiveness analyses are seldom conducted as 
part of a process of priority-setting across programmes in the health sector, and it is 
unclear how cost-effectiveness analyses of vertical interventions could fully consider the 
opportunity cost of not investing in an alternative option; and what exactly the trade-offs 
are. With many countries now having committed to Universal Health Coverage, the 
debate has shifted towards the notion of the design of benefit packages based on cost-
effectiveness analysis and affordability criteria, as part of a priority setting process (174). 
In addition, the link between the cost-effectiveness threshold and the budget constraint 
in the health system is not always clear (175). Some have argued that, beyond the 
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financial aspects, the budget constraint represents the organisation and capacity of a 
health system for which the decision is being made (22).  
 
3.3.1 Heterogeneity and decision-making 
 
Governments and donors often want to know whether (and how) investments improve 
health outcomes, with a focus on the need for ‘value for money’ investments. Decisions 
made during priority-setting processes that have unintended consequences or where the 
outcomes from the innovation are not as favourable as was hoped, may have a significant 
opportunity cost in terms of the value of an alternative investment that was not funded 
due to the over or under estimation of the benefit or costs of an investment.  Decision-
making without understanding the context may also result in exceptional value for money 
interventions not being identified and implemented. Garber (1997) suggested that 
uniform cost-effectiveness rules applied to a heterogeneous population are unlikely to 
yield Pareto-optimal resource allocations (176). Cost-saving interventions may be 
overlooked leading to inefficient and expensive healthcare, or through implicit rationing 
barriers in access and poor-quality care.  
 
De Sardan (2017) in his criticism of global decision making and target setting shows how 
interventions promoted by global donors and NGOs are simplified for the sake of 
widespread dissemination and to promote introduction in an almost identical format in 
vastly different country settings. He argues that:  
 
“The standardization of public health interventions is still rarely contested, neither 
at the operational nor at the theoretical level, and as such it appears to be 
‘untouchable’. It’s responsibility for implementation failures is neglected, and the 
major role of travelling models in the ignorance of underestimation of context is 
largely overlooked”.  
 
An important part of the critique that De Sardan raises, is that merely updating 
modularized ‘travelling models’ with predefined local variables, will not allow for the 
insights necessary to make decisions at the local level. Models need to be explicitly built 
with an understanding of the incentives and motivations that govern the behaviour of 
healthcare workers and the health-seeking behaviour of patients in a health system 
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context (177). This approach potentially allows for an improved understanding of 
leverage points within a system and how strategic investments would need to be designed 
to support these to improve resource allocation and decision-making in the health system. 
 
Innovations have as a function of their improved utility the ability to initiate change in 
the health system. Where previous policies or algorithms were not fully implemented, the 
improved utility or the prospect of improved utility may facilitate an improved 
commitment to these policies. It may be challenging to observe the changes sparked and 
these may only become more evident over time by influencing a network of interrelated 
levels. These may include healthcare provider behaviour, patients’ health-seeking 
behaviour and the wider health system which includes the infrastructure, functional 
organisation of the system and human resources.  
 
Similar interactions related to decision-making and agency present itself at each level of 
decision-making in the health system (73,178), whether it is the healthcare worker 
deciding on the best course of action in the treatment of a patient or the clinic decision-
maker deciding how to implement a range of recommended interventions; the district- or 
provincial level decision-maker tasked with deciding on how to spend the available 
budget, or decision-making at the national and global levels that shapes the direction of 
further policy development (32,108,109).  
 
3.4.2 Externalities and sustainability 
 
Up to now, the discussion has focused on how agents and therefore the production 
function may respond to changes. The market was conceptualised as only related to the 
health system. However, the health system is itself again situated within multiple 
dynamic systems. Actions taken within one system that influence other individuals or 
systems not explicitly involved in decision-making, are called externalities.  
 
In the evaluation of investments for TB control, when conceptualised within the confines 
of a vertically implemented conditional grant structure, several externalities that may 
have an impact on other health services should be considered. For example, diagnosing 
more people with TB, a clear clinical indicator for HIV, may prompt ART initiation and 
will within the organisation of the clinic, how this could best be dealt with in the existing 
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services is an important planning function. When considering investments from the 
societal perspective, the organisation of TB services including the number and duration 
of visits may affect patient productivity (days unable to work) and contribute to 
households’ medical poverty trap, especially in societies with high unemployment levels. 
Additional state services, in the form of social welfare may be required to support 
households In Chapter 6, we explore how externalities related to the impact of high TB 
prevalence on informal lending and support in communities may “spread” the medical 
poverty trap related to Tuberculosis in communities.  
 
3.4.3 Approaches to incorporating aspects of the health system in economic 
evaluation 
 
An emerging area of debate, especially in the application of economic evaluation in the 
dynamics and impact of infectious diseases, is that traditionally economic evaluations 
tend to be static analyses, in terms of the population, the impact of interventions on the 
population in terms of resource use as well as how guidelines are used. Economic 
evaluations therefore frequently represent the interactions in the health system at a single 
point in time (179,180). Within decision-making structures, processes for re-evaluating 
the cost-effectiveness of investments as changes in the health system happens and the 
implementation of technologies and the reorganisation of services changes practice (21). 
 
Given the interest in understanding how the system is likely to interact with the 
implementation of new interventions and the costs associated with these, there have been 
various attempts at improving modelling methods to make models more representative 
of the processes that they model (28,153,181,182). These efforts include the development 
of methods to include qualitative evidence  (183,184), allowing for a deliberative process 
in including model inputs when constructing the model, and for including realist 
approaches to understanding change associated with the intervention when modelling 
(185,186). A limitation of traditional cost-effectiveness evaluations is that a simplifying 
assumption is to focus on the intervention evaluated against a comparator (30,172). 
However, interventions to improve healthcare do not function within a vacuum and are 
influenced by healthcare provider behaviour, the socio-political context, co-morbid 
diseases, the burden of need and resultant patient-behaviour (152,187). As a result, to 
improve the usefulness of economic evaluations of healthcare interventions, it is 
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imperative to include some measure of the impact of the context on the cost-effectiveness 
of the intervention.  
 
There have been attempts at including the complexity of the health system in economic 
analyses, which often involves mixed methods studies with the results of the qualitative 
data reported separately in the discussion (188,189). English and colleagues (2009) 
propose a method for incorporating context by analysing the health system factors 
surrounding the intervention so that decision makers can clearly consider the context of 
the evaluation in deciding whether to act on the recommendations (187,188). Barasa and 
colleagues (2011) note that there are no established methodological approaches to include 
complexity in economic evaluations and suggest that economic evaluations should take 
the form of cost consequence analyses with a “balance sheet approach” in which costs 
and positive or negative consequences can be weighed up for the specific setting. The 
authors do however note that how this approach would make suggestions in terms of 
efficiency is unclear (30). This is because it is difficult to predict how resource use in the 
facility may shift, and which other services are likely to be deprioritised, and therefore 
the opportunity cost is unclear. 
 
The key methodological debates when applying economic evaluation to health systems 
strengthening interventions, include: 
? Health systems interventions are adaptive and dynamic as it diffuses through the 
health system, this is partly due to the discretionary power of health care workers 
in implementing these interventions. 
? Many cost-effectiveness analyses implicitly or explicitly assume that agents in 
the health system (health care workers or patients) are rational agents, by 
parameterising the analysis based on what is possible as opposed to what would 
happen in real health systems. 
? Decision rules are to implement the strategy leading to the greatest health 
improvement as the outcome of interest, however intermediary outcomes 
speaking to improvements in process may be more appropriate for evaluating 
investments in health systems strengthening. 
? Time preference. Investments that strengthen horizontal rather than vertical 
processes may not show an immediate (within a trial evaluation period) outcome 
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and the benefit of the investment may only be realised over a 10 to 20-year time 
period.  
? If decision-making were implemented as part of a continued process, there is a 
need for methodological clarity on approaches for making the case for 
disinvestment, as part of a dynamic health system. 
? Similarly, there is a need for considering when during the implementation of a 
new investment, it should be evaluated given the need for the intervention to first 
diffuse through the system. 
 
3.3.4 Spill over effects  
 
Historically, TB has been linked with poor living conditions, poverty and deprivation. 
Poverty and deprivation may be conceptualised as either absolute or relative, and further 
conceptualised in various ways. Traditionally, poverty has been assessed simply as a 
money-metric phenomenon. Increasingly, however, there is a recognition that poverty is 
a multi-dimensional manifestation of insufficient well-being which includes both 
monetary and non-monetary indicators. Some of the non-monetary indicators that have 
been considered include the lack of opportunities, freedom, information, health care, 
time, etc. and the inability to change this (190,191). The conception of poverty or 
deprivation (including the multidimensional measures) tends to ignore the relational and 
interactional aspects of individuals with their community (ecology).  Therefore, poverty 
is often described as resulting from an individual’s endowment and social network and 
not the ecological environment that relates to “civic participation, norms of reciprocity, 
and trust in others, that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit” (192: 1 491). The latter 
is contained in the social capital discourse.  
 
TB is by nature a social disease, given the association with deprivation and transmission 
through shared spaces (droplets).  In addition, poverty is entrenched when those who are 
ill are unable to work for an extended time, leading to loss of income, and further driving 
the cycle of impoverishment (52). TB may lead to stigmatisation of patients and isolation 
from their households and communities (193) due to the infectious nature of the disease 
thus eroding their connection with others. As a result, the link between TB and 
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deprivation needs to capture the ‘social’ dimension.  For example, Barnes (1995: 10) 
writes that an attempt to:  
 
“single out the determinant factor or factors in the incidence of tuberculosis … 
must inevitably run against the only indisputable fact that emerges from all the 
available evidence: the lives of many tuberculosis victims were lived inside a 
constellation of social conditions that affected their overall well-being.” 
 
The costs associated with ill health have been quantified in a variety of ways depending 
on the conceptualisation of the decision to be made and whether affordability of the cost 
of illness is considered at the individual, household, ‘firm’ or country level.  The resultant 
costs are either separately considered in a policy decision-making frame or combined 
with provider costs in an economic evaluation of interventions to support decision 
making (194: 4). However, these frameworks for considering the burden of ill health are 
too restrictive as they only consider the costs on individuals and households, without 
including the impact on the patient’s social networks. Traditionally, the household has 
been conceptualised as the geographical unit, in terms of those who live in the same house 
with the underlying assumption that this is how resources are shared (195). However, 
studies have found it difficult to predict households’ resilience to cost of illness, 
suggesting that there are factors other than the magnitude of costs at play (196). Recent 
patient cost studies have found that patients report that they had to borrow money to pay 
for health care related expenses but that no interest was charged on the loan (195,197–
199). These differences are thought to be dependent on social support structures such as 
being able to borrow money without interest, or where community members are able to 
perform the role of caregiver, social capital.  Household resilience was however found to 
diminish as chronic illnesses worsened the economic loss over time (200).  
 
3.4.4 Patient costs and the societal perspective 
 
Studies typically estimate out-of-pocket costs including the cost of transport and fees paid 
for treatment and compare these against a household’s or individual’s income or a proxy 
of income  (52). In some analyses an estimate of time cost or income loss (i.e. indirect 
costs), whether to the individual or other family caregivers, is included because these are 
also drivers of impoverishment (201,202).  
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In the literature, there is a substantial debate on how time cost should be valued (203,204). 
The approaches used can be grouped by the perspective of the decision-maker (i.e. the 
welfare state, ‘the firm’) or the perspective of the individual or household unit.  From the 
‘state’ perspective, the objective is to improve the wellbeing of citizens and to understand 
the impact of ill health on productivity, irrespective of how that productive time is used. 
This approach is called the Human Capital Approach (HCA), which attaches a monetary 
value to time spent being ill and unable to perform tasks; as well as time spent waiting at 
a health facility (205). The value of this time has varied. One approach to valuing people’s 
lost time uses the ‘market’ value of their time prior to being ill, in other words pre-illness 
income. While this approach is useful in advocating for a change in health services to 
improve access to those who are employed, it favours interventions that benefit those 
who are actively employed and disadvantages those underemployed or not employed 
outside the home and especially women (206). Others adjust for this in some ways using 
shadow prices. For example, the time of a mother who looks after her children at home 
would be quantified based on the market related value for a child minder  (205).  
 
When considering the individual or household perspective; a related measure is to value 
the opportunity cost of patients’ time by asking what they would have done if they were 
not ill or spending time in the health facility (207). This approach has however been 
criticised in that valuing the opportunity cost of one’s time is based on what “the market” 
would pay for one’s skills and could be seen as unjust in societies where people’s ability/ 
capability to acquire these skills is constrained through structural inequalities in access 
to education (208). It is also possible that such an assumption could lead to a focus on 
policies that would reduce the time cost of those who are least vulnerable based on their 
level of education and skill set. An alternative approach is to value the time of all people 
equally by using the mean income from a sample of respondents; or if not available by 
using a proxy such as the local minimum wage rate (209).  Using the HCA, all time lost 
due to illness or seeking care would be valued and no distinction is made between 
productive and leisure time (205,206). This is important as leisure time is crucial to the 
wellbeing of individuals, and to a productive workforce. 
 
If the objective is to understand the burden of ill health on ‘the firm’ or the economy, 
Koopmanschap (1995) has argued that the HCA overestimates the cost of productive time 
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by not distinguishing between time lost where the individual would have been productive 
and leisure time; and by not taking into account that individuals are likely to work harder 
the next day to make up for any productivity losses on the previous day (206). The friction 
cost method has been proposed as an alternative to evaluate the productivity cost of ill 
health on ‘the firm’. A key argument for this approach is that it recognises that within a 
company, if an employee is ill, it is possible for someone else to take on their work in 
addition to their own for short periods leading to minimal losses in productivity. 
However, if an individual is ill for longer periods of time, a new employee will have to 
be appointed. In the friction cost method, one would therefore see the cost of illness as 
the cost of having enough staff so that if one is ill, the work can be absorbed (internal 
labour reserves) as well as the cost of replacing the person who is ill if there is a longer 
term absence or the person has died (cost of mortality) (206).  The value attached 
therefore represents the net productivity loss observed. The economic unit of analyses for 
these approaches has primarily been the individual who is ill, their household and those 
in their household who care for them.  
 
Several approaches have been used to assess whether costs (OOP and time) incurred 
when ill are affordable to individuals and households. Some studies examine coping costs 
(eg. selling assets, borrowing money, children withdrawn from school) (210). Others 
examine whether costs are catastrophic by comparing the sum of the OOP costs incurred 
against annual household income, individual income or the household’s non-food 
expenditure (211,212). Another approach is to determine whether this pushes families 
into poverty or exacerbate existing poverty as measured in terms of how household 
income compares against the poverty line (211). When these measures are applied to an 
evaluation of the impact of a single disease, such as TB, it is likely that the impact of this 
illness within a broader health context will be underestimated (213). This is because many 
patients with TB will also have other co-morbid diseases such as HIV and diabetes that 
have already been eroding individual, household and community resilience. Having a 
specified level where households experience financial catastrophe may, therefore, not 
fully capture the full context of deprivation due to illness. Some have argued that 
household Ability-To-Pay (ATP) for healthcare is likely to be dependent on a wider range 
of factors, including the support received from social networks outside the household and 
community resilience (214,215). In addition, using a proportion of cost to income to 
compare against the catastrophic threshold does not consider the higher burden placed on 
  50 
low income households and communities, arguably the most vulnerable (216). It also 
does not consider how this burden changes during disease progression from acute to 
chronic, or migration between households or the possible network of dependents 
households may have who live outside the geographical unit.  It is therefore necessary to 
expand current measures beyond monetary affordability, to include measures of 
communities’ ability to afford the cost of ill health. 
 
The costs incurred by patients when ill and seeking health care is an important mediator 
of the effect of health service interventions and is included in economic evaluation 
(societal perspective) to inform investment decisions. Economic evaluation methodology 
has been expanded to include Extended Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, where the aim is to 
consider how investment scenarios may influence the proportion of patients with 
catastrophic costs or how the costs incurred influence position compared to the poverty 
line (42).  
 
Methods of possibly extending current approaches to economic evaluation include 
expanding the costs included in the economic evaluation. For Extended Cost-
effectiveness Analyses, where the analysis is dependent on assumptions on the size of the 
household/ the number of dependents on a salary, one may consider increasing the 
household size, while holding the income static to explore what effect these assumptions 
may have on the results. Others have proposed alternative decision-rules or extending 
outcomes in economic evaluation to take into account the family spill over effects of 
health care (156).  
 
A possible criticism of the approaches used to value the societal perspective is that it 
seldomly accounts for the connectedness of the community but sees the individual or the 
individual within their household without acknowledging the impact of ill health on the 
wider community/society, though one may argue that by incorporating productivity 
changes some of the impact on the wider community is included. The productivity loss 
would however not account for resource sharing within a wider community. Within a 
community with a high burden of chronic diseases such as HIV, TB, Diabetes etc. it is 
possible that social support structures will get depleted over time and potentially 
contribute to impoverishment at a community level. Patient cost analyses and especially 
poverty impact analyses should therefore take these broader issues into account. Whilst 
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the traditional application of the societal perspective is relevant in a system with a tax-
based social support network, in countries where there is a lack of formalised social 
support, it is crucial to include the costs of informal support in economic evaluations and 
decision-making. This will help to avoid shifting the burden of ill health from health 
services to families, households and informal social support structures.  
 
3.5 Theoretical framework of the thesis 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is presented in Figure 6.  The framework is 
intended to provide a shared understanding of the causal relationships among core 
concepts, some of which are then expressed mathematically in the model. It also provides 
an overarching scaffolding for concepts, some of which are then explored in more depth 
and represented in the analytical frameworks proposed for specific analyses. These 
analytical frameworks include the following:   
 
? Chapter 4: the drivers of healthcare worker diagnostic decision making (Figure 7);  
? Chapter 5: the concepts related to the economic burden of disease (Figure 17); and  
? Chapter 6: the model analytical framework (Figure 22).   
 
The thesis framework presents the cost-effectiveness calculation as the relationship 
between resources and outputs; which is mediated by the organisation of health services. 
The cost-effectiveness of an intervention is then compared against a cost-effectiveness 
threshold; which can represent either the efficiency of the health system or the revealed 
willingness of the ministry of health to pay for an improvement in health outcomes. The 
cost of the production of a component of the service, is expressed as the unit. The ways 
in which these resources are used within the organisation of the health service to produce 
an output then makes up the cost of care.  
 
The organisation of health services is guided by the social and institutional rules of the 
health system; and expressed through the behaviour of agents working within the system. 
The behaviour of agents within the constraints of the system, is influenced by a range of 
factors including their empowerment, the legal and institutional rules within which they 
work, their decision-making within perceived scarcity and their own sense-making of the 
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world (including ethical values and sense of altruism). The behaviour of agents 
(healthcare workers) may lead to the adaptation of guidelines and the associated resource 
use. While adaptation will lead to a change in how resources are used, it will also lead to 
a change in outcomes. In evaluating a diagnostic test, effectiveness does not directly 
follow from use but is mediated by the clinical decisions made by healthcare workers to 
request a test, as well as the decisions made in acting on information provided by the test 
(these can be conceptualised as the positive – and negative predictive values of 
decisions). The actions of agents with their own decision-making abilities working within 
the system, implementing an investment, leads to decisions that may not seem as efficient 
as was originally anticipated. This difference between the intended – and actual 
behaviour is called the agency cost and at macro level will contribute to the transaction 
cost of a system, recognising that at each decision point, there is the opportunity for 
adaption leading to a divergence from what was originally intended.  
 
The organisation of health services also has cost implications for patients accessing the 
service. At each interaction with the health service, patients will incur a cost in the form 
of direct out of pocket costs pertaining to travel, or if patients are paying for receiving 
health care - the cost of the service or medicines, but in addition patients also pay a cost 
in terms of their time spent travelling to the facility as well as their time spent in the 
facility waiting for care. In addition to this time opportunity cost, patients may also loose 
an income source due to the illness, when patients are too ill to work. These interactions 
are collectively called the economic burden of a disease and the cyclical relationship 
between ill health, loss of income, and cost associated with accessing care has been called 
the medical poverty trap. 
 
 
Figure 6. Theoretical framework developed for the thesis. 
The need for healthcare, is a function of many interrelated issues. It is not fixed but 
dynamic and grows and changes with time as is the case of an emerging epidemic, but it 
also changes as part of political priority setting processes and is sometimes stimulated by 
special interest groups. In this thesis, we define need for a particular population and then 
evaluate whether and how that need is met, making recommendations for the best 
approaches to meet this particular need. Perceived need also, through global, national and 
local decision-making processes drives resource availability as well as the development 
of clinical guidelines that ultimately shapes the movement of patients through the 
pathway of care. 
 
Decisions made within the health sector often lead to outcomes that impact on other 
sectors. This interaction is called the externalities of the decision. These externalities may 
be either positive or negative. So, for example, as was explained above, improved health 
outcomes, will reduce the cost of illness on patients and their households, possibly 
leading to a reduction in the need for social welfare due to loss of income. Similarly, a 
reduction in the length of time that a patient is ill or averting the transmission of a disease, 
could reduce productivity losses of the firm. The scope of an economic evaluation, which 
relates to the decision on which costs and outcomes to consider in the decision, is 
therefore a core part of the design and understanding of the problem being evaluated. 
 
Lastly, as the need for healthcare changes over time, so too many of the other interactions 
will change in ways that are sometimes challenging to predict, given that there are a range 
of interactions that influence the value of a given service. In economics literature, this 
shifting is referred to as the dynamic efficiency of the system. Economic evaluation as 
an analytical tool is used to assess the value of a specific investment at given point in 
time, within a clearly defined decision framework and therefore does not include these 
dynamic interactions in order to simplify the decision problem. However, as the practice 
of these evaluations are being included in the formal decision structures of health 
systems, there are increasingly recommendations for the cyclical re-evaluation of the 
cost-effectiveness of technologies. In the next chapter, the design of the economic 
evaluation upon which this thesis is built, is explained with reference to the empirical – 
and theoretical literature. In the analytical sections of the thesis, dynamic interactions are 
included by observing patterns of behavioural interactions and expressing these 
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mathematically by adding functions to express agency behaviour in the relationships with 
resource use and outcomes.  
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This chapter follows on from the preceding chapter, where the theoretical foundations of 
economic evaluation was discussed, by outlining the methods used in developing the 
mathematical model that forms the basis of the work presented in this thesis, the SINDI 
model. The model development will be described firstly by deriving a model conceptual 
framework to show the causal relationships between the variables included in the model. 
Parameter estimation is then described, followed by the validation and calibration 
processes used in the model and concluded in a review of the mechanics of the model 
using sensitivity analyses (the results of which are presented in Chapter 7) and outlining 
the strengths and limitations of the modelling platform as well as a reflection on the 
remaining gaps and areas of improvement needed.  
 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a leading cause of mortality in South Africa (217). The epidemic is 
associated with poor socio-economic status, nutritional deficiencies and living 
conditions, as well as with co-morbidities such as HIV and Diabetes. In relation to HIV 
co-morbidity, people living with HIV (PLWH) have a greater probability of developing 
active TB, and once ill with TB will have a higher rate of mortality. Furthermore, 
diagnosing TB in PLHIV is complicated by the disease dynamics. Patients who are HIV 
positive, are more likely to develop TB in sites other than the lungs (extra-pulmonary 
TB) and even in those with pulmonary TB, there is less cavitation in the lungs leading to 
pauci-bacillary sputum samples, making it harder to diagnose the disease when using 
sputum-based modalities. In contrast, while PLWH have a higher TB mortality rate, those 
who are HIV negative are currently thought to be more likely to contribute to TB 
transmission in the community (218), due to the cavitation in the lungs with bacilli 
expelled when breathing or coughing. Accurately diagnosing TB and starting the 
appropriate treatment as soon as possible is therefore a key pillar of TB control policy.  
In 2012, South Africa adopted the Xpert MTB/RIF test as a replacement test for sputum 
smear microscopy. While in smear microscopy, the bacterium is visualised under a 
  57 
microscope, Xpert MTB/RIF is an automated system that probes for Mycobaterium 
Tuberculosis genetic material. The integrated platform produces results within two hours 
and was developed with the potential of being used as a point of care test. In South Africa, 
during the implementation of the test, it was placed within the existing structure of the 
laboratory services and as a result, while the turn-around time greatly reduced, it was not 
reduced to a same-day response. Prior to the implementation of Xpert, most mathematical 
models predicted that the improved sensitivity of Xpert compared to smear would lead 
to a reduction in TB-associated mortality at a population level, with similar reductions in 
TB transmission due to a reduced time in the infectious state (80,219–224). Empirical 
studies conducted during the roll-out of Xpert showed that the implementation of the new 
diagnostic guidelines did not lead to a significant reduction in mortality (12,225,226), 
however many of the studies did show an improvement in intermediary outcomes such 
as the number of patients with bacteriological confirmation correctly started on treatment. 
It has been hypothesised that the structure of the health system and the test 
implementation, constrained some of the potential value of the test in routine care settings 
(12).  
 
Mathematical models have been extensively used to estimate the prevalence of TB in a 
population; used to simulate interactions between disease processes and biomedical 
interventions; to better understand interactions between people facilitating transmission 
or between populations and biomedical interventions. More recently, mathematical 
models have been used to simulate patients’ interactions within a health system for the 
estimation of resource needs at the population level (153,219,224,227).  However, the 
majority of these studies used observational data in the form of routinely collected -
(228,229) or secondary data from a variety of discrete studies, studying different 
populations within their context. There was therefore a need to understand within the 
same population, based on practice in routine care settings, how patients move through 
the patient care pathway and how this relates to their health outcomes. Cost-effectiveness 
analyses alongside clinical trials, are used to extrapolate the clinical outcomes from the 
trial to a period that is appropriate for the decision. It also allows the analyst to explore 
constraints and the mechanisms by which these may influence the overall results of the 
decision. 
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The dynamic modelling of system behaviours has advanced as computers’ processing 
power improved, and modelling methods expanded to include a focus on dynamic models 
and calibration processes (181). The model structure and approach are typically 
determined by the question, but an important consideration is also whether macro- 
(systems-level) or micro-level (between actors) interactions are modelled in a dynamic 
or static manner. Dynamic models account for both time- and population size dependent 
changes in the system. While static models consider the system as it would be in 
equilibrium at a specified point in time, this helps to limit computational complexity in 
the model. Dynamic models are useful for modelling macro-level processes; however, 
the complexity involved in modelling multiple interacting mechanisms, and the need to 
model the intersection between resource use and health outcomes, leads many analysts 
to use static decision analytic models (DAM) when modelling for cost-effectiveness 
analysis. In cost-effectiveness analyses the question tends to be, given a set of 
circumstances described, what would be the best set of investments, within a set budget 
to address the problem identified. A limitation of static DAM is that they are less 
adaptable to presenting the dynamic movement of patients into and out of care.  
 
Agent – or individual based models have been suggested as a tool for modelling complex 
behavioural interactions (230). It is a useful approach to include the detail of variability 
in patient movements through care.  However, these models require large amounts of 
data, especially when modelling detailed processes such as diagnostic, and are inherently 
stochastic when modelling the behaviour of individual agents. In addition, including data 
external to the trial, requires a resampling approach to parameter estimation therefore 
requiring a very flexible modelling framework and may be very computationally 
intensive. This makes uncertainty estimation, required for cost-effectiveness analysis, 
more challenging. Stochastic models include processes that are dependent on random 
numbers or events, and will therefore produce different results each time the model is run 
(230: 195). In contrast, in deterministic models, a given set of inputs will always produce 
the same output. Additional complexity may be added through the inclusion of time-
dependent processes in Markov models or the use of cost-functions to present how the 
production of a service may change with an increase in need (44). In economic models, 
the effect of changes in resource needs and population on the decision is explored using 
extensive sensitivity analyses.   
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We estimate the cost of investments to support the implementation of Xpert, a new TB 
diagnostic by: 
 
P x E x C 
 
Where P is the probability of movement along the pathway; E is the probability of the event (utilisation) 
occurring when the patient is in this state; and C is the unit cost associated with the particular service 
utilised. 
 
This chapter outlines the approach used, and how this was applied empirically. Trials are 
used as the platform for collecting and analysing data to provide input into policy 
processes related to resource allocation. Increasingly trials are conducted of, not only 
biotechnology, but of public health and social policy interventions (231). These economic 
evaluations have unique challenges and characteristics to be considered in the design of 
the economic evaluation, especially in cluster randomised control trials or observational 
studies (232). Firstly, given the expense of conducting trials with repeated follow-up 
visits, the length of the trial may be shorter than is needed to estimate an outcome for an 
economic evaluation. Trials are therefore often combined with analyses using 
mathematical models to predict outcomes beyond the timing of the main outcome of 
interest collected during the trial. For an economic evaluation, this is often a health 
outcome, typically mortality. A related challenge therefore with trial-based studies is that 
the intermediary endpoints in the trial do not necessarily correspond to the outcomes that 
are most useful to health economists. Decision analytic models are therefore used as a 
way of presenting a synthesised analysis of available evidence of the causal pathway 
between resource use and health outcomes. 
 
 
4.2 Overview of mathematical models of TB diagnosis 
 
Prior to the implementation of Xpert MTB/RIF, mathematical models were used to 
estimate the possible costs , the effectiveness, as well as potential drivers of revised 
diagnostic algorithms where Xpert MTB/RIF replaces sputum smear microscopy in a 
variety of contexts (233–235). As new evidence started emerging of the lack of effect of 
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the implementation of the revised diagnostic algorithms on population-level mortality, 
models in conjunction with emerging evidence were used to understand the differences 
between envisaged and actual impact of revised diagnostic algorithms. Modelling 
diagnostic processes is challenging, given the need to balance the detailed micro-
processes of the diagnostic algorithm that needs to be represented; and the systems-level 
movements of people into and out of care that drives disease outcomes, while still having 
the flexibility to investigate the mechanisms of interventions to amend or support these 
interactions (236). In addition, estimating uncertainty intervals around these detailed 
interactions can be challenging and may overestimate uncertainty in the final decision 
(237). In some models, the interactions between the micro- and the macro-level 
processes, analogous to the interactions mentioned in Coleman’s boat, see Figure 4, have 
been represented by using decision trees to present the micro processes of diagnosis, 
linked to a dynamic disease transmission model that represents how patient outcomes 
changes the population in need (224,238). Data sources for the models primarily included 
data from secondary literature or routinely collected data. Secondary literature tends to 
be aggregated at the cohort level and may hide interacting variables in the causal pathway 
that may alter treatment – or health outcomes, these include differing underlying patient, 
disease and health service characteristics between cohorts studied (239,240).  
 
Lin (2011) developed a modelling framework where he used a transmission model, with 
smaller transitions to present diagnostic processes. The model was applied in Tanzania 
and was used to evaluate the effectiveness of Xpert implementation. The model 
simulations suggested that, within the Tanzanian setting, that Xpert reduces the period of 
infectiousness from 10.4 months to 9.1 months and argued that the onset of symptoms is 
not a good indicator of the onset of infectiousness. His effectiveness results were 
dependent on delays in seeking care (demand side delays), access to TB care (supply side 
delays), patient loss-to-follow-up before diagnosis, or patients not returning after the 
diagnostic test, and finally the treatment success rate (153). In a cost-effectiveness 
analysis, conducted around the same time, Vassall et al. found that from the health service 
perspective that implementing Xpert would cost $52 - $138/ DALY averted. The model 
also differentiated between new and previous TB and smear positive and smear negative 
TB. In this analysis, the key drivers of the decision were thought to be the performance 
of the current TB practice which includes what happens after a negative test result (the 
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negative pathway). Using the model, they argued that if the sensitivityiii of the current 
diagnostic practice is low but the specificityiv is high, Xpert will have a larger impact on 
effectiveness, leading to a reduction in treatment costs by reducing the number of people 
with false positive test results receiving TB treatment. It is possible that following the 
implementation of Xpert and during routine use, this effect of the reduction of the number 
of false positives from the test, was negated by the lack of implementation of further tests 
after a negative test result (negative pathway) – thus reducing the incremental value of 
Xpert (80). 
 
Gaps in the literature 
 
The following gaps in the literature have been identified: 
 
? The majority of the model-based cost-effectiveness analyses of diagnostics were 
conducted from the provider perspective (80,219,221–224,241), with the exception 
of a study conducted in Tanzania (224), as well as the within-trial cost-effectiveness 
analysis as part of this XTEND trial (79) where the costs incurred by patients were 
also considered. This is an important gap as the number of visits made by patients in 
seeking care is likely to extend transmission time, and also increases the costs  
incurred by patients (104), a potential barrier to health care. 
? The model-based analyses typically used data from laboratory studies to estimate the 
sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic test, this approach may not fully link the 
limitations of sputum-based diagnostic modalities to the outcomes experienced by 
patients. Some of the limitations of sputum-based diagnostic modalities includes poor 
sputum collection techniques (242), estimates of pauci-bacillary sputum and extra-
pulmonary TB (243).  
 
The work reported here, addresses some of these gaps by combining the longitudinal 
patient cost study, with the provider perspective to also explore how changes in the 
                                            
iii The sensitivity of a diagnostic test: the ability of the test to correctly identify an individual as having the 
disease. In a 2x2 table, this would be estimated as the number patients TP/ (TP + FN). Where TP refers to 
true positive and FN refers to false negative. 
iv The specificity of a diagnostic test: the ability of a test to correctly identify an individual as disease free. 
In a 2x2 table, this would be estimated as the number of patients TN/(TN + FP) (371). 
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organisation of health services (through changes to guidelines or the behaviour of agents) 
would shift costs onto households or alleviate the economic burden of TB disease.   
 
 
4.3 Model structure 
 
The structure of a mathematical model represents our understanding of the relationships 
and interactions represented in the model. Following a similar approach to what was used 
by Carter et al. 2018, variables in the analysis were identified from a combination of a 
review of the literature, and empirical analyses of the trial epidemiological and economic 
data (244). Squires et al. argued that making the process of model development and the 
relationships between variables explicit, is an important part of rigour in the development 
of mathematical models. A conceptual modelling framework was constructed based on 
the available evidence (184,232,245) and is shown in Figure 7. The framework depicts:  
 
? the relationships between variables in the model;  
? hypotheses for how investments may be implemented in the model; and  
? shows the direction of the relationship between variables when estimating the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER).  
 
The model presented here, the SINDI model, uses the structure of a decision-analytical 
model (DAM) combined with Markov processes in order to bring in some of the 
complexity of how people move into and out of care (246). The majority of TB models 
reviewed either used a tree structures whereby patients move along the care pathway 
based on a set of conditional probabilities until either cured or died (80,220,247). 
Alternatively, disease models were built with the focus being on patient contact patterns 
or transmission and the complexity around diagnostic processes were often less fully 
presented, but dynamics over longer time periods are simulated (234,236). Here, the 
model was designed to make best use of the detailed data available representing routine 
patient care, by having patients move into and out of care, from diagnosis through to 
treatment. Changes in the behaviour of healthcare workers when implemented in the 
model shifts the ways in which people move into and out of care. We used the data from 
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the trial, representing routine care to parameterise the rate at which patients would move 
from out of care back to treatment.  
 
The model structure was defined by a set of mutually exclusive HIV disease states and 
subdivided to account for 1) TB/HIV co-infection and progression of TB disease, 2) 
diagnostic and treatment algorithms, 3) drug resistant TB strains. See Figure 8 and Figure 
9 for the model structure. To accurately present the complexity of TB diagnostic 
guidelines, transition sub-trees were added to the symptomatic Markov nodes (248). 
Using decision subtrees allows for the patient’s prior history to be considered structurally, 
mediating the ‘Markovian assumption’, referring to the tendency of Markov models to 
be “memoryless” (249). The model simulates individuals’ movements between health 
states deterministically in defined (monthly) cycles, following a cohort from the start of 
TB symptoms to death or resolution of symptoms.   
 
Transitions between health states are modelled using the following equations. Patients 
progress between states at constant rate (equal movement at equal cycle lengths) .  
The transition probability of going from state 1 to 2 in time t, is given as:   
 
  (1) 
 
Estimating conditional probabilities, in other words where there is a movement between 
states that is dependent on the path patients took in arriving at this transition, can be 
written as a set of Kolmogorov equations.  
 
It is possible for an individual to remain in each state in successive time periods, or to 
move between health states (and disease characteristics) monthly, dictated by state 
transition probabilities, and in the initial states, half cycle corrections were used to adjust 
for timing in the model. Absorbing states have no transition subtree or affiliated jump 
state and therefore the probability of exiting the state is zero. The model was developed 
and implemented using TreeAge Pro software. The model follows on earlier TB 
economic models but with a focus on explicitly modelling the interactions between 
patient pathways and the patient-important outcomes of the challenges experienced in 
health systems (80,153,224,234,250,251). 
p ?? ????=?- ????g?? ???
  64 
 
HIV/TB co-infection alters the rate of progression of TB disease but also dictates the 
sensitivity of the diagnostic tests and, due to low bacillary load, reduces the ability to 
diagnose TB from a sputum sample. Three subcategories were created to account for the 
differences in disease progression, utilisation, diagnostic – and treatment algorithms of 
those, HIV negative, HIV positive not on ART, and HIV positive on ART. Patients in the 
model are therefore at any time categorized by the combination of their TB and HIV (on 
or off ART) status. Each of the five core health states, namely TB symptoms, out of care, 
Drug Sensitive (DS) treatment, Retreatment, and Drug Resistant (DR) treatment are 
replicated for each of six possible HIV and TB categories namely HIV negative no TB, 
HIV negative with TB, HIV positive no TB, HIV positive with TB, HIV positive on ART 
no TB, and HIV positive on ART with TB. These states are then expanded into 81 unique 
health states in the model. Patients’ transition between model states and subdivisions are 
based on transition probabilities. Where transitions over time did not occur at a constant 
rate (time-varying), tunnels linking to parameter tables as well as cost curves were used 
to represent the change over time in the model. It is possible, within the model, for an 
individual to transition from being HIV positive to HIV positive on ART, however, 
within the model, we do not allow those HIV negative to become HIV positive.  
 
The model structure is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. All individuals enter the model 
as symptomatic; receive an initial diagnostic test, followed by additional tests and/ or 
treatment. If the individual does not start treatment within the first month of a diagnostic 
test result, they will move to the ‘out of care’ box in the model and return to treatment at 
a time dependent function calculated from the empirical data.  
 
Each health state is associated with resource use, costs and a disability weight based on 
the group’s TB and HIV disease profile. The model is used to estimate the expected value 
of mortality, cost and Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) averted from time in 
health states to the end of a single TB episode. TB and HIV- associated mortality was 
sourced from secondary published sources in South Africa and calibrated to the ‘within 
trial’ observed mortality rate. Disability-weights were derived from the 2010 global 
burden of disease study. All future costs and benefits included in the study, were 
discounted at 3%, and varied between 0 and 10% in the univariate sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
Figure 7. Conceptual framework summarising the evidence used to construct the mechanisms of the model. 
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Figure 8. Outline of the Markov processes of the model 
This same structure shown here for HIV negative patients with TB, is repeated for patient groups who are (2) HIV negative no TB; (3) HIV positive with TB; (4) HIV positive 
no TB; (5) HIV positive on ART no TB; (6) HIV positive no TB. The structure shows the part of the model where patients enter the model on the left, move through the health 
states and the red triangle at the end of the branch represents a movement to the next cycle and state. Where no link to a next box is indicated to the right of the red triangle, 
those branches are absorbing states, in other words patients do not return to the model population after having entered that state. In the figure, nTB refers to no TB; rr treatment 
refers to Rifampicin resistance, leading to MDR treatment; and ds treatment refers to drug-sensitive treatment.    
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Figure 9. Decision tree structure, representing the diagnostic processes of the model through which an individual enters the Markov states depicted in Figure 8 
Where nTB refers to no Tuberculosis; rr treatment refers to treatment for Rifampicin resistance leading to MDR-TB treatment; and ds treatment refers to drug-sensitive 
treatment. The variables below the line of the tree structure denotes the name of the parameter driving movement through the model. The structure shows the part of the model 
where patients enter the model on the left, move through the health and process states and the red triangle at the end of the branch represents a movement to the next Markov 
cycle and state. The states transitioned to are shown in Figure 8. 
The outcomes from treatment modelled are cure or death. In order to simplify the model 
structure, we assume that those remaining in care at six months on drug-sensitive 
treatment are cured of the current TB episode and would return as a new patient if they 
become symptomatic again; while those still alive on drug-resistant (DR) TB treatment 
at 24 months are considered cured.  These assumptions follow practice of identifying 
patients failing treatment earlier in the care pathway, and not having the technology to 
diagnose sub-clinical TB thus patients with previous TB, would therefore enter the 
system and be counted as a new TB treatment episode. 
 
 
4.4 Characteristics of the population modelled  
 
Following common practice in economic evaluation, we use a cohort modelling approach 
whereby we model options for the care of a particular group of people (cohort). The 
population modelled is representative of the population of the XTEND study (12), which 
can be argued to be nationally representative of routine care settings in South Africa. 
 
XTEND was a pragmatic cluster randomised control trial, embedded in phase three of 
the national roll-out of Xpert in South Africa. Clusters were defined as a laboratory with 
two affiliated healthcare clinics. Twenty laboratories were selected from four provinces, 
and randomised to sputum Xpert (immediate implementation) or sputum microscopy 
(deferred Xpert implementation) study groups (12).  
 
? Provinces represent very rural settings such as the Eastern Cape and highly urban 
settings such as Gauteng.  
? Patients were eligible for enrolment into the study if older than 18, not on TB 
treatment, and resident in the area for the next eight months.  
? If clinic staff requested a sputum specimen to investigate for possible TB. We 
therefore sampled patients after health care workers, practicing routine care, had 
already identified a patient as possibly having TB. 
? Patient management was conducted by clinic staff in line with routine practice. 
Participants were enrolled into the study and interviewed again six months later to 
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determine whether and when TB treatment or anti-retroviral therapy (ART) was 
started.  
? Deaths were recorded through reports from clinic staff, participant-nominated 
contacts, and by accessing the Department of Home Affairs vital statistics database.  
 
The epidemiological burden and health system indicators relating to TB and HIV care in 
South Africa are summarised, by province, in Error! Reference source not found. and 
Table 5. The provinces from which the XTEND study was sampled are highlighted in the 
table to facilitate comparison. The provinces included as part of the XTEND study and 
thus the population modelled, had a slightly higher HIV prevalence than the South 
African average, a slightly higher TB death rate among those who were diagnosed, with 
loss-to-follow-up numbers and treatment success rates similar to those reported as the 
national average.  
 
Table 1. Epidemiological and health service indicators at the time of the study.  
 
In the figure; *numbers of patients started on MDR or XDR-TB treatment is approximately half of those laboratory diagnosed; **Treatment success rated defined as the ‘the 
proportion of all types of TB patients that were either cured or completed a full course of treatment;***Average 2015 ZAR/USD exchange rate (1 USD = ZAR15,19), from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ (last accessed 6 March 2016). DHS: district health system; Results are presented by province; EC: Eastern Cape; FS: Free 
State; GP: Gauteng; KZN: KwaZulu Natal; LP: Limpopo; MP: Mpumalanga; NC: Northern Cape; NW: North West; WC: Western Cape. (Source: 2014/2015 Health Systems 
Trust District health barometer: 228; STATS SA publication P0302, P03022015: 7; HSRC 2012 SA national HIV prevalence, incidence and behaviour survey)
 4.5 Parameter estimation 
 
Five types of parameters were estimated to be used in the model: 
 
? Conditional transition probabilities along the pathway; estimated from trial data 
? Unit costs from the costing component of the study 
? Utilisation from the same trial participants 
? Disability weights from published literature 
? Survival from published literature and calibrated to the model analysis, using the 
structure informed by the conceptual framework. The relationship thus represents 
the mechanisms driving mortality in this cohort, with the behavioural mediators 
explicitly explored.  
 
The parameters used in the model are summarised in Table 11. 
 
4.5.1 Conditional transition probabilities 
 
The model parameters were calculated by estimating conditional probabilities from 
patient-level cohort data collected as part of a cluster randomised control trial (XTEND). 
The trial methodology is described fully in Churchyard et al. (2015) (12). Conditional 
probability P(B, A) is the probability (P) of an event (A), given that another (B) has 
already occurred. Probabilities were estimated for the specific patient types, including 
those HIV positive, HIV positive on ART and HIV negative at each time step, based on 
the model conceptual framework summarised in Figure 7. Following the results of the 
first diagnostic test, patients’ further pathways were calculated based on the observed 
results and how patients would then move through the diagnostic pathway to treatment. 
For each transition probability, the mean and standard deviation was estimated from the 
empirical data. Distributions for binomial events, two possible events at a model decision 
node, such as transition probabilities and disability weights were implemented in the 
model as Beta distributions. Beta distributions are continuous probability distributions 
between 0 and 1.  Where there were three or more probabilities around a decision node, 
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Dirichlet distributions were used so as not to exceed one during sampling (252). Dirichlet 
distributions are multivariate probability distributions, dependent on a set of Beta 
distributions. In the model, it allows for sampling from each of the underlying Beta 
distributions defined around the decision mode, with simultaneous adjustment of the 
other probabilities so that none will exceed a probability of one. Cost and utilisation data 
tend to not follow a normal distribution and are typically right skewed. This is because 
costs typically are not negative and can be very large in outlying cases for a range of 
reasons, including the organisational structure of the health facility where care is being 
costed or low utilisation of a facility but similar overheads (172: 254). These skewed 
distributions were implemented in the model as Gamma distributions. 
 
4.5.2 Guidelines and patient pathways 
 
Clinical guidelines are used as a set of recommended rules for practice in clinical settings. 
The guidelines are typically part of an evidence synthesis process to determine the most 
effective or preferred manner of identifying and treating patients with specific conditions. 
These guidelines can be conceptualised as the organisational rules that govern the 
behaviour of healthcare workers, with the aim of attaining a certain outcome at the 
population level. 
 
The South African TB diagnostic and treatment guidelines implemented at the time of 
the XTEND study are described below. At the time of the study, TB screening was 
primarily passive in that it depended on patients with symptoms suggestive of TB 
presenting to the health facility seeking care. In contrast, active TB case finding refers to 
the process of identifying patients with possible TB based on their risk of having TB, and 
a diagnostic test is offered. More recently, there has been a global focus on scaling up 
case finding and in the South Africa, the TB programme has extensively scaled up 
screening in health facilities. 
 
TB screening: has been primarily passive, as it depends on the self-presentation of 
persons with TB symptoms to health care facilities, bringing their symptoms to the 
attention of a health care worker. Following the South African national TB investment 
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case, there has been a shift in these recommendations towards more active TB case 
finding.  
 
TB diagnostics: The TB diagnostic algorithm at the time of the XTEND study, is 
summarised in Figures 10 and 11 below.  
 
 
TB treatment: Following the introduction of Xpert, there has been a move away from a 
retreatment regimen. The standard (drug-sensitive TB) treatment regimen is RHZE daily 
for 2 months (intensive phase); followed by RH daily for 4 months (continuation phase).  
This is the standard treatment regimen for new and previously treated patients.  In the 
case of extra-pulmonary TB, the continuation phase is prolonged to 7 months.  It is also 
recommended that patients are started on Vitamin B6 (25 mg daily) and steroids are given 
in EPTB. If drug resistant TB is diagnosed: INH mono-resistant TB – RHZA for 6 to 9 
months; any Rif resistant TB – MDR-TB regimen for 18 to 24 months. 
 
Monitoring: All diagnosed with Xpert will also need to have a baseline smear and be 
monitored with smear microscopy. If smear negative or EPTB, will be monitored 
clinically. A smear microscopy is done a week before the end of the intensive phase of 
treatment. If the smear microscopy is positive conduct a LPA (or culture and DST) to 
check drug sensitivity. Repeat one week before the end of the continuation phase. If 
positive, patient is identified with treatment failure. Recheck patient’s drug susceptibility. 
ART: ART initiation if TB diagnosed before starting  
ART: if patient has a CD4 count < 50 start ART straight away. If the CD4 count > 50 
start ART before end of intensive phase. If a patient develops TB while on ART, continue 
treatment but adjust the ART dosages to minimise drug-drug interactions. 
(About 20% of HIV+ patients who start ART after TB diagnosis will develop TB-IRIS. 
Prednisone is used to suppress severe symptoms.) 
DOT recommendation: The recommendation in the NTCP adult TB guidelines is that 
patients’ treatment monitoring should be adapted in a way such as would most suit the 
patient. 
 
While the summary presents the official guidelines, these guidelines were not uniformly 
implemented across all nine provinces in South Africa, with implications for the 
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generalisability of the results of the model estimates.  For example in the Western Cape 
instead of a single sample, two samples were taken consecutively at the health facility 
and sent to the laboratory (75). This provided the opportunity for an additional sample to 
be available in the case the first sample was not viable (low bacillary load or saliva as 
opposed to sputum) or if there is the need to culture a sample to check for drug resistance. 
A sample is not reusable after an Xpert test has been performed given that the bacteria is 
destroyed in the sample as part of performing the test. Therefore, routinely taking two 
sputum samples, is thought to provide more definitive results, more quickly and reduces 
the need to request another sample from the patient, which may delay diagnosis. 
 
Comparing against other patient pathway analyses; data collated from the South African 
national routinely collected data system showed that based on an estimated TB incidence, 
that of all patients with true TB, 95% access TB tests, 82% receive a diagnosis, 70% get 
treated and only 53% of those with TB will be recorded as successfully treated (228). The 
data from the XTEND trial was used to parameterise the movement of patients through 
care (12).  In the trial cohort, 14.9% (26/174) of patients in the microscopy arm of the 
study and 17.0% (34/200) of patients with bacteriologically-confirmed TB in the Xpert 
arm of the study did not start TB treatment within 28 days of submitting a sputum 
specimen. A review of routinely collected data in 11 primary health care clinics in the 
Western Cape, found an initial loss-to-follow-up of 16% (253). In the analysis of 
routinely collected data described above, the authors found an arithmetic mean of 19.4% 
initial-loss-to-follow-up rate with a range in values of between 14.4% and 24.3% (228).  
The similarities in initial loss-to-follow-up estimates between the routinely collected data 
and the results from the XTEND cohort thus suggests that the behaviour modelled from 




Figure 10. South African TB diagnostic guidelines (Xpert-based) at the time of the XTEND study.  
The algorithm presented here, represent the South African national guidelines at the time of the XTEND study. However, since the XTEND study (2012), the South African 
TB diagnostic guidelines have been updated to include the use of the urine LAM assay in hospitalised HIV-positive individuals with low CD4 counts (NAC, 2017).  
 
Figure 11. South African TB diagnostic guidelines (Sputum smear microscopy) at the time of the 
XTEND study. 
 
Table 2: Description of the model of TB service in each of the facilities sampled 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Province Eastern Cape Eastern Cape Eastern Cape Free State Free State Free State Gauteng Gauteng Mpumalanga  Mpumalanga 
Setting 
Busy clinic 
located in a semi-
rural area. Clinic 
located in town 
Very busy clinic in 
a densely 
populated area 
















on a hill which has 
access via a 




clinic is on the 
outskirts of the 
township. 
Large very 







Urban. Located in 
a densely 
populated area in 
a township on the 
periphery of a 
city. 
Annual clinic 
headcount 53 491 74 294 14 887 65 682 50 077 47 245 87 078 120 589 75 847 82 217 
Model of TB service 
Patients with 
possible TB are 
investigated in the 
facility. While 
awaiting test 
result, patient is 
treated for a chest 
infection. 
Daily facility-
based DOTS are 
provided. 
PHC and TB 
services are 
integrated. Patients 
with possible TB 
are referred to the 
exclusive TB 
nurse to collect TB 
sputum. All TB 
positive cases are 
also tested for 
HIV. TB treatment 




10% of TB 
treatment are on 
facility-based 
DOTS. 




10% of TB 
patients get daily 
facility-based 









TB are screened 
in the PHC 
rooms, if a 
suspect test 
positive for TB 
treatment is 
started and 













sputum taken in 













possible TB are 
screened in the 
PHC system. 
Facility based 
daily DOTS is 
administered by 
DOTS supporters 
employed by a 





nurses follow up 
patients who miss 
appointments. 
Diagnosis is made 

















referred to the 
TB section. 
Patients with 
possible TB are 
screened and 
diagnosed in 
this clinic then 




Integration is in 
process. 
There is a separate 
TB section with 
focal nurse. If on 
streptomycin, TB 
patients come to 
the clinic daily, 
otherwise collect a 
monthly supply of 
treatment and seen 
by peer educators/ 
CHWs four times 
in a month. 
Median intensive 
phase visits new 
treatment 




18 (4;28) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 21 (16;27) N/A 0.5 (0.5;0.5) 2 (2;2) 
Median continuation 
phase visits new 
treatment 




4 (4;4) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 (4;22) N/A N/A 2 (2;2) 
In the Table, data collected from the clinic manager between July 2011 and June 2012. Where CHW refers to the community health workers; DOT is directly observed therapy; PHC is primary health care; NGO is non-
governmental organisation.
 4.5.3 Unit costs 
 
Costs incurred by the cohort simulated in the model is estimated by adding a unit cost 
value multiplied by the utilisation associated with a specific health state or process during 
the specified time interval. Costs were assessed from a societal perspective and are 
reported in 2013 US dollars (USD). Using similar arguments to ones posed by Meyer-
Rath et al. 2015, costs were not inflated to present values (255), because adjusting for 
inflation would not accurately represent the present value of resource inputs given that 
some of the inputs do not track the consumer price inflation (CPI) index. For example, 
the prices of medicines used in the public sector are decided through a tendering process 
and then set for a number of years (256). Similarly, human resource costs are not 
primarily dependent on inflation-based increases as increases in the salaries of healthcare 
workers are determined through negotiations between trade unions and the State.   
 
Unit costs were estimated as part of primary data collection alongside the trial, sampled 
from the same study sites where the outcomes data were collected. The details of the 
methodology associated with these costing studies have been published (198,257–259). 
A combination of top-down and bottom-up costing methods were used. So, for example, 
facility overhead costs were allocated to specific processes using a utilisation or staff time 
allocation factor. Processes were observed, inputs noted and valued, and interactions 
timed to estimate the unit cost of a procedure or input (258).   
 
Provider costs, the cost of diagnosing and treating patients with TB, were estimated for 
eight of the primary health care facilities included in the study (two per province) and 
included the cost of building health care facilities, the cost of human resources, the cost 
of any observed resources used and the cost of medication. The cost of medication was 
estimated from the South African Department of Health medicines price registry, which 
lists the tender price of medicines negotiated. We added 8% of the tender price of the 
medicine, to this cost for the distribution system (ref Margaret von Zeil, personal 
communication). For MDR TB treatment, we followed the estimates of Sinanovic and 
colleagues who constructed a cost of RR TB treatment by assuming a mixture of 
centralised and decentralised models of care were used nationally based on a 54%: 46% 
urban-rural split (259). Inpatient care for MDR treatment was assumed to be 44 days in 
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the fully decentralised model and 128 days in the fully centralised model. The cost 
associated with Xpert in the laboratory was likewise calculated from primary data 
collection in twenty laboratories during test implementation, and includes the cost of 
laboratory space used to process the test, human resource costs (based on time spent 
processing observed), as well as the cost of any resources needed to conduct the required 
assays (258). Provider unit costs estimated are summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Provider unit costs in 2013 US$ 
Description Value or calculation Distribution Reference 
Antibiotic trial (5 
days) per patient, 
drug costs 
$0.28 Uniform 
Vassall et al. 2017; 
Churchyard et al. 
2015 
Chest x-ray $15.17 Uniform Foster et al. 2017. 
Culture $12.90 Uniform Cunnama et al. 2016. 
Culture (DST) $25.10 Uniform Cunnama et al. 2016. 
Inpatient bed day $71.61 Uniform   
LPA $20.30 Uniform Cunnama et al. 2016. 
Microscopy test $8.67 Uniform Cunnama et al. 2016. 
Public clinic visit $12.54 Uniform Vassall et al. 2017. 
Treatment visit $7.32 Uniform Vassall et al. 2017. 










– 6.9701(_tunnel)^4 + 
73.436(_tunnel)^3 – 
309.63(_tunnel)^2 + 





Vassall et al. 2017. 
 
In the Table, DS treatment refers to drug-sensitive treatment; LPA line probe assay; DST drug sensitivity 
test.  
 
The costs incurred by patients were estimated from patient exit interviews conducted with 
two cohorts of patients, in ten of the XTEND study clinics (198,257). The unit of analysis 
was the patient within their household and community. The first cohort of 351 people 
with suspected TB were interviewed at the time of receiving a TB diagnostic test and 
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followed up six months later. The second cohort, 168 patients on TB treatment were 
recruited from the same ten facilities and followed up at five months on treatment. In 
addition, 134 RR TB patients at different stages in their treatment were interviewed with 
82 of these receiving inpatient care and 52 receiving treatment in outpatient facilities. We 
estimated health care utilisation, out of pocket costs incurred due to transport and other 
expenses incurred. We also estimated patients’ income and income loss associated with 
ill health; as well as the cost of informal care. Cost results are presented separately for 
patient costs and ‘community costs’ that includes the cost of informal care. 
 
The costs associated with health seeking behaviour and time loss from the start of TB 
associated symptoms to getting tested for TB were estimated. The number of health 
service visits associated with receiving health care during case finding and treatment was 
based on a combination of patient reported (patient surveys), and provider reported visits 
for each facility.  
 
Where intervention scenarios modelled increased ART uptake, we included a monthly 
cost of ARV treatment and associated patient costs from secondary data sources. 
However, we do not include the cost of ART in all comparators. In the trial population, 
the implementation of Xpert did not increase the proportion of patients starting ART 
when compared against the smear microscopy arm of the study (12) and it is likely that 
adding the cost of ART could make interventions that differentially benefit those who are 
HIV negative appear more cost-effective (due to the significantly lower costs) than 
interventions that benefit patients on ART, with potential equity implications in the 




The use of health services as patients progressed through care was collected as part of the 
trial through case note abstractions of identified fields in the patient records. In addition, 
patients were asked specific questions about their use of health services during their 






A range of outcomes were used in the economic evaluation. The primary outcome from 
the trial was mortality six months after a TB diagnostic test (12). In the economic 
evaluation, we were also interested in the process or intermediary outcomes, these 
included the number of patients started on treatment; bacteriologically confirmed TB; 
initial loss-to-follow-up; started on drug-sensitive TB treatment; started on retreatment; 
and started on MDR-TB treatment. In addition, the proportion of patients with true TB 
was estimated using the model and reported in the results. The primary outcome of the 
economic evaluation was disability-adjusted life years averted (DALYs), based on global 
recommendations for comparability across interventions (261). DALYs were estimated 
by adding years of life diseased (YLD) to the years of life lost (YLL).  YLD is estimated 
by multiplying the number of cases by the disease duration and the disability weights. 
Standard disability weights from the Global Burden of Disease study were used (see 
Table 11). YLL was estimated by multiplying the number of deaths by the life expectancy 
at the age of death (in other words the number of years lost due to premature mortality). 
For the average age of onset of TB, the average age of the TB cohort interviewed (38.16 
years) was used (81). The remaining life expectancy at age ofon TB onset was estimated 
by subtracting the average age of onset of TB (38 years) from the average South African 
life expectancy at birth (63 yearsv) (262). We assumed that disability weights are not 
additive but used the highest disability weight where more than one disease was present. 
 
  
                                            
v This was estimated by taking the average of the estimated life expectancies for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 
and 2016 as reported in the SAMRC rapid mortality surveillance report (262). 
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4.6 Validation and calibration processes 
 
A recent systematic review of model-based cost-effectiveness analyses of TB 
management found that when comparing models, their processes and outcomes, and their 
influence on outcomes and conclusions, that there were vast disparities in the structure 
of models and this structural uncertainty contributes to variation in estimates. The process 
of model validation against observed outcomes reduces structural uncertainty in models 
by refining the model structure and covariates used in the model (263). 
 
The economic analyses conducted as part of the XTEND trial, included a ‘within-trial’ 
analysis using statistical methods (233). The objective of the ‘within-trial’ analysis was 
to test whether the implementation of Xpert made the TB diagnostic algorithm in South 
Africa more – or less costly than the sputum microscopy-based algorithm. This analysis 
was restricted to the 6-month period of the trial follow-up. The model reported here, 
SINDI, was developed to extend this analysis to identify where in a patient’s entire TB 
episode (36 months) would further investment in the diagnostic pathway improve the 
value of new TB diagnostics; with the aim of better understanding the interaction between 
resource use and patient health outcomes. 
 
Structural uncertainty in the model was minimised by validating the outcomes of the 
mathematical model to the statistical analysis as part of an iterative process that led to a 
refinement of the model architecture. This process allowed for the identification of 
possible model programming errors, as well as to identify differences in assumptions 




Model validation is crucially important given the size and complexity of many of the 
models used to make decisions for public policy. As models become larger and more 
complex with interacting mechanisms, debugging becomes complicated, even 
impossible. Validation processes and model reviews by a second technical expert 
therefore becomes an important step in building models that are producing results we can 
be confident in (264). The process may therefore be used to assess the validity of the 
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model for various purposes, these can be categorised as the technical -, predictive -, and 
face validity of models. I will discuss each of these in turn with an explanation for how 
this was assessed within the model. 
 
The technical validity of the model relates to minimising and checking for programming, 
data entry errors or logical inconsistencies. These may be minimised by using a 
consultative process during model development, by using conceptual frameworks to 
explicitly show how interactions are conceptualised, through code or model reviews by 
a second technical expert or by repeating the process and building a second model to 
assess whether the results are similar. In this model, we used a theoretical framework to 
guide model development, a second technical expert reviewed the model and after the 
development of the initial model, I rebuilt the model several times and assessed the 
outputs against previous versions of the model to identify technical errors. 
 
The predictive validity of the model refers to how accurately the model represents 
observed reality. Predictive validity of a model is tested by comparing intermediate and 
final outcomes with observed outcomes. In the development of this model, a strength of 
the model is the validation and calibration of the model outputs against the trial 
intermediate and final outcomes. This was done by firstly comparing the intermediate 
diagnostic outcomes of the model against the trial results (265). The outcomes compared 
included 1) mortality, 2) treatment started, 3) yield, 4) initial loss-to-follow-up, 5) number 
of patients starting DSTB treatment, 6) number of people starting retreatment, and 7) 
number of people starting MDR TB treatment. Other than helping to identify parameter 
values and improve the predictive value of the model, the iterative process of comparing 
the combined output across model inputs, assisted in understanding and exploring the 
relationships between input parameter estimates and how to represent this in the model 
structure (266). Figure 12 shows a comparison between the secondary diagnostic 
outcomes of the cohort, with the modelled outputs at the end of six months shown in light 
blue and purple respectively against the dark colours representing the data. 
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Finally, the face validity of the model refers to the process of comparing our assumption 
of what should be happening with what actually happens in the model. The face validity 
of this model was assessed by comparing the model results against other published 
analyses to see whether the results are in line or where there are discrepancies, whether 
they can they be explained by differences in modelling techniques. Secondly, the face 
validity of the model was tested by varying key model parameters and assessing whether 
the model outcomes responded as would be expected.  
 
4.6.2 Model calibration 
 
While model validation is the process of comparing the outcomes of the model to 
observations, calibration refers to the iterative process of varying the values of 
unobserved variables until the outcomes of a model fits the outcomes being fitted to 
(267). Cohort study data, where the same individuals are followed up and observed at 
multiple timepoints, is preferred as time-series calibration targets because it allows for 
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the control of birth cohort effects (267). A strength of this study is the use of detailed 
empirical data, which include transitions through care pathways and resource use, from 
a single cohort. 
 
The challenge with calibrating decision analysis models relates to the fact that these 
models typically model micro-processes, where there is a need for greater precision when 
estimating the resource utilisation and resulting costs of an intervention (268,269).  The 
trade-offs during calibration and validation is that if the values are fitted to many 
narrowly specified calibration ranges, the model may be overfitted and not be as 
representative of the system it is trying to emulate when extrapolating from the available 
data (230). Using measures to consider the overall fit of the curve as opposed to a fitting 
to a single point, mediates this challenge to some extent as places the focus on patterns 
of behaviour as opposed to a single statistic. 
 
We calibrated the original model structure to both arms (smear microscopy as well as 
Xpert MTB/RIF) of the trial, in order to refine the structure and explore covariates that 
drive the differences between the study arms in more detail. During the analysis, the 
model is then restricted to the Xpert arm only, with supportive investments. An implicit 
assumption made in models that expresses the patient care cascade is that the difference 
between what is currently happening, and the ideal can all be attributed to the incorrect 
implementation of clinical guidelines. This modelling approach of expressing movement 
through the model doesn’t explicitly express that health care worker behaviour and 
disease processes may be confounding variables in this relationship. In the model 
presented here, the interactions that influence healthcare worker decision-making is 
explicitly modelled, thus exploring interacting variables that drive behaviour. 
 
Given the pragmatic nature of the trial whereby there was no interference with public 
facilities’ current practice, the gold standard for TB diagnosis, culture was not artificially 
requested for each patient (culture for all was not part of the South African TB diagnostic 
guidelines at the time of the study). Therefore, given that neither smear microscopy nor 
Xpert is likely to identify every patient with TB, we were unable to empirically estimate 
what proportion of those with a negative diagnostic test result were correctly started on 
treatment i.e. the sensitivity and specificity of healthcare workers’ intuitive judgement to 
start people on treatment without a definitive TB test result. The calibration was used to 
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estimate the best combination of values to allow for a good fit of the model to the 
empirical data. The unobservable parameters in the model included 1) the effectiveness 
of clinical decision-making to correctly start those with TB on treatment from a negative 
test result and 2) the effectiveness of clinical decision making in the diagnostic algorithm 
in starting those with TB correctly on treatment. We therefore calibrated, through a 
sequential, iterative process, the mortality curve generated from the model output, to the 
Kaplan-Meier mortality curve from the trial. In a similar process, we calibrated the time-
to-treatment curve from the model output to the Kaplan-Meier time-to-treatment curves 
from the trial. The best fit was deemed the configuration of behaviour that provided the 
best fit of both the mortality and treatment curves simultaneously. 
 
To derive this from trial observed mortality (up to six months after a diagnostic test) and 
measured health care worker behaviour and outcomes, we populated our model with 
mortality rates from secondary data, shown in Table 11. Figure 13 shows an example of 
how the 2x2 table was used to estimate the Positive – (PPV) and Negative Predictive 
Values (NPV) of the diagnostic processes. 
 
The probability of bacteriologically confirmed TB from a positive or negative TB test 
result (the positive – or negative predictive value of the test) was estimated based on the 
reported sensitivity and specificity of the test, and the number of positive test samples in 
the trial (268,269). The approach is demonstrated below, using the example of Xpert 
MTB/RIF arm of the study. The same approach is then repeated to estimate the 
probability of TB if test positive p(TB|test positive) and the probability of TB if test 
negative p(TB|test negative).  
 
For Xpert MTB/RIF, we used the pooled sensitivity 0,860 in those HIV negative and 
0,790 in those HIV positive and those HIV positive on ART as estimated in the meta-





Figure 13: Xpert unadjusted 2x2 table 
 
A3 in Figure 13, TB prevalence, was estimated using the sensitivity and specificity of 
the test, solving for x in the following equation: 
 
0.86x + 0.01(100-x) = 7.67 
0.86x + 1 – 0.01x = 7.67 
0.86x – 0.01x = 6.67 
0.85x = 6.67 
x = 7.85 which relates to cell A3 
 
A1 was then estimated by multiplying the sensitivity of the test by A3. 
C1 was estimated by dividing the number of positive over the total sample (from the 
dataset). 
The P(TB|test positive) = TB+/ Allpos 




For the sputum smear microscopy arm of the model, we used the pooled sensitivity of 
fluorescent microscopy calculated in a meta-analysis; 0,723 in those HIV negative and 
0,446 in those HIV positive (270). In those HIV positive on ART, we used the same 
sensitivity as the general HIV positive value provided. A specificity of 0,999 was used. 
The TB prevalence in each of the samples, was unknown. TB prevalence was therefore 
estimated using the same approach as described above and estimated a prevalence of 
13.19%. 
 
Given that the population modelled was the microscopy arm of the trial, we re-estimated 
the probabilities of TB from test positive and test negative for a population with a TB 
prevalence of 13.19%. The revised probabilities were: 
 
HIV negative 
P(TB|test positive) = 0.877 
P(TB|test negative) = 0.012 
 
HIV positive 
P(TB|test positive) = 0.936 
P(TB|test negative) = 0.038 
 
HIV positive on ART 
P(TB|test positive) = 0.938 
P(TB|test negative) = 0.039 
 
From the probability of TB after the test result, we needed to estimate the probability that 
health care worker’s decision-making after a negative test result was either correctly 
identifying TB or not. In other words, whether health care workers were correctly starting 
patients with TB on treatment after a negative test result, averting associated mortality 
and whether their decision to provide additional testing after a negative test result was 
correctly identifying TB or not. Starting TB treatment earlier, would reduce TB 
associated mortality if correctly started on treatment.  
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The initial distribution of the probability to start TB treatment after an initial negative test 
result was estimated using the following equation:  
 
 Ni,t = Ai,tR + Bi,tW (2) 
 
Where: N is the probability of a health care worker acting as if the patient has TB (either by ordering further 
diagnostic tests or by starting treatment based on clinical suspicion),  after a negative test result, where 
further diagnostics are not ordered at time t and for individual type I; A is the probability of true TB at time 
t and for individual type i with this decision being the correct decision i.e. true TB represented by the letter 
R; B is the probability that  the patient does not have TB at time t and for individual type i with this 
diagnostic decision therefore being incorrect presented by the letter W. 
 
We started the calibration, initially assuming that health care workers had an equal chance 
of correctly and incorrectly identifying someone as having TB, no difference between the 
decisions to start people on treatment from a negative test result and doing additional 
tests for the diagnostic negative pathway, the impact of the change in probability on the 
predicted mortality in the model was sequentially calculated and matched against the 





Figure 14. Comparing the fit of the time-to-treatment curves from the empirical data to the modelled 
estimates 
The graph shows the cumulative proportion of the modelled cohort at monthly intervals. The model 
estimates of the time to starting treatment is represented by the solid line, with data points from the cohort 
study is presented as red crosses at each of the monthly time points. Two graphs were generated, one 
representing the sputum smear microscopy arm of the cohort; and the other the arm of the study that were 






Figure 15. Comparing the fit of the time-to-death curves, model outputs to the data 
The graph shows the cumulative proportion of the modelled cohort at monthly intervals. The model 
estimates of the time to death is represented by the solid line, with data points from the cohort study is 
presented as red crosses at each of the monthly time points. Two graphs were generated, one representing 
the sputum smear microscopy arm of the cohort; and the other the arm of the study that were randomised 
to receive a Xpert MTB/RIF test. 
 
 
The probability of starting treatment from a negative test result or from the negative 
pathway was estimated from the empirical data. Given the use of conditional probabilities 
to drive movement through the model, the calibration equations resulted in adjustments 
needed in other parts of the model, such as the denominator for treatment from out of 
care. These were calculated in a populated Excel spreadsheet. For each of the three 
uncertain parameters, we sequentially calibrated the probability to fit the mortality curve 
against the trial data observed in the trial, both in size and shape of the curve over time. 
With each subsequent calibration, the effect on related variables was re-estimated and 
repopulated in the appropriate model parameters. 
 
 
Table 4. Measures of model fit. 
  Smear microscopy XPert MTB/RIF 
 ME_mort ME_treat SqE_mort SqE_treat points_mort (<5) 
points_treat 





RW1_EPTB0% -42 -200 55 1143 6 6 8 158 5 694 6 0 
RW1_EPTB2% -5 -183 5 953 6 6 28 167 26 780 3 0 
RW1_EPTB4% 16 -166 18 780 4 6 48 177 73 870 1 0 
RW1_EPTB6% 37 -148 58 625 3 6 68 186 147 964 0 0 
RW1_EPTB8% 58 -131 127 489 2 6 88 196 247 1064 0 0 
RW0.5_EPTB0% -23 -154 17 690 6 6 10 175 6 854 6 0 
RW0.5_EPTB2% -2 -140 5 569 6 6 31 179 31 893 3 0 
RW0.5_EPTB4% 19 -127 23 461 4 6 52 183 84 933 0 0 
RW0.5_EPTB6% 40 -113 69 365 2 6 73 187 167 973 0 0 
RW0.5_EPTB8% 62 -99 146 281 2 6 93 191 277 1015 0 0 
RW0.25_EPTB0% -22 -131 16 506 6 6 11 184 7 941 6 0 
RW0.25_EPTB2% -1 -119 6 415 6 6 32 185 34 953 3 0 
RW0.25_EPTB4% 21 -107 25 333 4 6 53 186 90 965 0 0 
RW0.25_EPTB6% 42 -95 75 261 2 6 75 187 177 977 0 0 
RW0.25_EPTB8% 64 -83 155 199 2 6 96 189 294 990 0 0 
In the Table; each of the values represents the arithmetic mean drawn across 1 000 model samples. ME is the marginal error and SE represents the square root of the marginal 
error. The columns labelled points represents the number of points in the time-series where the model results are acceptably close to observations (within 5 or 20 units). 
 
 The difference between the curve and the trend line was determined by plotting the 
empirical data. The fit of the curve was expressed using three metrics; the maximum error 
(ME), the square root of the error (SqE) and the number of points in the time-series where 
the model results are acceptably close to observations (within 5 or 20 units).  
 
ME_mort represents the maximum error which is the sum of the differences between 
model estimates of mortality and the value observed in the trial. The maximum error is 
to be minimised; ME_treat is a similar statistic but refers to the proportion of those in the 
cohort who start treatment; SqE_mort refers to the mean squared error or the difference 
between the observed and modelled estimates of mortality and treatment started 
(SqE_treat); points_mort and points_treat is a measure of the number of points modelled 
that are within in the first instance five units, followed by 20 units from the point observed 
from the trial. This measure therefore speaks to the fit of the trend. To find the best fit for 
the combined curves representing the relationships between treatment started and 
mortality reduction,  the squared error of mortality was plotted against the squared error 
of treatment, summarised in Table 4, and shown graphically in Figure 16. The plot closest 
to the left and lowest on the y axis corresponds to the plot that represents the best fit of 
the interaction between mortality and TB treatment. 
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Figure 16. Degree of fit, identifying best fit of the graphs based on both mortality and TB treatment started. 
In the figure, SqE_treat represents the square root of the error (SqE) of the difference between observed 
and modelled representations of the time to treatment curve; and SqE_mort represents the square root of 
the error (SqE) of the difference between observed and modelled representation of the time to mortality 
curve. 
 
In the control arm of the analysis, sputum microscopy, the best fit was at the point where 
health care workers had a 0.25 probability of making the correct decision; with a 
prevalence of extra-pulmonary TB of approximately 2%. In contrast, the fit of the Xpert 
arm of the trial estimated a 0% prevalence of extra-pulmonary TB and a probability of 1 
of making the correct decision. This result is supported by other analyses of the trial data, 
that found that the Xpert arm of the trial was slightly healthier than the microscopy/ 
control arm and that health care workers were more likely to conduct further diagnostic 
tests and start treatment empirically in the microscopy arm of the trial than in the control 
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arm (12,271,272). The unobserved transition probabilities estimated during the 
calibration and used in the analyses are summarised in Table 11.  
 
The baseline characteristics of the cohort in the arms of the trial were slightly imbalanced 
as described above. The model was adjusted for the imbalance in patient population 
between the two arms of the trial, by implementing the following changes. The 
calibration modification to account for healthier patients in the smear arm of the trial: 
? remove calibration modification (50% mortality reduction for those HIV positive) for 
healthier patients in the GX arm  
? same proportion of HIV and ART types of individuals through the model 
? recalculate (using the 2x2 tables) the probabilities of having a positive test result and 
starting treatment based on an equivalent bacteriologically confirmed TB prevalence 
between the two arms 
 
 
4.7 Constructing comparators 
 
The comparators and interacting mechanisms were identified from the empirical data 
analyses and these interactions are summarised in Table 12 and discussed in more detail 
in section 6.2.5.  
 
 
4.8 Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 
 
The estimation of the decision uncertainty in an economic evaluation is an important part 
of the analysis. It is important to distinguish between variability, heterogeneity and 
decision uncertainty. Variability refers to differences that occur between patients by 
chance, it is the element of randomness and is sometimes referred to as first order 
uncertainty. Heterogeneity relates to the differences between patients that can be 
explained, these may include gender, and age. Uncertainty is the element that we are 
seeking to capture in our models; and can be further categorised as either parameter 
uncertainty (second order uncertainty) or structural uncertainty.  Structural uncertainty 
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refers to the assumptions imposed by the modelling framework. We explore the impact 
of uncertainty on our estimates by conducting a range of sensitivity analyses (273: 61). 
 
4.8.1 Probabilistic sensitivity analyses 
 
Probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) is used to jointly assess the uncertainty in all 
parameters and the implications for decision uncertainty. The results of the PSA are 
presented in Table 13 as uncertainty estimates. 
 
4.8.2 Univariate sensitivity analyses 
 
Univariate sensitivity analyses were conducted, whereby each individual variable in the 
model is varied downwards by a factor of 10, to provide a low estimate; and upwards by 
a factor of 10 to provide a high estimate of the outcomes of interest, namely provider 
costs, societal costs and disability adjusted life years (DALYs). The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 15. 
 
4.8.3 Multivariate sensitivity analysis 
 
Univariate sensitivity analyses, while useful to identify individual drivers of our predicted 
estimates, have limited explanatory utility in identifying model assumptions that will alter 
the decision to choose one investment scenario over another. Multiple variables interact 
along a decision pathway to produce a cost or an effect, so for example, increasing the 
value of the unit cost of a chest x-ray is unlikely to be identified as a key driver of the 
results if a low proportion of the cohort is identified as needing additional diagnostic tests 
after an initial negative TB test result. These issues are correlated as healthcare workers’ 
decisions to follow-up a patient after a negative TB test result will be influenced by the 
availability of chest x-ray facilities, a possible investment strategy. Complementary to 
the univariate sensitivity analyses, multivariate sensitivity analyses were used to further 
explore drivers of the investment decision, by varying a set of parameters simultaneously. 
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 14.  Based on the results of the univariate 
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sensitivity analyses, as well as key variables identified during the model calibration, 
drivers of the decision were identified. 
 
 
4.9 Strengths and limitations of the model 
 
Modelling disease processes alongside patients’ detailed movement through care, needs 
careful consideration for the structure of the model, as these diagnostic models rapidly 
become very inflexible. In this model, I wanted to maximise the use of the detailed data 
available, while still being able to have enough flexibility to explore the behaviour of 
healthcare workers. 
 
The additional value of this model-based analysis however rests on extensive primary 
cohort data collected, the rigour of the evaluation of the trial cohort, as well as the range 
of perspectives, both provider and patient included in this analysis. However, given the 
very detailed micro-processes modelled, the model is less flexible when estimating 
uncertainty intervals around the main estimates.  




This chapter provides an overview of the methods used in developing and parameterising 
the model. The structure of the model was developed based on an initial conceptual 
framework of the mechanisms (disease and process) that influence the progression of 
patients to the outcomes observed. The model parametrisation was based on the data 
generated as part of a pragmatic cluster randomised control trial. However, the trial was 
not able to collect data to estimate the TB prevalence in the cohort. The parameterised 
model was therefore validated against the process outcomes from the trial and calibrated 
to estimate the prevalence of TB in the cohort. From there, and based on a literature 
review, plausible health system investments to support TB diagnosis were constructed. 
Uncertainty in the results was explored by varying individual parameters in the univariate 
sensitivity analysis, followed by multivariate sensitivity analysis to better understand the 
effect that the interaction of changes in multiple parameters may have on the decision 
recommendation. 
CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC BURDEN OF TUBERCULOSIS 
 
Summary 
This chapter discusses the analysis, specific methods and results of the longitudinal 
patient cost study. These results were also used in Chapter 6 to estimate the societal 
perspective of the cost-effectiveness results. Social protection against the cost of illness 
is a central policy objective of Universal Health Coverage and the post-2015 Global 
strategy for Tuberculosis (TB). Understanding the economic burden associated with TB 
illness and care is key to identifying appropriate interventions towards achieving this 
target. The aims of this study were to identify points in patient pathways from start of TB 
symptoms to treatment completion where interventions could be targeted to reduce the 
economic impact on patients and households, and to identify those most vulnerable to 
these costs. Two cohorts of patients accessing TB services from ten clinics in four 
provinces in South Africa were surveyed between July 2012 and June 2013. One cohort 
of 351 people with suspected TB were interviewed at the point of receiving a TB 
diagnostic and followed up six months later. Another cohort of 168 patients on TB 
treatment, at the same ten facilities, was interviewed at two-months and five-months on 
treatment. Patients were asked about their health-seeking behaviour, associated costs, 
income loss, and coping strategies used. Patients incurred the greatest share of TB episode 
costs (41%) prior to starting treatment, with the largest portion of these costs being due 
to income loss. Poorer patients incurred higher direct costs during treatment than those 
who were less poor but only 5% of those interviewed were accessing cash-transfers 
during treatment. Indirect costs accounted for 52% of total episode cost. Despite free TB 
diagnosis and care in South Africa, patients incur substantial direct and indirect costs 
particularly prior to starting treatment. The poorest group of patients was incurring higher 
costs, with fewer resources to pay for it. Both the direct and indirect cost of illness should 
be considered when setting levels of financial protection and social support, to prevent 
TB illness from pushing the poor further into poverty. 
 
This chapter has been published as 
Foster N, Vassall A, Cleary S, Cunnama L, Churchyard G and Sinanovic E. 2015.  
The economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment in South Africa.  
Social Science of Medicine, vol. 130: 42 – 50. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Social protection against the cost of illness is a central policy objective of Universal 
Health Coverage and correspondingly the post-2015 Global strategy for Tuberculosis 
(TB) (274). Social protection strategies include access to health care, financial protection 
against the cost of seeking care and poverty alleviation strategies (275). The post-2015 
strategy aims for ‘no affected families facing catastrophic costs due to TB’ by 2025.  
Reducing the impact of the cost of illness is of concern in TB control, due to the synergy 
between poverty and TB disease. Poverty has been linked to a greater risk of infection, 
poorer patient outcomes as well as affecting health-seeking behaviour (49,276–279). In 
addition, TB disease also worsens poverty by reducing patients’ physical strength and 
ability to work, ultimately leading to loss of income (193,200). The economic impact on 
the household is then further exacerbated by the costs incurred while seeking health care 
(52).  In South Africa, the economic burden of ill health on households could potentially 
be severe, given that 30% of the global incident cases of TB-HIV co-infection occur in 
South Africa, which roughly equates to 530 000 people being infected with TB per annum 
(280,281). 
 
Historically, studies seeking to quantify the financial burden of TB on patients have 
focused on the out of pocket costs measured at a single point in time, with questions asked 
about retrospective expenditures. This approach suffers from several limitations, in that 
the measurement of cost is often not comprehensive, the economic impact on patient’s 
social networks is not captured, and there is little insight provided on how patients adapt 
over time (195). The costs typically measured, referred to as direct costs, include 
transport costs to and from the health facility and any costs for medication or consultation 
incurred by individuals while seeking care. The magnitude of these direct costs is then 
compared against the annual household income, individual income or the household’s 
expenditure on food (216). Various thresholds for quantifying the level of direct cost that 
is likely to drive households into poverty have been used, including 10% or 15% of 
annual household or individual income, and 40% of household non-food expenditure 
(212,282–284). Using these measures, previous TB costing studies have found that direct 
costs can be ‘catastrophic’ for many households and have called for further research to 
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identify households that are particularly at risk of catastrophic expenditures 
(195,197,199,285).  
 
There is greater paucity in terms of the measurement of costs associated with the time 
lost while being unable to work due to seeking care or being too ill to work. These so-
called indirect costs are used to capture the productivity and economic costs an individual 
or household incurs because of being ill or spending time seeking treatment (77,195,286). 
There are several methods to value time loss. The most common method is the Human 
Capital Approach, which considers a set of marketable skills of workers as a form of 
capital that is then used to produce an output, income for the worker, and a contribution 
to the economy for society (205,287). Following this approach, an individual’s time (or 
loss of productive time from treatment and illness) is valued based on their productive 
output, in the form of their reported income prior to being ill. This has equity implications 
given that it excludes the value of time loss of those not employed or looking after family 
at home. Alternative approaches include the equality of wages method where time loss is 
valued equally across individuals by using a proxy such as the minimum wage or the 
average reported income for the cohort (199,209).  However, simply attaching a value of 
time lost may not provide sufficient insight into changes in income over time, particularly 
the ability to recover income following a period of illness; and they may not capture the 
broader impact to the household, nor the ability of society to compensate any social 
welfare lost (206).  
 
Russell et al. made an important contribution to the understanding of costs of illness from 
a household perspective by highlighting the importance of and expanding the definition 
of households’ ‘ability to pay’ for health care to include the mobilization of additional 
resources including borrowing from family members, selling assets, forgoing 
consumption on other essential commodities, or delaying payment (214). Longitudinal 
household surveys suggest a heterogeneous economic impact of health costs on 
households, with some households demonstrating a resilience to high out of pocket costs 
while others are forced into poverty by relatively small expenditures (196). In South 
Africa, a longitudinal household study found that household resilience against 
catastrophic costs was dependent on social support structures within communities, such 
as being able to borrow money without interest, and someone to take over jobs or 
household tasks or to care for an individual who is ill. Household resilience was found to 
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diminish as chronic illnesses, such as HIV, increased the economic loss over time and 
jeopardised the long-term welfare of the family (200).  
 
In South Africa, there are a limited number of studies that have estimated the patient costs 
associated with TB care. Previous studies found that direct costs and time spent accessing 
health care could be substantial and that the cost of TB care varies between socio-
economic groups (209,288,289). However, these studies suffer from many of the 
weaknesses highlighted above. They did not include the patient costs prior to starting 
treatment or examine in-depth how costs and income changed over time.  
 
We present a longitudinal study of the economic burden on individuals and their social 
networks, from the start of TB symptoms to the end of treatment in South Africa. Indirect 
costs are estimated using reported income loss and costs are presented by socio-economic 
status (SES), to explore how the economic burden on patients and their social networks 





5.2.1 Analytical framework 
 
Economic burden (Figure 1) was conceptualised by drawing on the Access framework 
proposed by McIntyre et al. (2009) to examine the interactions between individuals and 
the health system that are likely to impact on patients’ health seeking behaviour (290). In 
terms of exploring the consequences of these interactions, in addition to estimating the 
out-of-pocket costs incurred by individuals, we examined reliance on social networks to 
mediate a catastrophic financial impact on the household (286).  
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Figure 17. Dimensions of economic burden on individuals and households and interactions with the health 
system, adapted from Russell (2004) and McIntyre (2009). 
 
Social networks were defined to include people from an individual’s community who can 
take over job-related or household related tasks while the individual is ill (‘carers’); to 
accompany the patient to the clinic (‘guardians’); and being able to borrow money 
without paying interest or receiving donations. The availability of cash transfers and 
health insurance was also conceptualised as a component of the patient’s social network, 
which could potentially alleviate some of the catastrophic consequences of ill health. 
 
5.2.2 Study design 
 
To capture the economic impact of TB over time, and minimise recall bias, a prospective 
cohort study of patient costs was conducted as part of a cluster randomised pragmatic 
trial evaluating the implementation of Xpert MTB/RIF in South Africa, the ‘XTEND’ 
trial. Interviews were conducted between July 2012 and June 2013. Conducting a patient 
cost study as part of a trial offers the advantage of having sufficient infrastructure to 
follow patients up over time but can restrict sampling approaches. Figure 18 provides a 
timeline of patients’ trajectory through care seeking and treatment, the interview time 
points and periods used in the analysis. These time points were selected to co-ordinate 
with the main interview points in the broader trial. As the trial was pragmatic, the aim 
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was to not influence the patient pathway to capture ‘real world’ conditions and thus the 
frequency of interview was constrained.  
 
The trial enrolled patients with symptoms suggestive of TB, who were then followed up 
six months later to determine patient outcomes (Figure 20 and Figure 21). Only 10% of 
those screened were projected to have TB. To capture the pre-treatment costs, we sampled 
from those with symptoms (cohort 1). However, it was not possible to capture sufficient 
numbers of those with TB, given that enrolment was conducted prior to the knowledge 
of whether a patient had TB, and due to the expense of conducting a full questionnaire 
on high numbers of trial participants. We therefore added a further cohort of TB patients 
who were recruited from the same clinics for the economic study alone (cohort 2), to fully 
capture the costs of those who proceed to TB treatment.  
 
 
Figure 18. Timeline positioning data collection and time periods (A, B, and C) for patient cost analysis. 
 
In the cohort of those enrolled in the main trial (cohort 1), every third trial participant 
enrolled at the sample sites was asked additional questions regarding their health service 
use, the associated costs experienced, as well as change in income from the start of TB 
symptoms. Patients were eligible if they were older than 18 years of age, would be living 
in the area for the next eight months, and were not currently on TB treatment. At the six-
month follow up, respondents were asked about their health service use and the associated 
costs from the baseline visit to when they started TB treatment or until the end of their 
TB associated symptoms Figure 18. In cohort 2, TB patients were eligible if they were 
older than 18 years, had not been interviewed for the TB suspect cohort and had started 
treatment approximately two months previously. At the TB patient’s enrolment interview, 
respondents were asked to report on their health service use and the associated costs in 
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the last two months. They were followed up three months later and were asked about 
costs incurred in the last month. 
 
5.2.3 Data collection 
 
Ten public health clinics, in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and Free State 
provinces were purposefully selected from the trial sites to generate a representative 
sample of rural and urban sites, facilities with different workloads, plus the location of 
the clinics relative to the communities served. Clinic characteristics are described in the 
supplementary results section, Table 2. Data were captured using Epidata v3.1 and 
exported to STATA13 for analysis (291,292). To minimise recall bias, respondents were 
asked about the costs incurred during their last visit; per period costs were then calculated 
by multiplying the cost per visit against the number of visits reported during that period. 
Individual income was estimated by asking detailed questions about income categories, 
including formal employment, working from home, non-monetary payments, 
government grants, pension as well as infrequent or ‘piece’ work. Income from 
government grants and charity donations was also explicitly unpacked. Furthermore, to 
assist respondents in recalling what happened to them between enrolment into the study 
and starting treatment, interviewers used a timeline and anchored the questions to 
memorable events such as starting treatment. 
 
5.2.4 Data analysis 
 
Costs incurred were analysed for three time periods shown in Figure 18, from the start of 
TB-associated symptoms to the initiation of TB treatment for those who did start 
treatment (A) or until the amelioration of symptoms for those who did not start treatment. 
Followed by, for TB patients, the time from the start of treatment to the end of the 
intensive phase at two months (B), followed by the time during continuation phase of 
treatment (C). The dataset for analysis was restricted to respondents where a follow up 
interview was conducted and responses from patients who passed away or were lost to 
follow up were not included. In addition, those who were symptomatic but did not start 
TB treatment were analysed separately and are presented in the results as a comparison. 
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For each of the time periods described in Figure 18, the direct and indirect costs incurred 
by people with suspected TB and those on treatment were calculated.  Direct costs were 
calculated by adding the cost of travel to and from facilities, admission or consultation 
costs, the cost of medication and/or food while admitted, and any fees paid in lieu of 
diagnostic procedures. In each period the overall cost was calculated by multiplying the 
number of visits by the cost per visit for the period. Indirect costs were calculated based 
on the reported income loss due to TB symptoms and/ or treatment. Finally, to explore 
the broader impact of the individual’s illness on the economic costs’ households faced, 
social resources were assessed by estimating the costs to adults accompanying the 
respondent to the clinic, time spent caring for or taking over the tasks of the individual 
who is ill, as well as money borrowed to cover costs (199,214). The opportunity costs of 
these ‘carers’ and ‘guardians’ were calculated by multiplying time spent by the average 
income of respondents prior to the start of symptoms.  
 
Due to the uneven distribution of costs with a minority of respondents reporting high 
costs, mean and median values were reported for all cost estimates as measures of central 
tendency and standard deviation (SD) and inter-quartile ranges (IQR) were reported 
(293). To assess differences in costs between groups, p-values were calculated using non-
parametric methods, two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Logistic regressions were run to identify patient and health service drivers of both income 
loss (1 = yes; 0 = no), and ‘catastrophic’ costs (1 = more than 10% of annual individual 
income; 0 = no). Costs were converted to United States Dollars (US$) using the 2013 
average annual exchange rate of US$1 = R9.62. (www.Oanda.com). 
 
As a measure of individuals’ ability to pay for out-of-pocket expenses, we compared 
direct costs incurred against annual individual income and defined costs as catastrophic 
if they exceeded 10% of individual income (284). Where individuals were earning no 
income, we performed a separate analysis, imputing an annual income of US$1 when 
calculating catastrophic costs. This approach was presented separately to highlight the 
burden on households with no incomes (216). A range of household measures of SES 
were collected, and an asset index was created using Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA). Variables used to create the asset index included type of house, material of walls, 
floors, type of water supply and toilet, possession of a bicycle or a car, as well as other 
assets such as an electric stove, radio, and livestock. MCA as opposed to Principal 
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Components Analysis (PCA) was used to create the asset index as MCA makes fewer 
assumptions about the underlying distributions of indicator variables and is more suited 




The human research ethics committees at the University of Cape Town (363/2011), 
University of the Witwatersrand (M110827), London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (6041), and the World Health Organisation (RPC462) granted ethical approval 
for the study. Health department officials and facility managers provided permission to 






A total of 618 respondents were interviewed. In the first cohort, 385 respondents were 
enrolled, 23 died prior to the follow up interview and 11 were lost to follow-up (LTFU). 
Of the 351 respondents remaining, 37 had a positive diagnostic test and a total of 45 were 
started on first line TB treatment, three on retreatment and one on MDR TB treatment. In 
the TB patient cohort, 233 TB patients were enrolled at the two-month change of 
treatment phase, 5 died and 53 were LTFU. Direct costs incurred at enrolment were not 
significantly different between those retained in the study and those not (p = 0.605; p = 
0.269).  
 
5.3.1 Sample and setting characteristics 
 
Of those interviewed, 45% were in rural and 55% in urban settings. Within study clinics, 
a mix of facility based – and self-observed TB treatment was provided with varying levels 
of community-based support Table 2. Table 5 presents the respondent characteristics.  
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Gender (% female)* 203 (58%) 78 (45%) 
Mean age in years (median) 38 (36) 40 (39) 
Self-reported HIV status (%)   
  HIV negative 88 (25%) 30 (17%) 
  HIV positive on ART 52 (15%) 79 (45%) 
  HIV positive 154 (44%) 33 (19%) 
  Unwilling to share status 57 (16%) 33 (19%) 
Educational status§** (%) 
  No formal education 256 (73%) 120 (69%) 
  School leavers’ certificate 81 (23%) 49 (28%) 
  Tertiary education 13 (4%) 1 (0.6%) 
Reported primary source of income*** (%) 
  Formal employment 86 (25%) 40 (23%) 
  Odd jobs 52 (15%) 23 (13%) 
  Self-employed 20 (6%) 9 (5%) 
  Maintenance 4 (2%) 1 (0.6%) 
  Pensioner 15 (4%) 5 (3%) 
  Government grant 41 (12%) 37 (21%) 
  Student 12 (3%) 3 (2%) 
  No income 121 (34%) 55 (31%) 
In the table, § no formal education defined as all respondents without a high school leavers certificate; * 2 
non-responses in the TB patients cohort; ** 1 non-response in the possible TB cohort and 5 in the TB 
patients’ cohort;*** 2 non responses in the TB patients cohort. 
 
The level of education in the sample population was lower than the general South African 
population, with 4% of respondents with post school education, compared to 12%. 
Similarly, the unemployment rate at 47% and 54% respectively was higher than the 
overall South African unemployment rate of 30% (297). Of the respondents, 12% and 
21% respectively listed government grants as their primary source of income, while 21% 
and 18% respectively relied on odd jobs or self-employment as their primary source of 
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income. Only 34% and 38% of respondents indicated that other household members had 
a steady job. Levels of private health insurance were low in both cohorts (1% and 4%). 
When compared against the national statistics, these findings suggest that the respondents 
were particularly poor relative to the average South African household (297).  
 
5.3.2 Costs associated with health service use 
 
During the symptomatic period, the median time from experiencing symptoms to getting 
a TB test was 21 days, and in those who started treatment, the median time from test to 
treatment was one day. There was a statistically significant difference in the time with 
symptoms between poor and less poor patients (p<0.05). In those who started treatment, 
the mean time from first symptom to TB test was 90 days in the poorest group compared 
to 33 days in the less poor group. Respondents’ first port of call when experiencing 
symptoms was their local public clinic (80%) and patients made a mean of two visits to 
the public clinic. During the two-month intensive phase of treatment, a mean number of 
12 (and a median of four) visits were made followed by 12 (and a median of eight) during 
the four-month continuation phase of treatment. Patients were collecting TB medication 
weekly or even monthly as opposed to daily Directly Observed Treatment (DOTS). Just 
under half of those in the TB patient cohort (45%) were HIV positive and on Anti-
Retroviral Therapy (ART) but only 24% of those on ART could collect their TB 
medication and ART during the same clinic visit. Reported utilisation of traditional health 
care workers was very low (1%).  
 
In Table 6, the direct costs incurred are presented and compared to respondents’ annual 
individual income. This is followed by direct, indirect and total societal costs in Table 7. 
The mean total direct costs incurred by respondents in accessing health care during TB 
diagnosis and treatment were US$111.83 or 12% of annual individual pre-symptom 
income and 53% of the total episode patient cost. The largest share of the direct costs was 
incurred during the pre-diagnosis and diagnosis phase. Direct costs were likely low given 
that TB care is provided free at primary health care clinics in South Africa and many 
respondents (61% and 66% respectively) could walk to the clinic to access care. Of the 
total direct costs, nutritional supplements - especially during the pre-diagnostic and 
diagnosis phase - were a substantial cost, with respondents spending an average of 
US$12.54 during the symptomatic period. People Living With HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) 
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spent significantly more on supplements (US$9.37) than those who were HIV negative 
(US$5.35) (p<0.05) which may reflect the emphasis placed on healthy diets during 
HIV/TB counselling.  The costs associated with someone accompanying the respondent 
to the health facility (guardian costs) were greatest during the intensive phase of 
treatment. Similarly, the cost of someone to either take over the respondent’s tasks or to 
look after them was greatest during the intensive and continuation phases of treatment. 
 
Table 6. Pre-treatment and treatment direct costs (2013 US$). 
Period Sample 
size 
Non-transport direct costs Direct transport costs Time loss 
(hours), 
mean 








  Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median    
Pre-diagnosis & diagnostic 49 22.73 0.00  10.55 0.00 9 12.54 0.00 45.82 76.05 5% 
Treatment (intensive) 175 29.80 0.00 4.33 0.00 59 1.10 0.00 35.23 76.05 4% 
Treatment (continuation) 175 17.96 0.00 11.58 0.00 31 1.24 0.00 30.78 76.05 3% 
Total episode cost  70.49 0.00 26.46 0.00 99 14.88 0.00 111.83 76.05 12% 
No TB 302 17.63 0.00 6.04 0.00 14 6.26 0.00 29.93 107.51 2% 























    Mean Median      
Pre-diagnosis & 
diagnostic 
49 45.82 0.64 39.26 0.00 85.72 9% 7.46 1.94 95.12 
Treatment (intensive) 175 35.23 6.57 15.56 0.00 57.36 6% 22.99 39.10 119.45 
Treatment (continuation) 175 30.78 36.11 0.00 0.00 66.89 7% 1.66 40.95 109.50 
Total episode cost  111.83 43.32 54.82 0.00 209.97 22% 32.11 81.99 324.07 
No TB 302 29.93 0.34 62.13 0.00 92.40 7% 5.49 1.93 99.82 
 
If we explore the costs incurred by SES, we find that the least poor group were spending 
a greater percentage of their annual income than those in the poorer group during the pre-
diagnostic period. This can be explained by more visits to private health care facilities 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Costs incurred (2013 US$), presented by socio-economic status (SES) and over time. 
 Poorest§ Least poor§ p-value  mean median mean median 
Pre-diagnosis & diagnostic period in those who start TB treatment: represents a mean of 45 days (n = 49) 
Public health facility visits, number of 3 3 3 3 0.845 
Private health facility visits, number of 0 0 1 0 < 0.05 
Total direct costs 24.35 0.00 55.57 17.36 0.173 
Direct costs as % of annual individual income 1% 0% 6% 1% 0.346 
Adjusted costs as % of income* 1000% 0% 3323% 2% 0.137 
Time loss, number of hours  5 2 11 2 0.236 
Reported income loss 50.86 0.00 67.25 0.00 0.539 
Guardian costs 0.00 0.00 11.07 0.00 < 0.05 
Carer costs 1.46 0.00 2.15 0.00 0.620 
Total costs 76.67 38.61 136.04 66.73 0.501 
Intensive treatment phase: represents a two-month period (n = 175) 
Public health facility visits, number of 15 4 11 4 0.885 
Private health facility visits, number of 0 0 0 0 0.515 
Total direct costs 52.88 0.00 17.11 0.00 < 0.05 
Direct costs as % of annual individual income 3% 0% 3% 0% 0.812 
Adjusted costs as % of income* 1514% 0% 285% 0% < 0.05 
Time loss, number of hours 62 21 44 15 0.412 
Reported income loss 12.17 0.00 19.00 0.00 0.995 
Guardian costs 17.35 0.00 18.97 0.00 0.609 
Carer costs 18.14 0.00 32.67 0.00 0.362 
Total costs 100.54 11.66 87.75 0.00 0.059 
Continuation treatment phase: represents a four-month period (n = 175) 
Public health facility visits, number of 14 8 14 8 0.222 
Private health facility visits, number of 0 0 0 0 0.196 
Total direct costs 48.18 0.00 13.18 0.00 < 0.05 
Direct costs as % of annual individual income 3% 0% 3% 0% 0.859 
Adjusted costs as % of income* 3791% 0% 1183% 0% < 0.05 
Time loss, number of hours 35 14 25 12 0.332 
Reported income loss 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.315 
Guardian costs 3.08 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.405 
Carer costs 1.98 0.00 5.38 0.00 0.627 
Total costs 53.23 0.00 17.58 0.00 < 0.05 
Total episode costs 230.44 50.27 241.37 66.73  
No TB (n = 302) 
Public health facility visits, number of 3 2 3 2 0.089 
Private health facility visits, number of 1 0 1 0 0.096 
Total direct costs 26.53 0.00 33.50 0.00 0.296 
Direct costs as % of annual individual income 878% 0% 1800% 0% 0.168 
Adjusted costs as % of income* 1% 0% 4% 0% 0.418 
Time loss, number of hours 14 2 15 1 0.281 
Reported income loss 82.00 0.00 109.80 0.00 0.849 
Guardian costs 7.69 0.00 2.86 0.00 0.894 
Carer costs 2.25 0.00 1.52 0.00 0.973 
Total costs 118.47 25.85 147.68 16.00 0.788 
In the Table, standard errors are not reported here due to space considerations; §The poorest group is 
represented in the lowest asset index tertile, and the least poor group is represented in the upper tertile; *In 
the adjustment for those with no income, we assumed an annual income of US$1 in all with no income. 
 
Once patients start TB treatment, we found that poor patients were spending a greater 
percentage of their annual income on costs associated with seeking care than those who 
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are less poor. The poorest group of patients were incurring higher direct costs, with fewer 
resources to pay for it. 
 
5.3.3 Income loss 
 
The mean monthly individual income of the entire cohort prior to starting symptoms was 
US$103.12. Income prior to symptoms was considerably different between those who 
started TB treatment compared to those who did not, US$76.05 and US$107.51 
respectively. Prior to symptoms, 59% of individuals in the cohort reported no income; 
this proportion was higher in the group that started TB treatment (69%).  
 
Table 9. Logistic regression exploring drivers of income loss while symptomatic (n = 351). 
Income loss (1 = Yes) OR (95% CI)* p-value 
Gender (1 = male) 0.66 (0.35; 1.24) 0.196 
Years of education 1.03 (0.93; 1.14) 0.609 
HIV status 0.88 (0.57; 1.36) 0.566 
Bacteriologically confirmed TB (1 = positive) 0.31 (0.10; 0.92) < 0.05 
Rural (1 = rural) 4.52 (2.18; 9.39) < 0.05 
Main income source = formal employment reference  
Main income source = self employed 1.34 (0.42; 4.27) 0.616 
Main income source = odd jobs 0.73 (0.32; 1.67) 0.462 
Main income source = non-productive income 0.02 (0.01; 0.06) < 0.05 
Main income source = no income 0.03 (0.01; 0.07) < 0.05 
Days symptomatic 1.00 (0.99; 1.00) 0.059 
Other HH member steady job 0.80 (0.39; 1.61) 0.525 
Asset index (1 = least poor) 0.80 (0.56; 1.13) 0.202 
Number of health care visits 1.07 (0.99; 1.15) 0.106 
 Pseudo R2 = 3948    
In the table, *OR = odds ratio; 95% CI = 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
Income loss was significantly higher in those who didn’t start TB treatment (p<0.05) - 
but probably points to the higher percentage of those with no income (and hence no 
possible income loss) in the group that starts TB treatment Table 9. In addition, income 
loss was higher in rural communities and there was some protective effect in those 
receiving non-productive income such as government grants. The greatest share of 
income loss occurred in the period between the start of symptoms and starting TB 
treatment. During the intensive phase of treatment, there is a further net loss of income 
that is possibly tempered due to an income gain experienced by some individuals. During 
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the continuation phase, we see a small net loss that does suggest that individuals who had 
the initial loss of income may not regain income as quickly as we might have expected.  
 
5.3.4 Coping costs and impact on social networks 
 
In trying to understand the broader impact of ill health, direct costs and income loss, we 
explored the impact on social networks. The percentage of patients who employ coping 
strategies and access social resources are shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. Percentage (%) of respondents using coping strategies (stratified by type) at different points in 
the pathway. 
 
About 22% of those with TB compared to 8% of those with TB reported relying on carers, 
either in the form of someone to take over their job or household duties or to look after 
them prior to starting and during treatment, and 5% of patients reported selling assets. 
We found that few patients (3%) were accessing cash transfers (in the form of the 
disability grant) during the intensive phase of treatment with a subsequent slight increase 
(to 5%) during the continuation phase of treatment.  This may reflect the time it takes 
from application to receiving the grant and suggests a lack of access to grants. We 
explored factors associated with incurring catastrophic health expenditure in Table 10 
below.
 Table 10. Regression exploring relationship between 'catastrophic' health care related expenditure (>10% 
of annual individual income) and key socio-economic and related factors. 
 Diagnostic period  Treatment period  
Variable OR (95% CI) p-value OR (95% CI) p-value 
Gender (1 = male) 1.20 (0,69; 2,10) 0.521 0.35 (0,17; 0,73) < 0.05 
Rural (1 = rural) 0.98 (0,53; 1,81) 0.950 2.67 (1,22; 5,85) < 0.05 
TB (1 = positive) 1.28 (0,60; 2,75) 0.528 - - 
Number of symptoms 1.18 (1,02; 1,36) < 0.05 - - 
Number of health care visits 1.10 (1,01; 1,21) < 0.05 0.99 (0,98; 1,01) 0.242 
Main source of income = No income reference  reference  
Main source of income = Formal 0.17 (0,07; 0,40) < 0.05 0.34 (0,12; 0,98) < 0.05 
Main source of income = Self-employed 0.22 (0,05; 0,97) < 0.05 0.70 (0,14; 3,59) 0.670 
Main source of income = Odd jobs 0.66 (0,30; 1,46) 0.304 0,46 (0,14; 1,56) 0,213 
Main source of income = Government 
grant 
1.23 (0,58; 2,61) 0.584 1,04 (0,41; 2,60) 0,937 
Asset index (1 = least poor) 1.26 (0,69; 2,28) 0.453 0.67 (0,31; 1,47) 0.315 
Years of schooling 1.01 (0,93; 1,10) 0.837 1.01 (0,90; 1,12) 0.926 
Amount spent on nutritional supplements 1.00 (1,00; 1,01) < 0.05 1.12 (1,02; 1,24) < 0.05 
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1651  Pseudo R2 = 0,1959  
 
Not surprisingly, we found that those who reported that their main source of income was 
through formal or self-employment, as compared to those with no income, were less 
likely to experience catastrophic expenditure. During the diagnostic phase, the number 
of symptoms and health care visits were significant factors in catastrophic expenditure. 
In both the diagnostic and treatment phase the amount spent on nutritional supplements 
increased catastrophic expenditure. 
 
 
5.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The study found that the cost of TB diagnosis and treatment in South Africa could be 
catastrophic and drive the ‘medical poverty trap’. For those starting on treatment, the 
costs associated with a TB episode totalled 22% of the average pre-symptomatic 
individual income. The greatest financial cost was incurred in the time between first 
becoming symptomatic and starting treatment. A similar trend was found in other patient 
cost studies where pre-treatment and treatment costs were included (197,298). This was 
compounded by the income loss experienced prior to treatment, which made up 72% of 
the total episode income loss and 26% of the total episode cost. This is significant given 
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that 59% of respondents reported no income prior to symptoms. Where we used a proxy 
to compare costs against a nominal income of US$1 per annum, the percentage of costs 
against income is seen to exceed income which suggests that those with no income are 
experiencing excessive out-of-pocket costs, placing a significant burden on households 
given that only approximately a third of respondents indicated that another household 
member had a steady job. 
 
Geographical access to health facilities was good, with few reported visits to private 
health facilities or Traditional Health Practitioners (THP) before receiving a TB test. Only 
3% of respondents reported visits to THP, this is possibly underreported due to social 
desirability bias (299). While the relatively low levels of direct costs were encouraging, 
we found that for many patients these small expenses were nevertheless catastrophic 
given that many patients reported no income. Where individuals did report having an 
income, income loss when patients started experiencing TB symptoms was high and may 
have been influenced by a lack of the protective effects of sickness benefits and leave 
when employed in the informal sector. 
 
Given that the number of health care visits was a significant factor in determining 
catastrophic expenditure, the South African Department of Health’s policy on reducing 
the number of visits to a health facility during TB treatment has alleviated some of the 
economic burden (300). However, without proper support, a reduction in visits may have 
consequences for adherence and future drug resistance. The system of TB treatment 
through community-based care has been shown to be cost-effective and has been policy 
for many years; but has yet to be implemented in a comprehensive manner (209). Further 
effort should be made to strengthen and implement this policy. 
 
Coping strategies and social networks triggered by these financial stresses were activated 
in a cascade. During the symptomatic and intensive phase of treatment, patients were 
relying on guardians and carers for assistance, and borrowing money was greatest during 
the intensive phase of treatment. Conversely, uptake of cash transfers only occurred 
during the continuation phase of treatment when the economic burden on individuals was 
at its lowest. In South Africa, a short-term cash transfer, called the disability grant is 
provided to individuals if they are deemed to be unable to work because of a physical 
disability. Access to these grants is however limited as patients must see a dedicated 
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doctor who is not based at the clinic (personal communication, South African Social 
Security Agency). This is reflected in our results, with only 5% of respondents receiving 
a disability grant. The percentage of patients selling assets increased between the pre-
treatment period and the continuation phase of treatment, as financial losses over time 
depleted household as well as social resources (200). The proportion of patients 
borrowing money and selling assets was like what was found in another South African 
study (289). 
 
The study had several limitations. Firstly, recall bias is a concern in patient cost surveys. 
Although we have improved upon previous methods by conducting a longitudinal study, 
a balance had to be found between ensuring the ‘pragmatic’ nature of the research setting 
was retained and recall bias. We attempted to limit the negative effect of recall bias by 
linking questions about costs incurred to ‘memorable’ events such as starting treatment 
or the start of symptoms. A second limitation of the study is that even though we 
attempted to capture the influence on social networks, assessing the impact on the 
household through patient - rather than household surveys may not fully capture the 
household impact of the cost of illness. For example, it was not possible to collect 
accurate household income data, and by comparing the direct costs incurred against 
annual individual income, we might have underestimated the burden of the cost given 
that individual income is likely to be shared among members of a household. It is also 
possible that household members would share their income with the respondent, although 
this effect may be small as only a third of respondents reported that another family 
member had a steady job. In addition, the impact of a single disease was studied, and 
further research should be done to estimate the economic burden to patients with multiple 
chronic diseases especially co-infection with HIV and TB. And lastly, due to the nature 
of the study, we were only able to interview those who, by definition, could access health 
services. It is therefore possible that we are underestimating the access barriers due to out 
of pocket cost and income losses. Although the findings are limited in the sense that they 
are pertinent to South Africa, the general approach used by this study could be applied to 
other settings; the use of longitudinal data, the measurement of income loss and including 
the costs to societal networks.  
 
Nevertheless, some important policy recommendations can be made. Firstly, the social 
protection scheme as it currently stands is not sufficient to alleviate the poverty impact 
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of TB and prevent TB by minimising poverty. It was encouraging to find that most 
patients’ first point of call when ill was a public clinic, and that patients were largely able 
to walk to a health facility. However, even though TB services are provided free of charge, 
patients are incurring catastrophically high costs. Many patients had little or no income 
with which to pay for these costs. The social protection currently provided comes in too 
late. Although there have been calls to reduce the ‘holes’ in the social protection safety 
net in South Africa, this remains a long-term solution (301). More comprehensive social 
protection programs, that cover more than just the direct costs of care but also allow for 
better nutrition and prevent households from being further impoverished by illness are 
needed. In the short term, the priority for poverty focused TB services must be the early 
detection of TB. Many of those with TB are currently in HIV care, and therefore policies 
supporting intensive case finding in these groups may have a poverty alleviating impact. 
For those accessing general health services, integration of TB screening into primary 
health care services would be beneficial. Once on treatment, providing treatment and 
support in the community would reduce the impact of TB on household members 
especially during the intensive phase of treatment. Access to the current disability grant 
could be improved by removing the need for assessment by a doctor. 
 
People with suspected TB and those on TB treatment were followed up over a sustained 
time to examine the economic burden of TB in South Africa. The results highlight the 
importance of including those with no incomes in the analysis and the mismatch between 
the need and availability of social protection for those with TB. We found that 
respondents incurred high economic losses prior to diagnosis and that income loss was 
severe. Both national and global policy recommendations should therefore focus on 
ensuring that health systems identify those with TB early on, support those on treatment 
with TB in a way that minimises income loss and provide social protection to those with 
the lowest income if we are to break the vicious cycle between TB and poverty for those 




Figure 20: Patient outcomes of the TB suspect cohort 
In the table, LTFU represents the patients who became lost to follow-up; TB+ and TB- refers to those who received positive TB test result and those who received a negative 




























































Figure 21: Patient outcomes of the confirmed TB cohort 
In the table, LTFU represents the patients who became lost to follow-up; TB+ and TB- refers to those who received positive TB test result and those who received a negative 









































CHAPTER 6: COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF 




South Africa was an early-adopter of Xpert MTB/RIF for TB diagnosis; however, studies 
conducted during implementation found that the Xpert-based TB-diagnostic guideline did not 
reduce mortality when compared to microscopy, though was found to be cost-neutral (12). As 
Xpert is efficacious, variation in implementation is hypothesised to have resulted in the lack of 
improvement in outcomes. A mathematical model was developed to explore how complementary 
investments may improve the value of the algorithm by strengthening supportive structures for 
the implementation of Xpert MTB/RIF. Complementary investments in the patient pathway were 
compared to the status quo (Xpert MTB/RIF). Scenarios assessed included actions to reduce 
initial pre-treatment loss-to-follow-up (iLTFU); supporting empirical TB treatment; and 
improving access to further diagnostic tests following a negative result (negative pathway)). We 
estimated costs, deaths - and disability-adjusted-life-years (DALYs) averted per scenario from a 
societal perspective. Sensitivity analyses explored the influence of behavioural, disease and 
organisational characteristics that potentially mediate the effectiveness of all investments. Among 
a population of symptomatic patients in South Africa with a TB prevalence of approximately 
13%, 45% HIV prevalence, and who are tested for TB, reducing iLTFU led to a 4% reduction in 
mortality compared to the observed ‘status quo’ scenario, while improving the pathway for 
further testing after a false negative test result reduced mortality by 14%. Effectiveness of 
investment in the negative pathway was dependent on ensuring a high rate of return for follow 
up visits. Up to an additional $600 per patient could be invested in health systems strengthening 
to support implementation of the TB diagnostic algorithm without crossing a revealed WTP cost-
effectiveness threshold. Investing in both direct and indirect complementary investments to 
support progression along the TB diagnostic pathway is potentially highly cost-effective. Our 
study demonstrates an approach to determine the optimal investments to support new diagnostic 
technology introduction in different settings.  
 
This chapter has been drafted, and received inputs from co-authors 
Foster N, Cleary S, Cunnama L, McCarthy K, Ramma L, Siapka M, Sinanovic E, Churchyard 
G, Fielding K, Grant AD and Vassall A.  
Strengthening health systems to improve the value of Tuberculosis diagnostics in high-burden 
settings: a cost and cost-effectiveness analysis.  
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Globally, there is renewed interest in understanding how disease-specific investments 
function in the context of broader health system challenges (302). Alongside this interest, 
is re-invigorated enquiry into how best to support policy makers to assess joint 
technology and health systems strengthening investments when introducing new 
technologies. A recent example of an investment with global importance is the roll-out 
of Xpert MTB/RIF (Xpert). In 2011, the South African Minister of Health announced the 
national roll out of Xpert as the first line TB diagnostic test in South Africa, following 
recommendations from the World Health Organisation (WHO) (303). Early 
demonstration studies in South Africa suggested that Xpert would be more sensitive in 
detecting TB in HIV-positive individuals than the previous standard of care, smear 
microscopy (304). Xpert was expected to provide results more quickly and have the 
added benefit of diagnosing Rifampicin-resistant TB (RR-TB), an indicator for multi-
drug resistant (MDR) TB. Model-based analyses suggested that Xpert was likely to be 
cost-effective due to improved diagnostic sensitivity or through generating downstream 
cost savings, depending on assumptions about the sensitivity and specificity of the 
standard of care in starting those with TB on treatment (80,234).  
 
However, studies conducted following the implementation of Xpert found no significant 
impact on TB related morbidity, mortality, initial loss-to-follow-up (iLTFU) or time to 
treatment for patients  starting drug-sensitive TB (DS-TB) treatment during the early 
stages of roll-out in South Africa (12,305). Where studies specifically examined the 
impact on patients with multi-drug resistant (MDR) TB, they found that Xpert reduced 
the time to appropriate treatment, though not to same day or same week, as had been 
expected (306,307). Furthermore, an economic evaluation based on a pragmatic trial 
following the roll-out in South Africa (the XTEND trial) found that Xpert implementation 
during early roll-out was both effect and cost-neutral and was unlikely to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the TB diagnostic algorithm (308). The study concluded that 
implementation constraints may have mediated the impact of Xpert under programmatic 
conditions (81,309). The lack of improvement in patient outcomes observed following 
Xpert implementation has been hypothesized by some to be as a result of TB treatment 
being started empirically following a negative smear microscopy result. The discrepancy 
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between modelled and observed population impact might also suggest that the baseline 
standard of care was better than could be predicted when parameterising models primarily 
using the diagnostic accuracy (222,309). Other countries have reported similar 
experiences from the implementation of Xpert (224,226,310–315). The placement of the 
test in the health system, how it is integrated into the available laboratory infrastructure 
and diagnostic algorithm, as well as patient linkages to treatment were found to be 
important mediators of costs and effects.  
 
For South Africa and beyond, there is therefore a need to support policy makers to 
determine which complementary investments are required to realise the potential benefits 
of Xpert, and other TB diagnostics. To inform this need and illustrate a potential approach 
to assessing combined diagnostic technology and health systems investments, we 
calibrated a purpose-built mathematical model, the SINDI model, to empirical data from 
the XTEND trial (12). We then explored which complementary investments to the Xpert-
based diagnostic algorithm would be most cost-effective in South Africa and used the 
model to identify the contextual drivers influencing the cost-effectiveness of these 
investments. For South Africa and beyond, there is therefore a need to support policy 
makers to determine which complementary investments are required to realise the 
potential benefits of Xpert, and other TB diagnostics. To inform this need and illustrate 
a potential approach to assessing combined diagnostic technology and health systems 
investments, we calibrated a purpose-built mathematical model, the SINDI model, to 
empirical data from the XTEND trial (12). We then explored which complementary 
investments to the Xpert-based diagnostic algorithm would be most cost-effective in 
South Africa and used the model to identify the contextual drivers influencing the cost-





A cost-utility analysis of health systems investments to support TB diagnosis was 
conducted. This analysis builds on previous modelling work that explores investments in 
patient pathways (153,228,251,316) by using patient-level longitudinal data from a 
pragmatic cluster randomised control trial (described in Chapter 4).  
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6.2.1 Overview of the conceptual approach 
 
Health systems investments are typically conceptualised as investments in health care 
infrastructure, clinical guidelines, technology  or human resources, with less emphasis on 
how the relational aspect of health systems (317) may affect the costs and outcomes of 
an investment. Clinical discretionary decision-points in patient care can be 
conceptualised as transactions between the provider and the patient, occurring within a 
given organisational system. One may consider these transactions as interactions between 
the hardware - and software components of health systems (318). Hardware components 
of the system include technology, infrastructure and finances; while the tangible software 
components refer to the formal or informal organisational rules of practice (including 
clinical guidelines). Intangible software refers to the values and beliefs that unite the 
organisation and explain behaviour. While some have estimated costs of investments by 
analysing how the production of healthcare responds to an increase in need (319,320); in 
this analysis, we identify patterns of provider behaviour and then model this behaviour 
as a function of resource availability, processes or relational interactions. This is 
implemented in the model by the mediation of decisions along the patient pathway, and 
by exploring how investment scenarios may be mediated (see Figure 22) (321). The costs 
of the decision-making process includes the cost of regulating the decision as well as the 
opportunity cost of the benefits forgone in the time taken to make the decision or in 
making the wrong decision, the transaction cost (31: 86). We estimate the value of 
additional investments that can be made to strengthen these decision-making processes, 
defined as the difference between the ICER and the CET. Secondly, we describe how the 




Figure 22. Simplified schematic of the SINDI model developed and used in the analysis.  
The figure is a simplified representation of the model, with the circular boxes representing health states and the square boxes representing intermittent states used to model 
shorter time step processes, the model structure is presented in more detail in Figure 8. “A” refers to the decision-making process from a negative test result to starting treatment 
without a bacteriological confirmation; “B” represents the decision to continue testing for TB (negative pathway) in those with a negative test result; C is the behaviour around 
starting treatment after a positive test result; D refers to the decision (based on an interpretation of the further diagnostic tests) to start treatment; and E refers to the decision to 
start TB treatment after being ‘out of care’. * The model structures following the TB test is replicated for each of the six patient types, those HIV negative (with and without 
TB), HIV positive not on ART (with and without TB), and those HIV positive on ART (with and without TB). ** The treatment states are replicated for drug-sensitive treatment 
and drug-resistant TB treatment.
6.2.2 Mathematical model  
 
A state-transition model with time-dependent Markov processes, the SINDI model, was 
developed (described in further detail in Chapter 4). The model simulates disease 
progression and interactions with the health system in a symptomatic population 
investigated for TB. The secondary benefits to the population through TB transmission 
reduction is not included (219). The timeframe of the analysis is three years, representing 
the time until the population is either cured of this episode, or dead.  A cycle length of 
one month was used to account for the slightly longer processes of treatment and 
movement from out of care, with additional structure added to model diagnostic 
processes with smaller time steps. The model was implemented in TreeAge Pro 2018 and 
parameters estimated using STATA 13.  
 
In the model, six discrete types of patients defined by HIV, ART and true TB status, 
move through health states until reaching an absorbing state (cure or death). Patients enter 
the model symptomatic and if identified as needing a TB test by primary health care staff 
(TB screen positive), transition through a series of diagnostic processes, following which 
they move to one of four possible health states (1) ‘out of care’ if not started on treatment; 
(2) treatment (drug sensitive or MDR treatment); (3) death; or (4) cured; which can be 
entered either after treatment or based on a self-cure rate from out of care in those with 
TB.  
 
Table 11. Summary of parameters and distributions. 
Definition Mean (standard deviation) and 
stratification 
Distribution Comments. References are listed as name of first author, year (Reference). 
Population 
   
Gender 59.9% female 
 
Represents trial population. Churchyard. 2015 (12)  
Age (IQR) 37 (29 - 48) years Fixed Represents trial population. Churchyard. 2015 (12) 
Initial population disease characteristics HIVneg 0.314 (0.030);  
HIVpos 0.531 (0.015);  
ART 0.155 (0.005) 
Dirichlet From trial population. Churchyard 2015 (12) Those with unknown self-reported HIV status are 
assumed to be HIV positive, not on ART. 
CD4 count in those with HIV (IQR) 315 (192 - 480) cells/μL 
 
Represents the trial population. Churchyard. 2015 (12) 
True TB prevalence (includes 
bacteriologically confirmed -, clinical - and 
undiagnosed TB) 
18.0% Fixed Estimated from XTEND trial and model calibration. Churchyard. 2015 (12) 
Proportion of patients diagnosed with drug-
resistant TB, any diagnosis 
4.0% (8/195) 
 
Represents trial population. Churchyard. 2015 (12).  
Proportion of patients starting MDR TB 
treatment 
2.0% (3/195)  Represents what was observed in the XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12). Time to starting 
MDR TB treatment was 11 and 33 days respectively. 
Diagnosis, transition probabilities 
   
Probability of a positive Xpert test result if 
symptomatic and able to provide a sputum 
sample 
HIVneg 0.077 (0.03);  
HIVpos 0.132 (0.05);  
ART 0.135 (0.03) 
Dirichlet Churchyard. 2015 Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12) 
Probability of TB if patient had a positive test 
result 
HIVneg 0.877;  
HIVpos 0.936;  
ART 0.938 
Fixed Estimated based on GX sensitivity 0.86 in HIVneg; 0.79 in HIVpos, 0.94 for Rif resistance, and 
GX specificity of 0.99 in HIVneg, HIVpos, 0.98 for Rif resistance. Steingart 2014 (322), 
Steingart 2006 (323), and Boehme 2011 (324). 
Probability of TB if patient had a negative test 
result  
HIVneg 0.012;  
HIVpos 0.113;  
ART 0.114 
Fixed Unobserved parameter estimated from model calibration. Based on GX sensitivity 0.86 in HIVneg; 
0.79 in HIVpos, 0.94 for Rif resistance, and GX specificity of 0.99 in HIVneg, HIVpos, 0.98 for 
Rif resistance. Steingart 2014 (322), Steingart 2006 (323), and Boehme 2011 (324). This includes 
a probability of a false negative test result; HIVneg 0.012; HIVpos pre-ART 0.038; HIVpos ART 
0.039 as well as a probability of ‘undiagnosed TB’. Undiagnosed TB includes those who provide 
pauci-bacillary sputum or have extra-pulmonary TB.  
Probability of starting treatment within 30 
days of a positive test result  
HIVneg 0.882 (0.325);  
HIVpos 0.802 (0.400);  
ART 0.944 (0.236) 
Dirichlet Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard et al. 2015 (12) 
Probability of starting treatment within one 
month of a negative test result without further 
diagnostic tests (empirical treatment) 
HIVneg_TB 0.535; HIVneg 0.002; 
HIVpos_TB 0.072; HIVpos 0.009; ART_TB 
0.017;  
ART 0.003 
Fixed Probability of starting treatment was estimated from XTEND trial, whether this clinical decision 
was correct (treatment started in those with TB vs those without) was estimated through model 
calibration. Churchyard et al. 2015 (12). We therefore assume that clinicians are unlikely to start 
treatment empirically in those HIV negative. 
Probability of receiving further investigations 
after a negative test result (negative pathway) 
HIVpos_TB 0.041; HIVpos 0.041; ART_TB 
0.073; ART 0.073 
Fixed McCarthy. 2016 Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12,272). 
Probability of starting TB treatment after 
further diagnostic tests (negative pathway) 
HIVpos_TB 0.212; HIVpos 0.027; ART_TB 
0.217; ART 0.037 
Fixed Estimated from XTEND trial and the model calibration. Churchyard. 2015. McCarthy. 2016 
(12,272). 
Probability of starting TB treatment from ‘out of care’, by month: from all who do not start TB treatment within one month of the diagnostic test 
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month 2 HIVneg_TB 0.928; HIVneg 0.005; 
HIVpos_TB 0.164; HIVpos 0.000; ART_TB 
0.100;  
ART 0.000 
Fixed Curve estimated from XTEND trial. Assume that the behaviour from out of care remains the 
same (12). 
month 3 HIVneg_TB 0.756; HIVneg 0.000; 
HIVpos_TB 0.066; HIVpos 0.000; ART_TB 
0.207;  
ART 0.000 
Fixed Curve estimated from XTEND. Assume that the behaviour from out of care remains the same. 
Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
month 4 HIVneg_TB 0.000; HIVneg 0.005; 
HIVpos_TB 0.146; HIVpos 0.000; ART_TB 
0.148; ART 0.000 
Fixed Curve estimated from XTEND. Assume that the behaviour from out of care remains the same. 
Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
month 5 HIVneg_TB 0.000; HIVneg 0.015; 
HIVpos_TB 0.064; HIVpos 0.000; ART_TB 
0.000; ART 0.000 
Fixed Curve estimated from XTEND trial. Assume that the behaviour from out of care remains the 
same. Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
month 6 HIVneg_TB 0.000; HIVneg 0.010; 
HIVpos_TB 0.060; HIVpos 0.000; ART_TB 
0.000; ART 0.000 
Fixed Curve estimated from XTEND trial. Assume that the behaviour from out of care remains the 
same. Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
Probability of starting DR-TB treatment if 
diagnosed with DR-TB 
HIVneg 0.025; HIVpos 0.019; ART 0.000 Dirichlet Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
Treatment, transition probabilities 
Probability of drug sensitive TB regimen 
started if TB treatment started 
HIVneg 0.952; HIVpos 0.969; ART_TB 
0.834 
Dirichlet Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12).  
Probability of MDR-TB regimen started if TB 
treatment started 
HIVneg 0.039 (0.208); HIVpos 0.023 
(0.002); ART 0.000 (0.000);  
Dirichlet Estimated from XTEND trial. Churchyard. 2015 (12). 
Disease progression, transition probabilities 
Average life expectancy at birth, South Africa 63 years Fixed From the rapid mortality surveillance report 2014. Assume that HIVpos patients who are on ART 
when they enter the model, would have the same life expectancy as the general population 
(varied in the sensitivity analysis). HIV specific mortality considered in model through 
probabilities. Dorrington. 2015. (325)  Years of life remaining at death is estimated from the 
difference between current age in model (mean age of cohort + time in model) and the average 
life expectancy at birth. 
All-cause mortality in those without TB, 
monthly 
HIVneg 0.001 (0.0005); HIVpos 0.002 
(0.000); ART 0.001 (0.001) 
Dirichlet From Statistics South Africa report (P0309.3), mortality and causes of death in South Africa: 
findings from death notification (326). 
Mortality if living with TB, not currently 
receiving treatment, monthly 
HIVneg 0.018 (0.020); HIVpos 0.132 
(0.005); ART 0.039 (0.005) 
Changes over time Based on Tiemersma. 2011.(327)  Used half-cycle correction to adjust for earlier movement into 
treatment in month 1 of the model. 
Mortality on treatment for those with TB, 
monthly 
HIVneg 0.002 (0.001); HIVpos 0.046 
(0.002); ART 0.006 (0.003) 
Changes over time Andrews 2012 (328). Mohr 2015 (329). Monthly mortality reduction due to TB treatments added 
as distribution over time, where mortality reduces to 10% of the mortality of those with TB not 
on treatment at month 5 on treatment. Based on comparison with mortality on treatment observed 
in the XTEND trial. Churchyard 2015 (12). 
Disability weights HIVneg_TB 0.331 (0.057); HIVpos_TB 
0.399 (0.070); HIVpos 0.221 (0.041); ART 
0.053 (0.011); ART_TB 0.331 (0.057) 
Beta Salomon. 2015 (266). Kastien-Hilka. 2017 (330). Assuming that disability weights are not 
cumulative, thus those on ART with TB has the same disability weight as someone with TB 
disease only. 
Cost and resource use 
   
Microscopy (FM) $ 6.30 ($ 1.34) Gamma Cunnama 2016.(165) 
Xpert MTB/RIF $ 16.90 ($ 6.10) Gamma Cunnama 2016.(165) 
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Sputum liquid culture $ 12.90 ($ 2.26) Gamma Cunnama 2016. (165) 
Digital CXR $ 15.17 ($ 7.74) Gamma Foster. Unpublished.  
First-line drug sensitivity test (LPA) $ 20.30 ($ 7.28) Gamma Cunnama 2016. (165) 
Second-line drug sensitivity test $ 25.10 ($ 20.22) Gamma Cunnama 2016. (165) 
Provider cost of clinic visit for initial 
diagnosis and monitoring 
$ 8.63 Fixed Vassall 2017. (331) 
Provider cost of clinic visit for treatment $ 3.89 Fixed Vassall 2017. (331)  
Patient cost of clinic visit $ 2.90 Fixed Foster 2015. (198) 
Guardian cost per clinic visit $ 10.04 Fixed Foster 2015.(198) 
Cost of caregiver per day $ 0.69 Fixed Foster 2015. (198) 
Resource use along the diagnostic pathway Detailed input available from S2 Data. Gamma Estimated by disease progression. Reported in Vassall 2017. Foster 2015. (198,331). 
Provider cost of DSTB treatment, episode $ 192.99 Time-dependent 
functions 
Estimated based on disease progression from trial (see Figure S5). Reported in Vassall 2017 and  
Foster 2015. (198,331) 
Provider cost of MDR treatment, episode $ 10 802.66 Time-dependent 
functions 
Estimated based on disease progression from trial (see Figure S5). Reported in Vassall 2017 and. 
Foster 2015 (198,331) 
Patient cost of DSTB treatment, episode  Cost of accessing care associated $ 459.16;  
Cost of illness $ 135.94 
Time-dependent 
functions 
Foster 2015. (198) 
Patient cost of MDR treatment, episode Cost of accessing care associated $ 3 
592.27;  
Cost of illness $ 2 442.03 
Time-dependent 
functions 
Foster 2015. (198) 
In the Table, where a distribution is called fixed, it refers to one where no uncertainty interval added to the distribution; and is common practice for calibrations of complex 
models. Where IQR = interquartile range; HIVpos = individuals HIV positive not yet started on ART; HIVpos_TB = individuals HIV positive with TB; ART = individuals 
HIV positive started on ART; ART_TB = individuals HIV positive on ART with TB. The full parameter list upon which this Table is based, is available in the supplementary 
materials. 
 
6.2.3 Parameter estimation and model calibration 
 
Transition probabilities, resource use, unit costs and associated parameter uncertainty 
were estimated from trial data (summarised in Table 11). Where treatment-related events 
occurred after the six-month trial period, data from published cohorts and meta-analyses 
were used to construct the patient pathway until the end of the treatment episode. The 
pragmatic nature of the trial did not allow for definitive confirmation of TB diagnosis 
among all trial participants. Therefore, unobservable parameters include the true TB 
prevalence in the population, as well as the predictive value of decisions to start treatment 
or request further investigations. These parameters were estimated by calibrating  the 
model’s mortality and treatment outputs against those observed in the trial (264). We 
estimated a plausible range of values for each of the unobserved parameters and then 
iteratively calibrated the mortality and time-to-treatment curves from model outputs to 
the Kaplan-Meier curves from the trial until the shape of the respective curves fitted using 
a range of goodness-of-fit measures (230:260). The calibration procedures are described 
in Chapter 4. 
 
6.2.4 Cost analyses 
 
The costs of providing and accessing care were estimated alongside the trial and included 
provider -, patient -, laboratory and above service-level costs estimated using a 
combination of top-down and ingredients costing approaches and reported in detail 
elsewhere (233,258,259). The costs associated with HIV care were extracted from 
published sources (Table 11). Provider costs were estimated by multiplying unit costs by 
the number of events incurred by patient type from data collected during the trial, 
implementing time-varying costs. The cost incurred by patients include travel - and time 
costs incurred by patients and caregivers when accessing care. Costs incurred due to 
illness included income loss, the cost of caregiver’s time, interest on loans as well as the 
cost of nutritional supplements. The opportunity cost of time was valued by multiplying 
time loss by the pre-illness mean income of the cohort (198). All costs were estimated in 
local currency using 2013 prices and converted to US dollars using the average 2013 
exchange rate of US$1=R9.62 (www.Oanda.com).  
 
 




The pragmatic nature of the trial enabled us to identify the gap between ideal movement 
along different decision nodes of the pathway and current mediating variables of 
effectiveness in routine care settings (summarised in Table 12).  
 
Based on these insights, we modelled three investment strategies to support TB diagnosis. 
These included (1) reducing initial loss-to-follow-up (iLTFU), (2) changing the extent to 
which TB treatment is started in the absence of bacteriological confirmation (empirical 
treatment), and (3) providing additional diagnostic tests after an initial negative test result 
(negative pathway). Investments were implemented by altering process variables at key 
stages in the patient pathway.  
 
Table 12. Summary of the investment designs.  
Investment Model implementation Parameter, events or resource changes Assumptions 
Reduction in initial 
LTFU  
(in Figure 1; 
decision-point C and 
E) 
All patients with positive TB test 
results start treatment within one 
month of testing - simulating a 
point-of-care or a track-and-trace 
scenario with active follow-up of 
people with a positive TB test 
result. Synergies with investment 
in a community health worker 
programme.  
ptxfpos = 1 - pMort_m1 (stratified by 
HIV and TB status) 
 
The probability of starting treatment 
from a positive test result was the 
remainder of all patients in that state 
after those who would die in that 
month had been subtracted. The 
mortality rate was stratified by HIV 
and TB status. 
Probability of starting treatment after positive (in month 
1), from: 
HIVneg: 0.882 to 1; 
HIVneg_TB: 0.882 to 1; 
HIVpos: 0.802 to 1; 
HIVpos_TB: 0.802 to 1; 
ART: 0.944 to 1; 
ART_TB: 0.944 to 1 
Monthly conditional probabilities of starting 
treatment from ‘out of care’, was estimated from 
the trial in the base scenario (reported in Table 1). 
In this investment scenario, patients shift from 
moving to the ‘out of care’ state if not started on 
treatment within one month, to the treatment state 
immediately, thus probabilities of starting 
treatment from ‘out of care’ approximates zero. 
The relative proportions of those starting various 
treatment types is kept the same as observed in the 
trial.  
Empirical treatment 
from negative test 
result 
(in Figure 1; 
decision-point A) 
The ability of healthcare workers 
to correctly act (by giving TB 
treatment to those with test 
negative TB expressed as the 
sensitivity and specificity of that 
decision) based on continued 
clinical symptoms, on the same 
day as the results visit. This was 
based on the behaviour estimated 
during the microscopy arm of the 
model calibration and was 
applied to behaviour after a 
negative Xpert test result.  
 
pnegpathfeg = 0 
ptreatfneg = value estimated from 
reported behaviour in the control arm 
of the XTEND study (332), under the 
assumption that behaviour observed 
after the implementation will revert 
back to pre-implementation levels. 
 
Assumed that all have at least one 
visit to a public health clinic (and 
associated costs) after a negative test 
result for treatment initiation. 
 
Probability of the negative pathway after a negative 
test result, from: 
HIVpos: 0.027 to 0.000 
HIVpos_TB: 0.212 to 0.000 
ART: 0.037 to 0.000 
ART_TB: 0.217 to 0.000 
Probability of starting treatment after 
negative, from: 
HIVneg: 0.002 to 0.040 
HIVneg_TB:0.054 to 0.270 
HIVpos: 0.009 to 0.180 
HIVpos_TB: 0.072 to 0.360 
ART: 0.003 to 0.060 
ART_TB: 0.017 to 0.090 
 
Given the differences in health care worker 
behaviour after a microscopy test compared to a 
Xpert test result observed in the XTEND trial, we 
use the calibrated transition probabilities estimated 
for the microscopy arm of the trial (333,334).  
Improvements in the 
negative pathway (in 
Figure 1 decision-
points B and D) 
Those HIV positive with negative 
test results get further 
investigations (CXR/culture) for 
possible TB, and a proportion are 
started on TB treatment, 
simulating additional investment 
in improving access to further 
diagnostic tests.  
 
ptreatfneg = 0 
pnegpathfneg = 1 (stratified by HIV 
and TB status) 
treatfnegpath = 0.10 (no TB); 0.80 
(with TB) 
 
The probability of starting treatment is 
shifted from following a negative test 
result to the decision to order further 
diagnostic tests. The negative - and 
positive predictive values estimated 
from the trial are assumed to stay the 
same. The probability of starting 
treatment after the negative pathway 
was 10% in those without TB, and 
80% in those with TB. 
 
Probability of starting treatment after negative 
changes from: 
HIVneg: 0.002 to 0.000 
HIVneg_TB:0.054 to 0.000 
HIVpos: 0.009 to 0.000 
HIVpos_TB: 0.072 to 0.000 
ART: 0.003 to 0.000 
ART_TB: 0.017 to 0.000 
Probability of the negative pathway after a negative 
test result change from: 
HIVpos: 0.041 to 0.900 
HIVpos_TB: 0.041 to 0.900 
ART: 0.073 to 0.900 
ART_TB: 0.073 to 0.900 
Probability of treatment from negative pathway 
changes from: 
HIVpos: 0.027 to 0.000 
Similar to the previous scenario, we model a 
behaviour change scenario based on the difference 
in observed behaviour between the microscopy and 
Xpert arms of the study. This scenario simulates a 
situation where all receive further investigations 
after a negative test result. Therefore, we reduced 
all empirical treatment to 0 and all eligible patients 
received a CXR, as part of the negative pathway. 
The proportion of those who receive further 
diagnostic tests was assumed to be similar to that 
observed in the microscopy arm of the XTEND 
study. 
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Assumed that every person will 
accumulate two visits to the public 
clinic during the negative pathway 
implementation, and that each person 
getting further tests will get at least 
one CXR. 
 
HIVpos_TB: 0.212 to 0.846 
ART: 0.037 to 0.000 
ART_TB: 0.217 to 0.846 
 
In the Table, the individual characteristics of the patients are labelled as HIVneg for people who are HIV negative; HIVneg_TB for people who are HIV negative and has been 
diagnosed with TB; HIVpos for people who are HIV positive; HIVpos_TB represents people who are HIV positive and has been diagnosed with TB; ART represents the 
individuals who are HIV positive and on ART; and ART_TB represents the individuals who are HIV positive, on ART and has been diagnosed with TB. 
 
6.2.6 Economic analyses 
 
The cost-effectiveness and cost-utility of investment scenarios are estimated from a 
provider – and societal perspective. The societal perspective includes the provider costs 
as well as the cost to patients. Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) averted were 
estimated using the model estimates of years of life lost (YLL) due to premature mortality 
and years lived with disability (YLD). YLL were estimated based on progression through 
the model, assuming an average life expectancy of 63 years and based on the mean age 
of patients in the trial of 38 years (12,325). Disability weights from the 2010 Global 
Burden of Disease study were attached to progression through stages in the model, based 
on patient disease characteristics (335).  For people on ART with TB, we assumed the 
same disability weight as for those with TB who are HIV negative. Costs and outcomes 
were discounted at 3% per annum, and varied in the sensitivity analysis (35: 108 - 112). 
 
Changes in the optimal investment at a range of transaction costs, the costs generated by 
the way in which health services are structured, is presented by plotting cost-effectiveness 
acceptability frontiers (CEAF) (336).  The CEAF presents the optimal investment option, 
defined as the strategy with the highest net monetary benefit (NMB), a statistic of the 
monetary value of an investment at a given cost-effectiveness threshold (?). 
 
6.2.7 Sensitivity and scenario analyses 
 
The impact of variation in individual models’ parameter on the results in the model was 
assessed through univariate sensitivity analysis (see Table 15).  Probabilistic uncertainty 
analysis, simulating 100 000 samples, was used to assess the simultaneous effect of path 
and parameter uncertainty on the results of the analysis (337).  
 
Scenario analysis was used to explore how implementation may vary under different sets 
of circumstances. Given the set of interactions governing decision-making in the care 
pathway, some of which would be harder to mediate through additional investment (26), 
an increase in the value of supporting investments would not lead to a proportional, linear 
increase in improvements in outcomes (338). These interactions are therefore explored 
in scenario analyses.  




6.3.1 Disease and behaviour related factors affecting the effectiveness of TB 
diagnostics  
   
After incorporating all data, assuming perfect sensitivity and specificity of health care 
worker decision-making around TB diagnostics, and fitting to the observed secondary 
outcomes, we found that the model fitted the data poorly (see Chapter 4). In order to fit 
the model, we needed to also consider the limitations of sputum-based TB diagnostic 
modalities (339). Undiagnosed TB may be related to the site of infection (extra-
pulmonary TB), and low bacillary load in the sample, as is common in advanced HIV 
disease. During the model calibration, we therefore also added a value for the prevalence 
of extra-pulmonary TB (EPTB), varied along with the PPV and NPV to identify the best 
model fit (shown in Table 4).  
 
6.3.2 Costs, effectiveness, and cost-utility analyses of the investment scenarios 
 
Table 13 presents the costs, effectiveness (deaths averted and DALYs averted), and 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of investment scenarios, compared with a base case 
of Xpert as observed during the trial. From the provider’s perspective, the incremental 
cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) ranged between $29.12 and $56.54 per DALY averted. 
We estimated a provider cost of TB services of $89.59 (UI: $88 - $92) per symptomatic 
person tested using a Xpert-based diagnostic algorithm. The societal cost per person is 
estimated to be $169.42 (UI: $166 - $173).  
 
Table 13. Costs (US$), outcomes and ICERs over three years (36 one-month cycles). 
Status quo and four 
investment 
scenarios  
  TB service costs per symptomatic  individual (US$) Outcomes per symptomatic individual ICERs: compared against the status quo    
In cohort 
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Xpert plus 
reduction in initial 
LTFU (iLTFU) 
995  $     92.27  $ 2.68  $    177.51  $ 8.08 4.57 0.16 0.13 0.00  $      56.54   $   164.91   $     355.84   $       1 009.47  
(C and E) (979; 
1012) 




1115  $   108.28  $ 18.69  $    246.02  $ 76.59 4.06 0.66 0.11 0.02  $     29.12   $    117.36   $      251.47   $      1 009.47  
(A and E) (1093; 
1137) 





1404  $   141.07  $ 51.49  $    278.24  $ 108.82 3.44 1.29 0.09 0.04  $     41.82   $      85.84   $    1417.22   $      2 912.52  
(B, D and E) (1374; 
1433) 
(139; 144) 57% (273; 283) 64% (3.3; 3.6) 27% (0.09; 0.10) 29% (39; 45) (80; 92) (1322; 1513) (2742; 3083) 
In the Table, Incr is the incremental change in costs or effectiveness from the base case. The base case in this analysis which represents the current status quo, Xpert as observed in the intervention 
arm of the XTEND study; dominant: less costly and more effective; dominated: more costly and less effective; The 95% uncertainty interval (UI) is shown in parentheses; ICER: Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio; DALYs: Disability Adjusted Life Years. In the scenario column, the capital letters refer to the decision points upon which the investment scenario acts, as shown in Figure 22. 
 
 Reducing initial LTFU by starting all individuals who test positive on treatment increases 
the cost of treatment and patient cost of accessing care per patient (by $2.68 and $8.08 
respectively). This scenario reduces time to starting treatment but has a comparatively 
small effect on the total number of people starting treatment and on health outcomes. 
Increasing the probability of starting treatment in month one to 100%, shifts the time-to-
treatment started curve to the left, starting people on treatment who would have never 
started as well as those who would have started within the next couple of months. Since 
TB treatment does not instantly reduce the mortality rate for patients who have TB, the 
proportion of patients who start treatment in month one only increases by 12% in those 
HIV negative, 10% in those HIV negative with TB, 20% in the HIV positive group, 7% 
in those HIV positive with TB, 6% in those on ART, and 2% in those on ART with TB, 
in the reduction in iLTFU investment option. 
 
Initiating TB treatment based on clinical signs at the follow-up visit, after a negative test 
result (TfN) increases the cost of TB service per symptomatic person per episode (by 
$18.69), with likewise an increase in societal costs associated with accessing treatment 
of $45.00 per patient, see Figure 23.  
 
In contrast, improving access to further diagnostic tests following a negative test result 
(negative pathway) increases diagnostic costs by $35 per patient due to the follow-on 
tests ordered, with a resultant increase in the cost of treatment (increase of $18 per 
patient). This scenario disproportionately increases the patient costs associated with 
accessing care (from $60 to $105 per patient) as patients make multiple costly visits for 
follow-on diagnostic tests and results. In addition, delays in starting treatment increase 
the cost of illness due to inability to work. 
 
  
Figure 23. Societal service-level costs (US$) per symptomatic person per episode. 
In the Figure; GX refers to the base option, representing the Xpert scenario; GX&iLTFU represents the 
Xpert scenario with investment in reducing initial loss-to-follow-up; GX&TfN represents the Xpert 
scenario with investment in supporting treatment from negative; and GX&NP which represents the Xpert 
scenario with investment in the negative pathway. The cost of accessing care (Access) includes out of 
pocket and time costs incurred by patients and caregivers when accessing care; the cost of illness (Illness) 
includes the cost of caregiver’s time, the cost of patient’s time when unable to work as well as loan interest, 
assets sold and the cost of nutritional supplements. 
 
When comparing what happens after a negative test result between investment strategies, 
starting treatment after further diagnostic tests (negative pathway) is more effective than 
starting treatment empirically. The provider episode costs per symptomatic individual are 
$108.28 ($106 - $110) in the treatment from negative scenario compared to $141.07 
($139 - $144) in the strengthened negative pathway. Considering the societal perspective 
Figure 23, the cost of accessing care increases as the number of visits increases (from 
$70 per person to $137 per person in the negative pathway scenario). Likewise, longer 
delays in correctly diagnosing people increase the cost of illness which is based on 
caregiver’s time as well as patient’s time unable to work.  
 
6.3.3 Investment cost and transaction cost analysis 
 
 We find that investing costs of up to $100 per symptomatic person per transaction with 
the health service (see Figure 24), would not increase the ICER of these investment 
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scenarios to levels in excess of a cost-effectiveness threshold that reflects recent decisions 
adopted by the South African government (revealed willingness-to-pay) (170). For 
example, the decision to adopt universal ART has an estimated ICER of $658/ DALY 
averted (166,319).  It is therefore likely that considerable investments in strengthening 
supportive systems around TB diagnosis in South Africa would still be considered cost-
effective.  
 
Figure 24 reports the cost-effectiveness acceptability frontiers, which show the optimal 
provider investments at a range of transaction costs and cost-effectiveness thresholds. 
Here we considered the points at various cost-effectiveness thresholds where the optimal 
strategy switched at levels of transaction costs. Transaction costs refer to costs to support 
decision-making interactions between agents, we therefore add a transaction cost value 
to each decision-making interaction along the patient pathway (shown as blue dots in 
Figure 22). Assuming no transaction costs, investing in reducing initial loss-to-follow up 
was the optimal investment if the threshold was below $30/DALY averted, but at higher 
thresholds, the negative pathway was the optimal investment. As the investment cost per 
person per transaction increased, empirical treatment became the optimal investment 
compared to the negative pathway at lower thresholds. This is driven by a reduction in 
healthcare visits when patients are started on treatment empirically. 
 
6.3.4 Sensitivity analyses 
 
The results of detailed univariate sensitivity analyses are shown in Chapter 7, with a 
summary presented here (see Figures 25).  The service level costs of each intervention 
vary depending on the population, so for example, if much of the population is HIV- 
positive, the cost of the ART investment increases and so does the cost associated with 
the investments in what happens after a negative test result. In terms of the effect of the 
investments, the scenarios related to what happens after a negative test result are 
particularly sensitive to the prevalence of undiagnosed TB after a negative test result. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of these investments is also sensitive to the health-seeking 
behaviours of patients, specifically whether they return for their results, the availability 
of CXRs and whether treatment is started after further diagnostic tests. The prevalence 
of MDR-TB and cost of MDR-TB treatment was an important driver of costs and 
effectiveness of the overall results.
 
Figure 24. Provider cost-effectiveness acceptability frontiers at various levels of transaction costs.  
Where iLTFU refers to the Xpert plus a reduction in initial loss to follow up scenario; TfN refers to the scenario modelling Xpert plus treatment from negative; NP refers to 
Xpert plus improvements in the negative pathway. The cost-effectiveness acceptability frontier (CEAF) expresses the uncertainty around the cost-effectiveness of investments, 
by showing which strategy is economically preferred at a range of cost-effectiveness thresholds (on the x-axis). The base case scenario for each of these comparisons is Xpert 
MTB/RIF use, as observed in the XTEND trial. The graph is a plot of the proportion of individual runs that would be cost-effective for each intervention (y-axis) while restricting 
the options to only those that would be the most cost-effective (optimal) investment for at least one individual, against a range of cost-effectiveness thresholds (x-axis). As the 
threshold increases, the preferred option changes, the switch point being where the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) value increases beyond the threshold, rendering 
the option no longer cost-effective (340). The analysis is repeated at a range of transaction costs per person, thereby varying the costs needed to be invested to facilitate systems 
level change in line with the investment strategy.  
 
Figures 25(A), 20(B) and 20(C): Results from the univariate sensitivity analyses, showing the ten 
parameters with the greatest influence on the (A) provider cost, (B) the societal costs, and the (C) 
effectiveness (DALYs) of the base case. The full results for these analyses are presented in Table 15. In 
each one-way analysis, one parameter was varied by a factor of 10†† from the mean to produce the low and 
high estimates, with all other variables kept constant at their respective means. Where DALYs are disability 
                                            
†† The values of each of the variables was multiplied by 10 to produce the high value and divided by 10 
to produce the low value. 
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adjusted life years; Prov standard for provider; and Soc is societal. DS treatment is drug-sensitive treatment.  





Our analyses build on a global body of work that has evaluated the use of Xpert-based 
diagnostic guidelines (221,226,233,235,247,341,342), by presenting the costs, 
effectiveness, and cost-utility of complementary investments to strengthen the diagnostic 
pathway and by considering how these investments may interact with the costs incurred 
by patients (79). We explored how investments along the patient pathway and the 
strengthening of health systems may affect the impact and resource use associated with 
TB diagnostics. The results of our analysis suggest that it is unlikely that a single 
investment or technology would dramatically improve the outcomes for symptomatic 
patients receiving a TB diagnostic test; instead our results suggest that investments in 
various parts of the care pathway could generate additional benefits, and, based on the 
transaction cost analysis, we show that relatively high levels of investment in health 
systems strengthening would be cost-effective. When comparing across the care pathway 
(see Table 2), our analysis finds that in a symptomatic cohort with 13% prevalence of 
TB, only minor reductions in mortality can be achieved by improving initial pre-
treatment loss to follow up, while much larger benefits can be achieved by improving 
access to further tests after a negative TB test (the negative pathway). This may be 
explained, in part, by the higher mortality rates observed in people who are HIV positive 
with an initial negative TB test result. 
 
6.4.1 Potential drivers of investment value 
 
While the Xpert assay automates diagnostic processes, with results (TB & MDR-TB) 
generated within two hours and could potentially be used to facilitate same-day diagnosis, 
machines were placed at laboratories in South Africa, with results delivered to health 
facilities within two days. At these laboratories, Xpert implementation sparked efforts to 
reduce the turnaround time of results, nevertheless a follow-up clinic visit by patients was 
still required (165). While the need to improve the linkage of patients with their results 
has been highlighted as an important component of better TB diagnosis, our analysis 
suggests that low gains in terms of mortality reduction would be achieved in such an 
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investment scenario (relative to the other scenarios modelled). This may be driven by 
lower mortality rates in those with positive sputum test results, given that people living 
with HIV who have high rates of TB-associated mortality are less likely to have a positive 
sputum test result. While the mortality reduction is likely to be modest, those with 
positive TB test results are potentially transmitting TB disease in communities, increasing 
the future burden of need at a population level (343). These results are somewhat 
supported by findings from recent studies that highlighted the challenges of point-of-care 
(POC) Xpert testing at facilities in urban settings (344) but also the benefits in a rural 
community (345).  
 
Clinical decision making (empiric TB treatment) after a negative test result has been 
shown to be important in understanding the cost-effectiveness of new TB diagnostics and 
that greater awareness of TB symptoms among health care workers may improve 
outcomes and be a cost-effective intervention (14,233,346). In Uganda, Hermans et al. 
(2017) found that TB treatment was initiated based on clinical symptoms in 18% of 
patients (333).  In Cape Town, South Africa, an evaluation of TB programmatic data 
found that, following the introduction of Xpert, there was a decline in the use of empirical 
TB treatment from 42% to 27% (334).  It is possible that the introduction of Xpert did 
not significantly reduce TB-associated mortality due, in part, to a reduction in action, 
including follow-on tests, after a negative test result (332).  However, access to further 
tests after a negative result (CXR and culture) is dependent on both the availability of 
tests in close proximity to the health facility as well as how the affordability of additional 
visits to patients influences health seeking behaviour (81,104,309). Our analysis suggests 
that assumptions of how quickly TB treatment reduces mortality rates are determinants 
of the effectiveness of this strategy.  
 
6.4.2 Investing in health systems strengthening 
 
While it is not possible to say whether an investment scenario is cost-effective without 
consensus on a cost-effectiveness threshold in South Africa, we find that investing in 
strengthening health systems to support the TB diagnostic algorithm is likely to be a high 
value investment. The outcomes of these investments are also likely to influence other 
disease programs and sectors (32). We do not include these spill-over benefits in our 
analysis, and thus our estimates are conservative. Recent empirical work has highlighted 
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the importance of going beyond investing in assets and technology to also invest in 
developing agency and governance in health systems (347). Those investments are highly 
contextual and difficult to cost, so while our approach highlights to decision makers the 
resource envelopes required, more work is needed to develop and iteratively assess 
context-specific investment strategies.  
 
The following limitations should be considered when interpreting our findings. Firstly, 
we did not model the effect of the various scenarios on the TB epidemic at a population 
level. While the implementation of Xpert primarily resulted in an increased identification 
of smear-negative TB, currently thought not to be a major driver of transmission, not 
including transmission in the analysis is likely to discount the comparative benefit of 
reducing pre-treatment LTFU at a population level (343,348,349). Secondly, while we 
are modelling scenarios and benefits in a nuanced way, the relationship between health 
system structures and health care worker and patient/ community behaviour is highly 
complex and while one can observe patterns, predictions will be limited by our 
understanding of the mechanisms driving these patterns. It is also possible that the reason 
for the existence of this gap in practice are due to structural challenges in the system that 
may be harder to mediate than our analysis suggests. Thirdly, any investment in the health 
system will be likely to have an impact on other associated services, the benefits of which 
we did not include in our analysis (165). And lastly, while our model includes a pathway 
for patients to initiate drug-resistant TB treatment if diagnosed, and individuals will 
initiate DR-TB treatment and incur the associated costs, we do not attempt to estimate 
the true prevalence of DR-TB or what effect the investments may have on the DR-TB 
epidemic. In the analysis of the negative pathway therefore, the model may be 
underestimating the effect of incorrectly starting an individual on drug-sensitive TB 
treatment and continued transmission of DR-TB. It should be noted though that following 
the roll-out of Xpert, studies have found that barriers to initiating DR-TB persisted and 
that the time to correct treatment was only slightly reduced (75,306).  
 
 6.5 Conclusion 
 
In summary, our findings suggest that within the context of a high TB prevalence setting, 
with a well-developed laboratory infrastructure, it is important that the implementation 
of a TB diagnostic test is accompanied by additional investments. Investments in the 
health system to support TB diagnosis of approximately $100 per patient per interaction 
with the health system may still be considered highly cost-effective. Our analysis also 
suggests that there is a high prevalence of undiagnosed TB in those who are symptomatic 
(passive case finding) in South Africa. South African policy and elsewhere is to 
substantially expand and intensify case detection, yet if this is not supported with 
substantial investments in the health system, it may place further burden on a health 
system that is struggling to implement passive case detection, and the impact of these 
policies may also be modified. Focussing effort on ensuring quality along the patient 
pathway therefore remains critical if the large investments in TB diagnostics are to 




At lower levels of transaction costs, strategies have a higher probability of being cost-effective 
at lower CET. 
 
 
Figure 26: cost-effectiveness acceptability curves at various levels of transaction costs 
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In this chapter, the theoretical literature introduced in Chapter 3 are used to interpret the 
results of additional scenario and sensitivity analyses conducted using the model shown 
in Chapter 6, identifying possible policy leverage points and exploring how the behaviour 
of agents will mediate the cost-effectiveness of investments in technology. The results 
are interpreted and discussed with reference to the theoretical literature and the 
implications for decision-making are outlined. In the model, the behaviour of healthcare 
workers is explored in three distinct ways 1) by using data from a pragmatic trial 
reflecting routine practice and clinical decision-making at the time of the study; 2) by 
developing a conceptual framework of the relationships between behaviour at decision 
points and disease outcomes; and 3) by investigating how these interactions may 
influence the value of the diagnostic algorithm. In this chapter, the analytic focus is on 
the third point. The chapter is concluded by reflecting on approaches to incorporating 





The diagnosis of TB is dependent not only on the diagnostic test, but also on both the 
context as well as the behaviour of health care workers who implement the test 
(219,222,350). During the implementation of Xpert, it was found that health care workers 
were less likely to request additional diagnostic tests for patients following a negative TB 
test result than if the initial test was a sputum smear microscopy (271,272). It was thought 
that healthcare workers had overestimated the ability of Xpert to identify all TB, while 
people knew the limitations of microscopy and therefore requested additional tests if they 
continued to suspect TB infections. However, these differences in practice were also 
affected by the availability of chest x-rays as additional diagnostic tests, as well as 
patients’ continued symptoms at follow-up visits (272). These differences between what 
the expected and the observed movement of patients through the care pathway, was 
attributed to health systems weaknesses. The analysis presented in Chapter 6, found that 
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investments in supporting TB diagnosis would be considered high value investments, but 
the decision would vary depending on the context of implementation. Cost-effectiveness 
analyses are commonly used to provide guidance to national – or global level decision-
makers on how best to spend scarce resources in order to maximise the benefit gained. 
However, in decentralised health systems, especially in low- and middle income country 
(LMIC) settings where there is no central body making purchases, and therefore decisions 
on resource spending that guides clinical practice are often made at a local level, yet 
economic evaluations tend to not provide enough guidance on which decision would be 
most appropriate given a specific context (16). In considering health systems in economic 
evaluations, questions that have been raised in extending the use of economic evaluation 
has included whether payers should invest in health systems or in technology (351) and 
explored how to include the interactions with systems (46,245), but there has been less 
guidance on how to present local level policy makers with nuanced advice on the 
implication of one decision over another. Diagnostic processes are highly dependent on 
the behaviour of those who use the guidelines in routine practice; for the interpretation 
of test results, deciding who should be tested, and following up to ensure that treatment 






The model, developed in Chapter 4, with the results discussed in Chapter 6, was used to 
first conduct univariate sensitivity analyses to understand how variation in individual 
model parameters would influence the decision. These interactions were classified based 
on whether they related to structure, behaviour or biological processes. Secondly, 
scenario analyses were developed to explore how implementation in specified contexts 
would change the optimal decision. 
 
In the univariate sensitivity analyses, every model parameter was varied by a factor of 10 
and the outcomes are presented in the Table below. The main drivers of the provider costs 
were the cost of treatment (particular MDR TB treatment), the cost of clinic visits as well 
as the costs of chest x-rays. If the proportion of the population that was HIV positive was 
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higher – this was also a key factor in higher provider costs. Proportion of the cohort, HIV 
positive as well as the proportion of patients with hard-to-diagnose TB were also key 
drivers of the outcomes of the model. 
 
Decision points in the TB diagnostic pathway were identified, along with the downstream 
decision points that they in turn will influence, based on the conceptual framework of the 
model. These decision points are places in the pathway where health care workers and 
patients have an interaction, or where alternative courses of action that influence TB 
outcomes (particularly mortality) occur. These were identified based on a combination 
of the clinical guidelines used in health facilities, the movement through care captured in 
the pragmatic cluster randomised control study, and an understanding of the range factors 
that influences these decisions based on the observations done by the researchers while 
collecting data for the primary cost analyses (198,257,331). We explore how alternative 
patterns of behaviour will affect the value of the TB diagnostic algorithm in South Africa 
by varying multiple interacting probabilities in the pathway.(198,257,331). The results 
of these analyses are presented in Table 14. 
 
7.2.1 Analytical framework 
 
There is no unifying definition of what constitutes investments in strengthening health 
systems. Some have conceptualised health systems investments in terms of changing the 
structure of the health system, by investing in additional technology, trained healthcare 
workers or additional budget to improve the service more broadly (88). As discussed in 
Vassall et al., these investments are crucial to support the implementation of new 
technologies in the longer term and are important for planning resource needs to support 
the sustainable implementation of new technologies (28). For example, improved 
diagnostic technologies are likely to increase the number of patients to be started on 
treatment or will require additional human resource time to identify those in need of a 
test. Under the assumption that health systems are functioning at maximum capacity, 
additional investment in human resources will be needed to support the implementation 
of the revised diagnostic guidelines.  
 
Analytical approaches evaluating systems wide investments required, have the potential 
to allow us to identify the additional resources required for budgeting purposes, and are 
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therefore important predictive tools to assist policy makers. However, may have less 
explanatory ability – to assist in an understanding of why and how the outcomes of an 
investment differ from what was intended, to explore contextual heterogeneity and to 
provide more realistic estimates of cost-effectiveness, with the aim of identifying possible 
policy leverage points. This approach can be extended, by conceptualising and then 
modelling the relationship between health system investment and health outcomes (as 
presented in the model conceptual framework). Building on conceptual frameworks 
proposed by Aragon (318) and Hanson et al. (91), we conceptualise the interaction with 
the patient (see Figure 27) as one that is shaped by the structure of the health system, the 
use of structure through the formal and informal rules of the system (including clinical 
guidelines), as interpreted by healthcare workers and expressed through clinical decision-




Figure 27. Analytical framework for exploring the implementation of health systems 
strengthening investments developed based on the literature reviewed. 





7.2.2 Scenario analyses 
 
Rather than variability in a single variable, the particular characteristics and patterns of 
the system within which an investment is implemented, is represented by changes in 
multiple variables simultaneously. 
 
Initial loss-to-follow up refers to the number of patients, who have a positive TB 
diagnostic test but is not started on treatment within one month of the diagnostic test. 
This statistic is collected routinely for TB services, and this is reported in Error! 
Reference source not found.. This is often used as indicator of the quality of TB services 
provided. However, within a clinic environment, the pathway of patients through the 
clinic means that in order to reduce initial loss-to-follow-up, patients need to be started 
on treatment at the point of diagnosis. Some of the challenges that arise  
 
1. In the initial LTFU scenario, we varied the probability of starting treatment after a 
positive test result between 25% to 100%.  
2. Lower the mortality reduction due to TB treatment started in those who have TB to 
0.005 in HIV positive patients and 0.001 in patients on ART.  
3. Changed the characteristics of the population so that the entire HIV positive 
population is on ART. 
4. Used the highest RR-TB diagnosis reported by Naidoo et al. 4.6% (3.5 – 5.7), 
implemented after positive, negative and out of care – a significant increase from 
XTEND where 1.9% and 2.5% was diagnosed with drug-resistant TB. 
5. Greater access to the negative pathway, with 70% of those eligible gets the negative 
pathway and 80% of those with TB starts treatment. 
6. Models settings with low patient return rates to the clinic, such as possibly more rural 
clinics or where there is a lot of migration 
7. Increased prevalence of extra-pulmonary TB, hard to diagnose using a sputum-based 






Table 15 shows the results of the univariate sensitivity analyses. Each variable was varied 
individually and the effect of that variation on the provider costs, societal costs and 
effectiveness of the base case was estimated. Considering the impact on provider costs, 
costs related to the structure of the health system were the largest determinants in 
variation in costs. These included (with percentage variation shown in brackets), the costs 
drug-sensitive treatment (26%), MDR treatment (18%), Xpert test (17%), clinic visit 
(14%) and chest x-ray (3%). Disease specific factors including the prevalence of TB 
contributed approximately 6% to variation. And factors related to the behaviour of 
healthcare workers contributing to variation in costs included whether a chest x-ray was 
ordered from a negative initial test result (3%).   
 
Considering the effect of changing variables on the effectiveness of the baseline result, 
disease specific factors have the greatest impact on variability. The prevalence of extra-
pulmonary TB has the greatest impact on outcomes, contributing 59% and the proportion 
of the population who is HIV positive, contributes 11%, followed by the prevalence of 
bacteriologically confirmed TB at 5%. Behavioural variables contribute less, with the 
probability of starting treatment only contributing 1%. 
 
Univariate analysis is however likely to underestimate the impact that behaviour is likely 
to have, as behaviour on more than one variable in a chain needs to be modified to 
improve an outcome. For example, increasing the proportion of patients initiating the 
negative pathway, will not a substantial effect on outcomes unless the proportion of 
patients who start treatment correctly from the negative pathway, is also increased. 
Additional multi-variate analyses were therefore conducted to understand how different 
contexts are likely to change the prioritisation of the optimal investment strategy. 
 
 
Table 14. Multi-variate sensitivity analyses. 
Scenario GX&iLTFU GX&TfN GX&NP Change in 
prioritisation 
Comments 






    
Primary estimate 51.42 117.83 84.07     
Initial loss to follow up, high (25%) 45.44 116.27 83.29   ptxfpos changed to (1-0.25) 
Reducing mortality from treatment started 45.64 102.07 72.74   tMort_treat_i1 = 0.005; tMort_treat_i2 = 0.005; 
and tMort_treat_i3  = 0.001 
Universal ART (100% of HIV positive 
cohort is on ART) 
N/A 159.75 85.23 *** This gives the same change in ICER as was 
observed in the iLTFU option; change here is 
not attributable to ART but to reducing ILTFU 
- fix this. 
Percentage of patients who start MDR-TB 
treatment 
77.81 241.86 82.20   used the highest RR-TB  diagnosis reported by 
Naidoo et al. 4.6% (3.5 - 5.7), implemented 
after pos neg and ooc, an increase from 
XTEND between 1.9% and 2.5%. XTEND 
underpowered for this. 
Greater access to the negative pathway; 
70% of those eligible gets the negative 
pathway and 80% of those with TB starts 
treatment.  
51.49 662.43 110.88     
Low patient return rate for a second visit 
(10xbase) 
63.33 155.16 446.67 *** In settings with low return rate; only 10% of 
people return at each decision point 
High pEPTB, increased to 30% in those 
HIV positive, and those on ART 
51.49 61.51 45.89 ***   
In the Table, for each scenario the block that corresponds to the optimal investment has the darkest colour, with the colour then decreasing in intensity to the least cost-effective 
option. In the last column of the table, three stars are used next to the scenarios where the optimal strategy for investment differs from the one presented for the primary estimate.  
Where pEPTB refers to the probability of extra-pulmonary TB; MDR-TB is multi-drug resistant TB; GX&iLTFU refers to the scenario where the investment is to reduce initial 
loss-to-follow-up; GX&TfN is the scenario with treatment from negative; and GX&NP is the investment with support for further diagnostic tests in the negative pathway.  
 
 In settings with high initial loss to follow-up, such as what has been observed in the 
Western Cape of South Africa, investment in reducing initial loss to follow-up continues 
to be the best value intervention, if we do not consider the additional costs to find those 
remaining patients. Another scenario that leads to a change in the prioritisation of 
investments is if there is a higher prevalence of MDR-TB in the initial cohort, with 
investments in the negative pathway becoming more cost-effective relative to other 
options. If we assume that in some contexts, patients will have a lower rate of return to 
care, we find that investment options that reduces the number of visits by starting patients 
with TB on care sooner becomes more cost-effective. In settings with higher prevalence 
of Extra-pulmonary TB, investing in the negative pathway of starting empirical treatment  





7.4.1 Policy levers for supporting TB diagnosis 
 
The analyses presented above shows how the interactions between disease (such as the 
prevalence of hard-to-diagnose TB, or the limitation of sputum-based diagnostic tests), 
as well the behaviour of healthcare workers through the reduced probabilities of routine 
care and access to certain diagnostic tests interact, and dictates the value of the 
implementation of a new diagnostic in routine care settings.  
 
Key policy levers identified above, include strategies to encourage healthcare workers to 
facilitate further testing for TB (the negative pathway). Our results however show that 
access to the tests alone is unlikely to be sufficient in reducing mortality, it is crucial to 
also ensure that treatment is started after further diagnostic tests. These results are 
supported work conducted by Fairall et al. who found that working with healthcare 
workers to increase their awareness of TB and the procedures for testing for TB, was a 
highly cost-effective investment (14).  
 
As was argued by Hanson et al., evaluating investments to strengthen the health system 
to improve specific health outcomes in the health system requires an understanding of 
constraints in the system. A challenge in investigating constraints, is that not all 
constraints will act in the same way. Some constraints will be more amenable to 
investment than others.  
 
7.4.2 Amenability to buy out 
 
The behaviour of agents acting under uncertainty, can be expressed as a function based 
on a set of interactions, as presented in the conceptual framework (see Figure 7). These 
functions, sometimes called utility functions in economics, are analogous to the concept 
of fitness costs in ecology (22: 41, 143). In neoclassical economic theory, the utility 
function of an individual is an expression of the behaviour of agents attempting to 
maximise their individual utility within a budget or set of resource constraints (353). The 
utility functions estimated express the behaviour of health care workers as the agents, 
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responding to a set of contextual interactions which includes the prevalence of the 
disease, the types of disease observed (the prevalence of extra-pulmonary TB), the 
behaviour of patients, a response to a set of institutional rules or norms (expressed as 
diagnostic and treatment guidelines) as well as a response to a set of resource constraints 
(116).  Given that this model expresses the average behaviour of a set of agents (a cohort) 
as opposed to the actions and outcomes of individuals, the dynamic utility function is an 
expression of the average behaviour of health care workers under a set of circumstances, 
with heterogeneity of behaviour expressed in the uncertainty estimates. 
 
We identified four primary interaction points where decisions are to be made by 
healthcare workers. These include the decision to start TB treatment after a positive TB 
test result (C). These decisions will also influence other interactions with patients, for 
example if more tests are ordered after an initial negative test result, a follow-on decision 
that will influence outcomes is whether TB treatment is started after follow-on tests (D). 
Similarly, where no further action was taken within a one-month period, patients would 
move to an out-of-care state with a probability of starting treatment from out-of-care (E).  
Each of the utility functions are also influenced by the prevalence of TB within the cohort. 
 
The decision after a negative initial TB test result is constructed as two interacting 
decisions, starting treatment without further evidence (PA) and ordering additional 
diagnostic tests (PB). These decision utility functions can be conceptualised as a function 
of patients returning to care for follow-up visits; the prevalence of symptoms after a 
negative test result and the sensitivity of the WHO symptom screen as implemented in 
health facilities; as well as an access variable used to explore how constraints in terms of 
access to TB treatment or to further diagnostic tests may influence the results of the study. 
 
  (3) 
 
Where PA is the probability of starting TB treatment after an initial negative test result and without further 
diagnostic tests; r is the probability that the patient will either return for a follow-up visit (demand-side) or 
will be followed up by health care workers including community health workers in the community (supply-
side); s is the diminishing probability of TB-associated symptoms at subsequent visits to the health facility 
(modelled as a Poisson regression); w represents the sensitivity of the WHO symptom screen tool when 
implemented at a routine facility; and ?A as an access variable. 
 
??=?? ? ???? ? ? ´ ???´ a ?
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This utility function assumes that this decision can only be taken at the next visit of the 
patient at a healthcare facility, that action can only be taken at the visit when the patient 
returns to the clinic for results. 
 
  (4) 
 
Where PB is the probability of ordering additional diagnostic tests thus initiating the negative pathway after 
an initial negative TB test; r is the probability that the patient will either return for a follow-up visit 
(demand-side) or will be followed up by health care workers including community health workers in the 
community (supply-side); s is the diminishing probability of TB-associated symptoms at subsequent visits 
to the health facility (modelled as a Poisson regression); w represents the sensitivity of the WHO symptom 
screen tool when implemented at a routine facility; and ?B as an access variable. Representing the 
proportion of facilities that will have access to chest x-rays. 
 
Each of the utility functions influences the proportion of the cohort in a specific state and 
thus influences upstream decisions, including the decision to start treatment from out of 
care and starting treatment after further tests following a negative TB test result.  
 
Where interactions are largely driven by the behaviour of healthcare workers in the 
system, there is some potential for incentivising the behaviour of agents to improve TB 
outcomes. The transaction costs analyses shown in Chapter 6 suggests that investing in 
incentivising these transactions is likely to be highly cost-effective. However, as was 
shown in the sensitivity analyses, many of these interactions are driven by the 
characteristics of TB and the limitation of sputum-based diagnostic modalities. These 






Economic evaluations based on extra-welfarist theory values health outcomes (often 
mortality outcomes). However, for health systems, an investment that improves processes 
within the health system may add greater value to related systems processes (159: 81). 
For example, investing in additional x-ray facilities will have a benefit in terms of a health 
outcome attached to improved TB services. However, the reorganisation of health 
services in order to implement the x-ray facility may strengthen processes in the health 
system, in ways that would also improve patient outcomes or reduce patient costs. 
?? =?? ? ???? ? ? ´ ???´ a ?
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Beyond the valuation of outcomes related to health or processes, time preference as used 
in economic evaluation may also unfairly weight investment options against health 
systems strengthening. When evaluating a clinical or public health investment, 
investment costs required to set to strengthen systems, may due to the nature of the 
disease only have an impact on epidemic control or disease outcomes at a time point 
beyond the evaluation period of the trial. 
 
A third challenge in conducting economic evaluation of health systems investments, is 
that within decentralised health systems, it is possible that some of the costs of 
implementing a system strengthening intervention would fall on another budget – with 
implication for considering optimisation of health outcomes against the healthcare budget 
(32).  
 
In this section, challenges and approaches to evaluating health systems investments in 
economic evaluations are outlined. These include: 
? Valuation of health or process 
? Time preference 
? Falls on different budgets, leading to difficulties in defining the threshold 
? Modelling complex interactions, by observing patterns and those changes the 




Univariate sensitivity analyses 
 
Univariate sensitivity analyses were conducted whereby every model parameter was varied by a factor of 10vii and the outcomes are presented in 
the Table below. The main drivers of the provider costs were the cost of treatment (particular MDR TB treatment), the cost of clinic visits as well 
as the costs of chest x-rays. If the proportion of the population that was HIV positive was higher – this was also a key factor in higher provider 
costs. Proportion of the cohort, HIV positive as well as the proportion of patients with hard-to-diagnose TB were also key drivers of the outcomes 
of the model. 
 
Table 15. Univariate sensitivity analysis, varying each variable in the model and recording change in effectiveness, provider – and societal costs.  
      Provider perspective (Base: 
$89.37) 
Societal perspective(Base:  
$168.80) 
Effectiveness (Base: 4.64 DALYs) 






















Provider cost of DS treatment, monthly 3 309 70 282 26% 150 362 3% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of MDR treatment, monthly 52 5168 73 251 18% 153 330 2% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of Xpert test 2 169 74 247 17% 153 326 2% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of a clinic visit 1 86 75 232 14% 155 311 2% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of a positive TB test result, HIV positive 0 1 76 178 6% 126 447 7% 4.27 7.05 5% 
Prob of a positive TB test result, HIV negative 0 1 81 178 5% 146 394 4% 4.62 4.89 0% 
Provider cost of chest x-ray 2 152 83 153 3% 162 233 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a chest x-ray after a negative test result 0 5 83 152 3% 163 232 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting MDR-TB treatment after a positive result, if HIV 
negative 
0 0 84 143 2% 161 246 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prob of starting MDR-TB treatment after a positive result, if HIV 
positive 
0 0 84 142 2% 162 242 0% 4.63 4.76 0% 
Provider cost of a LPA test 2 203 85 133 1% 164 213 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting MDR-TB treatment from out-of-care, if HIV 
positive on ART 
0 1 84 117 1% 162 209 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
                                            
vii The value of each parameter was multiplied by ten to get the input parameter for the high value; and divided by ten to get the input parameter for the low value. 
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Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a negative test result, if 
HIV positive 
0 7 87 115 0% 166 194 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting MDR-TB treatment after positive result, if HIV 
positive on ART 
0 0 89 115 0% 169 206 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for Rif resistance after a negative 
result 
0 1 87 108 0% 167 188 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of a hospital bed day 7 716 88 106 0% 167 185 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a negative test result, if 
HIV negative 
0 7 88 105 0% 167 184 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of a positive TB test result, HIV positive on ART 0 1 87 104 0% 156 247 1% 4.50 4.66 0% 
Prob of starting MDR-TB treatment from out-of-care, if HIV 
positive   
0 0 89 106 0% 169 192 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prop of cohort, HIV positive on ART 0 0 84 100 0% 158 193 0% 4.31 5.36 1% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
positive with TB 
0 1 76 91 0% 128 173 0% 4.54 5.81 1% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for INH resistance after a negative 
test result 
0 1 88 102 0% 168 181 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of a smear microscopy test, fluoro-microscopy 1 63 88 101 0% 168 181 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of a culture test 1 129 88 100 0% 168 180 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a smear microscopy test after a negative 
test result 
0 2 88 100 0% 168 179 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a negative test result, if 
HIV positive ART 
0 10 88 99 0% 168 179 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a positive test result, HIV 
positive 
0 2 89 99 0% 168 178 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a positive test result, HIV 
positive 
0 16 88 98 0% 168 178 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a culture test after negative test result 0 1 89 97 0% 168 177 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
negative with TB 
0 1 82 89 0% 149 168 0% 4.65 4.89 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a negative test result, HIV 
positive on ART 
0 1 89 95 0% 168 175 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting the negative pathway after a negative test result, 
HIV positive 
0 0 89 95 0% 168 174 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a negative test result, HIV 
positive   
0 0 89 94 0% 168 174 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for Rif resistance after a positive 
test result 
0 2 89 93 0% 168 173 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a second Xpert test as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 9 89 93 0% 168 173 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of TB from a positive test result, HIV positive 0 1 85 89 0% 165 169 0% 3.95 4.65 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for INH resistance as part of the 
negative pathway 
0 7 89 93 0% 168 172 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
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Prop of cohort who get a DST for Rif resistance as part of the 
negative pathway 
0 7 89 93 0% 168 172 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a positive test result, HIV 
negative 
0 2 89 93 0% 169 172 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a positive test result, HIV 
positive on ART 
0 2 89 92 0% 169 172 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised as part of the negative pathway, HIV 
positive 
0 2 89 92 0% 169 172 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
positive with TB 
0 1 87 89 0% 157 169 0% 4.63 5.03 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a culture test as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 7 89 92 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting treatment from the negative pathway, HIV 
positive no TB 
0 1 89 92 0% 169 179 0% 4.61 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a positive test result, HIV 
negative 
0 11 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Probablity of starting treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
positive 
0 0 89 91 0% 168 177 0% 4.62 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting the negative pathway after a negative test result, 
HIV positive ART 
0 1 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort, HIV positive 0 1 88 90 0% 157 176 0% 2.02 6.31 11% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for INH resistance after a positive 
test result 
0 1 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a smear microscopy test after a positive 
test result 
0 3 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic after a positive test result, HIV 
positive on ART 
0 11 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort starting MDR-TB treatment after negative test 
result, HIV positive 
0 0 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a chest x-ray as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 4 89 91 0% 169 171 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of an antibiotic trial 0 3 89 91 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised after a negative test result, HIV 
negative 
0 0 89 91 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get an antibiotic trial after a negative test 
result 
0 6 89 91 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort hospitalised as part of the negative pathway, HIV 
positive on ART 
0 2 89 91 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a chest x-ray after a positive test result 0 1 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
negative   
0 1 88 89 0% 166 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a second Xpert test after a positive test 
result 
0 1 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
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Prop of cohort who access a clinic as part of the negative 
pathway, HIV positive 
0 6 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting the negative pathway after a negative test result, 
HIV positive with TB 
0 0 89 90 0% 169 171 0% 4.60 4.65 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
positive with TB 
0 0 89 90 0% 168 172 0% 4.51 4.66 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a culture test after a positive test result 0 1 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a second Xpert test after a negative test 
result 
0 0 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Probabiility of hard-to-diagnose TB in those with a negative TB 
test result, HIV positive on ART 
0 1 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 4.43 6.74 3% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
positive   
0 1 89 89 0% 166 169 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prob of TB from a negative TB test result, HIV positive on ART 0 0 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 4.53 5.73 1% 
Prob of mortality from out of care, HIV positive on ART with TB 0 0 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 4.36 4.78 0% 
Prob of starting the negative pathway after a negative test result, 
HIV positive ART with TB 
0 1 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.63 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a clinic as part of the negative 
pathway, HIV positive on ART 
0 4 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a smear microscopy test as part of the 
negative pathway 
0 2 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of TB from a positive test result, HIV negative 0 1 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.60 4.65 0% 
Probabiility of hard-to-diagnose TB in those with a negative TB 
test result, HIV positive 
0 1 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 3.74 13.77 59% 
Prop of cohort who get a INH pheno test adter a negative test 
result 
0 0 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a RIF pheno test after a negative test result 0 0 89 90 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
positive on ART no TB 
0 0 89 90 0% 169 170 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a positive test result, HIV 
positive on ART 
0 1 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of TB from a negative TB test result, HIV positive   0 0 89 89 0% 168 169 0% 4.18 9.27 15% 
Prop of cohort who get an antibiotic trial after a positive test 
result 
0 4 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a INH pheno test as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a RIF pheno test as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment following the negative pathway, 
HIV positive on ART with TB 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.63 4.64 0% 
Prob of TB from a positive test result, HIV positive on ART 0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.60 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a INH pheno test after a positive test result 0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of mortality (all cause) if no TB, HIV positive on ART 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.68 0% 
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Prop of cohort who get an antibiotic trial as part of the negative 
pathway 
0 7 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of mortality (all cause) if no TB, HIV positive   0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.62 4.87 0% 
Prob of mortality with TB, HIV positive 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.63 4.65 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
positive on ART with TB 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of mortality with TB, HIV positive on ART 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a RIF pheno test after a positive test result 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of TB from a negative TB test result, HIV negative 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.60 5.09 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment following the negative pathway, 
HIV positive on ART no TB 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of mortality with TB, HIV negative  0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.68 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment following the negative pathway, 
HIV positive with TB 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.65 4.65 0% 
Prob of mortality (all cause) if no TB, HIV negative 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.65 0% 
Prob of mortality (all cause) if no TB, HIV positive on ART 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of mortality (all cause) if no TB, HIV positive  0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of anti-retroviral therapy, year one 9 940 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of anti-retroviral therapy, year two 5 524 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of a clinic visit 1 52 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of a hospital bed day 0 4 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of a hospital bed day, per night 0 4 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of a hospital visit, per visit 6 580 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost fof a visit to a private health facility, per visit 3 292 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of a clinic visit, per visit 0 29 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of nutritional supplements, per day 0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Disability weights, HIV positive on ART with no TB 0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.63 4.80 0% 
Disability weights, HIV positive on ART with TB 0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.63 4.75 0% 
Disability weights, HIV positive with no TB 0 2 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.42 6.90 4% 
Disability weights, HIV positive with TB 0 4 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.62 4.88 0% 
Disability weights, HIV negative with TB 0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.71 0% 
Prop of cohort on DS-TB treatment (continuation phase), monthly 0 10 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort on DS-TB treatment (intensive phase), monthly 0 40 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a follow-up Xpert test while on treatment 0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a DST for Rif resistance while on 
treatment 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a RIF pheno test 0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who get a smear microscopy test during TB 
treatment 
0 11 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private faclity after a negative test 
result, HIV negative 
0 10 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility after a negative test 
result, HIV positive 
0 2 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
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Prop of cohort who access a private facility after a negative test 
result, HIV positive on ART 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility as part of the negative 
pathway, HIV positive 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility as part of the negative 
pathway, HIV positive ART 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility after a positive test 
result, HIV negative 
0 2 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility after a positive test 
result, HIV positive 
0 1 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort who access a private facility after a positive test 
result, HIV positive on ART 
0 3 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort starting MDR-TB treatment after negative test 
result, HIV negative 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort starting MDR-TB treatment after a negative test 
result, HIV positive on ART 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prop of cohort starting MDR-TB after being out-of-care, HIV 
negative 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Provider cost of DS-TB treatment (time dependent function), 
monthly 
4 395 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of accessing DS-TB treatment, time dependent 
function 
16 1557 89 89 0% 125 1195 73% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of accessing MDR-TB treatment, time dependent 
function 
19 1881 89 89 0% 164 229 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of illness, while on DS-TB treatment, time dependent 
function 
4 409 89 89 0% 156 436 5% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Patient cost of illness, while on MDR-TB treatment, time 
dependent function 
3 329 89 89 0% 166 177 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
negative no TB 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Prob of starting TB treatment after a negative test result, HIV 
negative with TB 
0 0 89 89 0% 169 169 0% 4.64 4.64 0% 
Discount rate 0 0 88 90 0% 165 171 0% 4.40 4.76 0% 
In the Table, prop refers to the proportion of the population, while prob is the probability of an event occuring. 





The overarching aim of the thesis was to use an empirical example to explore ways of 
extending the evaluative space of economic evaluation to improve its application to local-
level policy development, by exploring how the behaviour of healthcare workers may be 
analysed within the framework of a cost-effectiveness analysis. The example of 
investments supporting the TB diagnostic algorithm in South Africa was used. This 
allows us to identify possible policy leverage points, by exploring the proportion of 
additional benefit achievable through investment. The study aimed to understand these 
dynamics by evaluating the cost-effectiveness of health systems investments to 
strengthen the TB diagnostic pathway in South Africa. The work was conceptualised 
based on the first evaluation of Xpert MTB/RIF (a new TB diagnostic) in South Africa, 
which found that the test was not effective and cost neutral when implemented in routine 
care settings.   
 
In this thesis, I set out to meet the following objectives, to: 
 
1. Develop a conceptual framework, describing the TB diagnostic related interactions, 
between healthcare workers and the system within which they work; 
2. Estimate the economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment in South Africa; 
3. Develop a mathematical model representing the TB diagnostic pathway in South 
Africa, with an emphasis on the decision points of healthcare workers;  
4. Determine the cost-effectiveness (from a societal perspective) of complementary 
investments to support the implementation of new TB diagnostic tests in South 
Africa; and to 
5. Propose and reflect on approaches for modelling how healthcare workers’ behaviour 
in response to the resources available to them will alter the value of the 
implementation of new TB diagnostic technologies.  
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In the remainder of this chapter, the main findings of each of the objectives will be 
discussed individually. This will be followed by a reflection on the contributions made 
by the work presented in this thesis and in the last section, the limitations, policy 
implications and future research will be discussed.  
 
 
8.2 Main findings, strengths and limitations 
 
In this section, the main findings are discussed, with reference to the study objectives as 
well as the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3. The framework from Chapter 
3 is reproduced here in Figure 28,  showing the relationships between the objectives of 
the thesis. Each of sub-sections includes a discussion outlining the strengths and 
limitations of the analysis pertaining to the relevant section of the work as well as a 
reflection of alternative analytical approaches. The chapter is concluded with a section 
on the contributions of the thesis and recommendations for future work, followed by the 
conclusions drawn from the work presented. 
 
8.2.1 The economic burden of TB diagnosis and treatment 
 
This section relates to Objective 2 of the thesis and was addressed in Chapter 5. The 
analysis presents the results of a longitudinal patient cost study and was used in the 
parameterisation of the mathematical model presented in Chapter 4. The policy value of 
empirical patient cost studies, is that they are a tool that can be used to aid decision 
making when comparing disease priorities for investment. Importantly, it provides an 
opportunity for determining the appropriate levels of support services that are needed, as 
well as for monitoring whether patients are able to access the services that they need 
(104). Tuberculosis is the archetypical poverty-related disease, with the poorest 40% of 
the South African population bearing 65% of the disease burden (5). TB patient cost 
studies therefore have an important contribution to make in designing poverty-sensitive 
policies for TB control. However, the relationship between TB and poverty also raises 
important methodological challenges that need to be taken into account to provide 
meaningful advice to policy makers but are often overlooked. The results of the work that 
forms part of this thesis, are contextualised in relation to the way in which the field has 
moved forward since publication, while also identifying remaining gaps for further 
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research. In the last part of this section, some of the methodological challenges in 




The economic burden of a disease is an expression of the transport costs as well as any 
service fees (out-of-pocket costs) incurred by individuals when accessing care. It also 
includes the opportunity cost of the time spent by individuals when attending health 
services. Given that public primary health care is provided free of charge at the point of 
service in South Africa, the primary driver of out-of-pocket and time costs, is the number 
of healthcare visits needed to be made by a patient in seeking care for a specific disease. 
The number of visits is determined by the organisation of health services as well as well 
as by the implementation of guidelines (see Figure 7). In some settings, how services 
were organised, significantly contributed to the cost burden on patients, especially where 
there were multiple visits if HIV positive with TB (355). The theory related to the 
valuation of time is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In addition to the out-of-pocket and 
time costs, the cost of nutritional supplements as well as the costs incurred by caregivers 
or the cost of someone to take over job-related tasks are added to quantify the economic 
burden on the household. The work presented in Chapter 5 highlights the importance of 
income loss in fuelling the medical poverty trap experienced by patients and their 
households. An important finding from the study, was the discrepancy between when 
patients were experiencing the greatest income loss, in the period before starting 
treatment, and when they were able to access cash transfers which was during the 
continuation phase of treatment.  
 
In South Africa, several TB patient cost studies have been conducted, with the exception 
of the study reported in Chapter 5, the majority of the studies had been cross-sectional, 
interviewing individual patients at a single point in time (257,289,355–357). It is notable, 
that with the exception of one study (257), the studies largely focused on drug-sensitive 
TB treatment. The estimate monthly out-of-pocket costs incurred by patients ranged 
between $7.06 and $21.72, with $56.00 per month if patients had drug-resistant 
Tuberculosis.  Our study found that the greatest cost burden was during the diagnostic 
phase. The time taken to access care was reported as high across studies, with the indirect 
costs (or opportunity costs of time) accounting for between 55% and 86% of total 
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participant costs (355). Across the studies the average monthly income of patients 
interviewed was very low, ranging between $76.05 and $150.00. Up to a third of patients 
reported no income, with an additional 12% reporting government grants as their primary 
source of income. Large income losses of between 50% and 86% of reported income as 
a results of TB illness and care seeking. In our study, we surprisingly did not see the 
expected increases in productive income in the continuation phase of treatment as had 
been shown in other settings (355,356).  
 
Opportunity cost of time and measures of catastrophic costs 
 
Verguet et al. 2017. showed that investment in expanding access to TB care and 
improvement in treatment, could potentially reduce the number of households 
experiencing catastrophic costs by 5%, 18% and 18% among the poorest households 
(358). The notion of catastrophic costs has been conceptualised as a threshold of costs 
over income. But these thresholds have been found to be highly context specific, differing 
substantially between households (359). Goudge et al. 2009. argued that for some 
households, costs contributing as little as 4% of income will be catastrophic while for 
others, 30% will not be enough to drive the household into poverty (200).  Whether 
households will be driven into the medical poverty trap is dependent on what the other 
stressors on households are and mediated by their ability to rally resources. Households 
may respond by for example reducing consumption, changing nutrition by buying less 
meat for example, or by selling assets (289). Across the studies, poor access to the South 
African cash transfer (the disability grant) were reported with only between 0% and 5% 
of respondents accessing grants. Ramma et al. found that only 16% of patients with drug-
resistant TB patients accessed grants during the intensive phase of treatment as opposed 
to 46% during the continuation phase, with none during hospitalisation (257). Not all of 
the studies included the costs of caregiving, but where they did, significant amounts of 
caregiving were reported. A challenge related to including this cost, and one of the 
implications of poverty, is in how we value time spent in monetary terms. From the 
perspective of the State, valuing a caregiver’s time based on their income prior to taking 
over as caregiver may underestimate the potential value of their time or fully value their 
potential income had they not left formal employment to care for an ill family member. 
However, if the person has not been employed prior to caregiving (and within the context 
of large-scale unemployment in the country), their time may not be valued, and no 
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opportunity cost may be attached to shifting care work onto available “free” labour. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that informal caregiving negatively impacts the wellbeing 
of the caregiver. Currently, while the evidence on the impact of informal caregiving on 
the productivity – and wellbeing loss of informal caregivers has been studied in 
developed countries and is sometimes included in decision-making (162,360), there is a 
paucity of such work in low-and-middle income country (LMIC) settings. It is possible 
that the burden on the wellbeing of resource constrained households would be even more 
pronounced and could further deepen the medical-poverty trap.  
 
8.2.2 Cost-effectiveness of investments to support TB diagnosis 
 
This section relates to Objectives 1, 3 and 4 of the thesis. The conceptual framework for 
the model is shown in Chapter 4, as well as the methodology used in the development of 
the model. Chapter 6 presents the results of the cost-effectiveness analyses, followed by 
additional analyses to identify policy levers in Chapter 7.  
 
The investment in and the implementation of XPert MTB/RIF into routine care settings 
has been widely discussed and analysed (79,221,235,310,361,362). Many countries 
conducted implementation studies following the roll-out of Xpert, and this has provided 
a rich field for studying TB diagnostic capacity and treatment initiation in countries. It is 
an interesting case study as raises important points about how guidelines are developed 
and implemented globally (135). In addition, given the number of cost-effectiveness 
analyses concluding that implementation in high-TB burden countries would be cost-
effective, the results of the analyses based on routine care data finding that, in South 
Africa, it is likely to be cost neutral – highlights important cautionary points in our current 
use of economic evaluation at a global level for making implementation decisions. South 
Africa adopted Xpert as a test following international recommendations, and while the 
evidence does not suggest that the investment was not appropriate, it is a good case study 
for highlighting the importance of the configuration of the health system in assessing the 
value of a test and where to invest in the future. A question that may be asked following 
the results of the within-trial -and the model analyses presented here, is whether it is more 
cost-effective to invest in interventions that would strengthen the system around a new 
technology or to invest in a novel test?  So, for example, as new TB diagnostic tests are 
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now entering the development pipeline, should South Africa invest in these tests or rather 
strengthen systems around the currently implemented tests? The results of the analysis 
presented in this thesis, suggests that investment to support current technology may be 
highly cost-effective with up to $100 that could be spent per person per interaction with 
the health system without exceeding even very conservative cost-effectiveness 
thresholds. It is important that these investments be considered alongside new 
technologies during priority setting. 
 
The work also highlights the importance of identifying policy leverage points along the 
pathway and then structuring interventions based on whether those leverage points would 
be amenable to further investment or would need large scale reforms to the system.  
 
 
Figure 28. Theoretical framework of the thesis reproduced from Chapter 3. 
 
8.2.3 Approaches to incorporate health systems in cost-effectiveness analysis 
 
In this thesis, the impact of the behaviour of health care workers on the value of the TB 
diagnostic algorithm is investigated in three ways, by:  
? using data from a pragmatic randomised control trial to describe how patients move 
through the patient care pathway in routine care, as well as the associated costs 
incurred; 
? developing a conceptual framework based on available literature of the behavioural 
drivers of decision making related to diagnostics; and  
? exploring how different elements in that decision may influence the value of the 
diagnostic algorithm.  
 
On the relationship between the resources and the outcomes, there was large variation 
between the clinical guidelines and how these were implemented in public health 
facilities. Where we estimated how the transaction cost incurred during an interaction 
between a healthcare worker and a patient would shift the prioritisation of certain 
investments over others, we saw that large transaction costs were required (up to $100 
per person) to shift the curve with negative pathway investment as initiating ART having 
a reduced probability of being the optimal investment. In considering how the ability of 
healthcare workers to correctly identify those who should be prioritised for further 
examination after a negative test result, impact on the outcomes at a cohort level, we 
found that each decision in that chain was important to improve outcomes.  In considering 
how the ability of healthcare workers to correctly identify those who should be prioritised 
for further examination after a negative test result, impacts on the outcomes at a cohort 
level, we found that each decision in that chain was important to improve outcomes. So, 
for example, health care workers being more likely to identify someone correctly for 
further test would increase the cost of the algorithm but would not lead to population 
level improvement unless in the next interactions with healthcare workers, the patient 
was also started on treatment. 
 
Similarly to what Abimbola found in a study of TB diagnosis in Nigeria, any additional 
study visits required, did not only increase the cost to patients of accessing services but 
also prolonged productivity loss (104). Understanding what impact these interventions 
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would have on patient cost though is more complex than presented in the framework. In 
the patient cost study, it was found that patients would not only lose their own income 
but would also rely heavily on their social networks to assist in informal lending. The 
current version of the framework focuses on the interactions with the health system but 
could have extended to include the interactions related to other social services received 
(including the disability grant). Within the economic evaluation literature, however, there 
is an active debate related to how best to evaluate investments where the costs and effects 
fall outside of the health system but are crucial in the production of health (32). 
 
Another area of important developments as this thesis was being written is the area of 
debate on how best to estimate the opportunity cost of competing investments 
(24,363,364). Some have argued that the marginal productivity of the health system 
should be estimated, while others have seen the threshold as a “willingness-to-pay” 
concept whereby a value is attached to (either historically or negotiated) an improvement 
of wellbeing. While these recommendations are sensible where economic evaluation is 
being used as part of a health technology assessment (HTA) process, evaluating more 
complex investments in health systems raises additional challenges. These include, how 
to consider the decisions of different payers or funders who are optimising against 
different budget constraints. During the evaluation, the challenge of conceptualising the 
causal relationship between investment in health systems and health outcomes. Some 
have therefore argued for the importance of not only considering the impact of 
investments on health outcomes, but also on strengthening processes in the system (365). 
Using the example of TB diagnosis, one would therefore not only be interested in the cost 
per death averted or cost per DALY averted, but would also consider the cost per patient 
diagnosed or the cost per patient correctly started on treatment.  
 
8.2.4 The mathematical modelling framework 
 
A strength of the economic work is that it was conducted alongside a pragmatic cluster 
randomised control trial, during the second phase of the national roll-out of the 
technology platform, into the existing national laboratory service. This allowed for the 
training of human resources and lessons from phase one to first permeate the system 
before the formal evaluation was conducted (366). The infrastructure of the trial was used 
to collect and analyse economic data. The value of conducting the study alongside a 
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pragmatic trial was that it captured the clinical decision-making of health care workers, 
as they were providing routine services. The trial also allowed us to increase the sample 
size of the patient cost study.  However, the design of the trial constrained the interview 
interval and some of causal pathways between trial outcomes, and the outcomes used to 
estimate cost-utility were not included in the investigation. Additional model calibration 
and validation procedures were conducted to refine these causal pathways. A particular 
strength of this trial was the low trial loss-to-follow-up and thus missing data, as well as 
the methodical process to collect data on the clinical outcomes of each and every 
participant (12).  
 
Despite the sample we were able to enrol, estimating conditional probabilities for such 
detailed processes for the same people over time, meant that the sample size for 
observations of end processes was sometimes small and categories had to be collapsed, 
possibly losing some detail in the analysis. Given the pragmatic nature of the trial design 
and the trial end-point, 6 months after first diagnostic test, it was not possible to interview 
the same set of patients from diagnosis through to the end of treatment. In addition, the 
trial was sampling patients identified with probable TB, the trial had a TB prevalence of 
approximately 6%, thus under sampling from those who truly had TB. A longitudinal 
patient cohort was constructed by interviewing one cohort at the time of sputum 
collection and again at their 6-months visits. The second cohort was sampled from the 
same health facilities at the point of transitioning from the intensive to the continuation 
phase (2 months) of TB treatment, with a follow up interview conducted at the end of the 
treatment (5 months). In constructing the cohort for the patient cost analysis, we made a 
simplifying assumption by assuming that the patients in the TB treatment cohort was the 
same as those in the presumptive TB cohort started on treatment at the same facilities. 
Given our sample size, we were not therefore able to comprehensively explore patient-
level heterogeneity in more detail. 
 
While the modelling framework used has many important strengths, it was possibly less 
flexible than might have been possible if coded in a different platform to facilitate 
integration of a Bayesian resampling approach to estimate the unknown parameters, and 
the uncertainty around them. The challenge with more complex economic models is to 
bring the precision needed for the economic outputs – especially in terms of predicting 
specific resource needs into the future, and uncertainty estimates around decisions against 
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a structure that allows for modelling the dynamic interactions of people moving into and 
out of care (367). This is likely to particularly affect the uncertainty estimates in the 
results presented – possibly overestimating the uncertainty in this decision. 
 
 
8.3 Contributions of this thesis 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge empirically and 
methodologically. The empirical contributions include one of the few patient cost studies 
to follow TB patients over time, therefore quantifying how patient income changes 
through different phases of TB diagnosis and treatment. The model analysis further 
shows that investing in health systems to support the implementation of new TB 
diagnostic is highly cost-effective when compared against other recent investments made 
in the health system. 
 
The methodological contribution of the thesis relates to exploring an approach for 
expressing mechanisms interacting between macro- and micro-level interactions relating 
to patients’ pathways through care. It does this by conceptualising the causal pathway 
between health systems strengthening and patient health outcomes. This 
conceptualisation was then used to model agent-behaviour in a state-transition model for 
decision making. Utility functions were constructed, to explore how behaviour may 
amend the value of an investment, using a combination of three approaches; 
 
? empirically from the data on cost, resource use and health outcomes collected during 
a pragmatic cluster randomised control trial;  
? calibration of modelled estimates to pragmatic data; and  
? development of a conceptual framework based on the available literature representing 
interactions as well as theory. 
 
Furthermore, this study builds on previous cost-effectiveness work of TB diagnosis, by 
estimating the cost-effectiveness of supportive health systems investments to support TB 
diagnosis in South Africa. 
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8.4 Recommendations for future work 
 
Mathematical models have the potential to make valuable contributions to the study of 
the impact of health systems strengthening investments on the value of clinical 
guidelines. This work shows an approach to studying these effects and raised some 
interesting areas for further study.   
 
The work presented here, highlighted the discrepancies between where patients incur the 
greatest economic burden if they have TB, and where further financial support is provided 
by the State. One of the policy outcomes of the work was a commitment by the SASSA 
(South African Social Security Agency) grants agency to consider ways of closing this 
gap, by getting the grant to those who need it earlier during treatment. However, the grant 
is limited in its ability to intervene in the TB poverty spiral, as it is designed and only 
available to those who are unable to work due to a disabling illness (very narrowly 
defined) – not all patients with TB will be eligible. It is still a relatively small proportion 
of patients with TB, who are accessing the grant (less than 10%). There is a need for 
further research to develop TB-sensitive cash transfers as these patients represent the 
most vulnerable in the population. Beyond, TB sensitive cash transfers, our work 
suggested that ill health could possibly also place an additional burden on the social 
networks of TB patients. Terreblanche (1977) first described what he called “chronic 
community poverty”, as a phenomenon whereby ill health, poverty and the dynamics of 
violence reinforces each other in communities (368). There may be potential in 
investigating how, and whether TB can act as an indicator and potential catalyst for 
community poverty, through the depletion of social networks used to support and care 
for those who are ill. There is a need to use such work to identify policy levers that may 
be used and tested in the design of broad based pro-poor policy (going beyond cash 
transfers), which may make a more meaningful contribution to TB control. 
 
Health care worker behaviour in response to the implementation of interventions, could 
be modelled in more nuanced ways. In this model, interactions of components of the 
drivers of behaviour was considered, but as a next step it would be valuable to go beyond 
merely identifying policy levers; by modelling incentive structures and investments to 
amend the behaviour of healthcare workers along the diagnostic pathway.  
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In terms of methods of evidence synthesis,  this work may also be expanded by using 
participatory approaches for developing the conceptual framework, for example by using 
processes for developing theories of change for interventions (369).  
 
Finally, there is a gap for future work to define and empirically test the causal pathways 
between health systems strengthening and disease outcomes (370). In terms of model 
implementation, the challenge is how to model multiple interacting mechanisms that 
approximate interactions, emergence and adaption of investments in a way that allows 
for an understanding of the results. This is analogous to the challenges faced in multi-





TB diagnosis is a core pillar of the TB control strategy in high-burden countries, including 
South Africa. The study suggests that with the current diagnostic algorithm, investing in 
health systems strengthening approaches to support the use of TB diagnostics would be 
highly cost-effective. However, early diagnosis and treatment initiation may not reduce 
the poverty impact of TB since patients experience the greatest economic burden during 
the period of the start of TB-associated symptoms and in this study, patients did not regain 
income once started on treatment. Beyond TB sensitive cash transfers, comprehensive 
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